Let the generals fight this war, give them what they need. They know how to win. Keep politicians from turning this into another Vietnam or Somalia.

This works. They were directing the fight from native Afghan's against the Taliban et al, before 9/11 and it was going to continue whether or not 9/11 happened.

Mis Allocation of resources and the beginning of an additional conflict changed the Strategy in Afghanistan.

How do the Taliban communicate? Are they all just independent groups that fight on alone, or do they work together in some small way? Do the Taliban trust each other, even the ones that know each other?
The Rhodesians had a little game they played. Put some small goups together that can fake being Taliban. Use Afghans to set up fake Taliban. Coordinate with each group and network against the leaders of the enemy. Not a total encompassing operation, just enough to create some distrust and competition against each other. Each tribe against the other, each village against the other, each minority against each other.
Selous Scouts.
If Johnny Walker Lind and Lawrence of Arabia could do it why can't we?
I hear that Osama was paid off by us a long time ago, we just pull him out once a year to stir up some interesting communication intercepts. Any other interesting ideas?
Semper Fidelis,
Tipy

http://www.cfr.org/publication/19330/winning_the_information_war_in_afghanistan_and_pakistan.html#p2


http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/Strat_Com/goldman_Plenary.pdf
We do, but depends on policy and strategy.



This sounds like a mix of conspiracy and truth. Depends on the time line and reference.

Our relationship with him is well documented, it's a lot of reading.

Matthew Hoh, the former Marine Capt. who resigned Over U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan is on GPS today at 2:00 PM PST.

Unfortunately it's CNN, but he brings up some things that aren't usually discussed in the media, reguardless if you agree with his personal opinion or not.

http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/fareed.zakaria.gps/

He was convincing, IMO.

Here is another point of view.



http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2291

Fredo. Thanks for the link.


Perhaps I should have said something more about TIMING regarding Hoh's letter and subsequent interviews.

To what end, I ask? These Marines are both saying the same thing about the big picture. What results can you find if you don't know the question?

There is a lot of money to be made though...

An educated and perceptive soldier in the field can see solutions that the general in the bunker cannot. But if the Karzai government is corrupt and the insurgency grows because of that. All the whitewashing of a bond between rural Afghanistan and it's army/government will be just that.

Nato troops cannot bring about a "shotgun wedding" between the people of Afghanistan and a army/government that neither serves nor protects.

Don't want to leave the Army unrepresented.

Maj. Jim Gant's paper "One Tribe At A Time"

This is 45 pages.

http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf

Link to blog with responses to anticipated criticism.
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/

All in ASAP. If we pulled out,the troops who perished would be all for nothing.The politicians have to stop half assing the war and get it over with by totally kicking the crap out of the enemy ala WWII style. I'm no rocket scientist but I have a funny feeling that isnt going to happen.

With due respect to those who and served and fallen, I believe we are in a no win situation. We have no alternative that is palatable to anyone. We cannot bomb them into the stone age because they are already there, we cannot change there hearts and minds because of their cultural and religious orientations that are medieval, arcane and frankly irreconcilable with Western morays. We cannot wage the type of scorched earth war that many advocate, even if we could wage a war of attrition, I believe that the remnants of the country would gravitate back to the fractionated fiefdoms and religious fundamentalism that is the root of their problems. Regardless of troop increases or staying the course, we will continue to lose more precious lives and resources then it is worth. One day in future we will abandon this folly, I would say cut our losses now and focus on stabilizing and containing Pakistan.

Let loose the dogs of war and go WT Sherman on them. "War Is Hell"

I think we should do the same in the war on crime, and the drug war, the Pepsi-Coke war, March Madness (it's going to be war, baby...) since surely people can be brought to their senses and sit down and agree to an unconditional surrender, which, of course, would bring some things to an end...

"What do we learn Palmer?"

ahh, Burn After Reading quotes...priceless.
---

The following is written by a retired CSM who is now working the issue on the civilian side.

---
15 August 2009

Mehtar Lam, Laghman Province, Afghanistan -- AAR Notes: I'm sure I built this thesis on several false pretenses, but this is my After Action Review on the two-week training mission we just completed in Laghman Province. It builds on an already matured and developed opinion of the Afghan National Army.

The typical Afghan officer views his military employment as a paycheck instead of a profession and lacks all the competencies expected of a senior staff officer. To further those shortfalls, we are spending more time building relationships than capability. The most disconcerting part about the OCC-P staff is the extent of apathy rampant among them, as evidenced by their halfhearted work ethic. They were still asleep outdoors when we arrived each morning, and rose only in time for breakfast. They changed out of uniform every time the temperature rose above 85 degrees, spending the bulk of the day disrobed and very unproductive. If it wasn’t for mealtime protocols, they would’ve had no structure or organization at all.

The local Task Force has placed minimum expectations on the OCC-P, focusing on personnel and assets instead of performance. They have manned and equipped the force, but failed to train and employ them as coalition partners. The select, educate, and utilize pillars are grossly neglected, and yet they are surprised when the OCC partnership fails to integrate assets or meet expectations. We’ve set the bar pretty low and still failed to meet it.

The local commander has the ability to demand performance. He wields the coercive, reward, legitimate, and expert power to create dynamic improvements, but lacks the referent power and command presence to exercise these assets. He doesn’t recognize positive performance, demote or fire non performers, promote success, empower the OCC, or coach, teach, and mentor the staff. The OIC is sliced from a tenant unit on the FOB and isn’t supported by the Task Force outside of logistical assets. He isn’t included in targeting meetings or the development of operational plans and his insight is discarded without consideration. The TOC is unresponsive to SIGACTS and SITREPS and continually misses opportunities to integrate Afghan resources and build confidence in coalition capacity.

The OCC-P commander is BG Ghazimer, an artillery officer from previous regimes. Although equal to the task in military education and training, he is grossly lacking in the developed leadership attributes and experience typical of an armor or infantry commander. Throughout his career, combat commanders have told him where to go, which direction to orient his fires, and precisely when to shoot. Even his task, purpose, and concept were provided by another officer, someone who could visualize, describe, and direct the employment of forces. In this case, BG Ghazimer doesn’t provide direction or inspire initiative. He cannot create the inertia for action at any level, and he is only marginally productive with direct input from US or outside influences, and only then when within arms reach of the influence.

Instead of manning three complete eight-hour shifts with a full compliment of staff officers as outlined in their SOP, this command allots what amounts to a fireguard while the rest malinger in mass during the day shift and sleep through the night. The integrity of the night or afternoon watch is grossly understaffed, with no PIR or wake-up criteria, and no demands for monitoring radio traffic. Shift-change briefings are non-existent and teaching the format is an exercise in futility.

They can and sometimes do demonstrate moments of competence and an individual sense of ownership toward this OCC-P facility, but it is certainly an anomaly when it occurs. The NDS representatives and select ANP officers have slightly more adherence toward the OCC’s fundamental purpose and link to the National Defense Strategy, but again they are consumed by the apathy of the predominant ANA staff officers.

Although Afghans are an amicable and appreciative people, the ANSF officers do not possess the strength of character to defend themselves or their country. They are not courageous or indignant enough to defend their values, embrace nationalism, or patriotic enough to demonstrate the loyalty seen in other effective military organizations. At best, they will always be a people of puppets, readily subordinating themselves to any willing adversary or paying benefactor.

The US has created a welfare state within the Afghan National Army by giving them everything on a platter. Instead of a committed and competent coalition partner, we have an enormously pitiful covey of wet baby birds screeching for their next half-digested handout. I can’t begin to fathom how to correct the course of this disastrous program, but between now and Election Day it won’t be possible. The ANP and NDS alone may win the day for Afghanistan, leaving yet another bedsore in the prestige and esprit of the ANA, this one surely to fester for another four years.

Insurgents in the region maintain freedom of maneuver, creating havoc at will on the Afghan people while competent National Defense Policy goes unheeded by the very forces committed to security. Whereas the election provides an opportunity to demonstrate to the free world the resilience of the Afghan people and the resolve of the ANSF to secure their liberties and way of life, the apathy of the mid-level leadership will surely undermine coalition support and the political base worldwide to continue on the current path.

It is unthinkable that people wouldn’t embrace an opportunity of this magnitude, yet the willingness to stand idle while insurgents molest their motherland and infest their villages underscores the very lethargic nature and ineptitude of the Afghan defense forces and their unduly appointed leadership within. Instead of ensuring a stable environment for citizens and instilling the confidence to prosper and raise a family under a trusted and representative government with the security to worship in accordance with their faith, they fumble with inane reports and internal hierarchies that produce absolutely no level of security.

It will take an exceptional leader with a strong following of stout subordinate commanders to inculcate a warrior ethos into this force, and don’t expect it to happen any time soon with the rampant corruption and blatant self-serving leadership commanding at all levels of ANSF and the central government.

The essence of successful mentorship pivots on the values rooted in the Afghan Soldiers’ heart. If they embrace the sovereignty of Afghanistan, embody a Warrior-type Ethos, believe in their Service’s purpose, understand that they are a vital part of a team and value their place in it, then they will readily learn the requisite skills and attributes of the Profession of Arms and the specific knowledge requirements of their duty position, thereby becoming a vital instrument in the security of their people and defense of their homeland.

Individual values are first and foremost in the hierarchical attributes of effective leadership. Individual values, beliefs, and character precede technical and tactical knowledge, knowledge of self, and knowledge of human behavior. They are definitive precursors to providing purpose, motivation, and direction. Duty, honor, country. After that, everything else is academic.

The coalition emphasis must be placed on their values before any other form of leadership instruction can be of significance or importance. For if they don’t truly care about the national interest, strong central governance, and defeating a heartless insurgency to the extent of subordinating their own personal welfare to the cause at hand, they will not be able to provide or deliver the leadership and direction necessary for success.

Without that, the bulk of the US Army CSTC-A, MPRI, and ETT expertise is wasted on a corrupt or self-serving conglomerate of underdeveloped individuals. Such is not an Army for a nation-state but an imbalanced welfare state for an otherwise incorrigible caste system wrought with prejudice, self-preservation, corruption, and communal immorality.

The question then is how do we educate them on the absolute imperative for strong personal values, and then how do we instill a proper value system into the hearts and minds of all key leaders from corporal through general. We must re-focus our efforts to properly address who they are, what they believe in, and how their strength of character has to demonstrate those essential core values in everything they do. Ten years of Soviet rule and eight years of Taliban dominance have starved Afghans of their dignity and their identity. We must replace the lessons learned during their former military years with values and ethics centered on a collective morality central to the prosperity of the Nation. Where we grew up reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, listening to the National Anthem, honoring our veterans and fallen heroes, we often forget how deeply seated our values are.

When we figure out how to address and mentor their values, then and only then will we be able to steer them forward toward competent and honorable military service to their country.


SGM Curtis L. Regan
MPRI, Kabul Afghanistan

Cavscout, that was one great post. Thanks.

This is the key: "Although Afghans are an amicable and appreciative people, the ANSF officers do not possess the strength of character to defend themselves or their country. They are not courageous or indignant enough to defend their values, embrace nationalism, or patriotic enough to demonstrate the loyalty seen in other effective military organizations. At best, they will always be a people of puppets, readily subordinating themselves to any willing adversary or paying benefactor."

If they are not able to stand up and fight for ANYTHING, what the hell are we doing over there?

I read commentary about honoring the memory of the fallen. I would suggest we ask ourselves what they would say, knowing what they now know.

Here is a similar opinion of embedding small numbers on a tribe by tribe basis.

November 4, 2009, 5:04 pm
Going Tribal in Afghanistan
By James Dao
Chris Hondros/Getty Images Afghan Pashtun tribal elders in the village of Hazi Madad in Afghanistan’s Kandahar Province.

In Washington, the debate over Afghanistan seems to center around two broad ideas: counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism. Should the United States add troops for a more population-centric strategy, as Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal advocates? Or should it use a less ground-heavy approach, disrupting Al Qaeda with Special Operation Forces and unmanned drones, as Vice President Joseph Biden argues?

There is, of course, no shortage of other ideas, many of them afloat in the blogosphere. Among the more provocative ones has been posted on Steven Pressfield’s blog, It’s the Tribes, Stupid, and it comes from an Army Special Forces major who has spent much time in both Afghanistan and Iraq training indigenous fighters.

The 45-page paper, “One Tribe at a Time” by Maj. Jim Gant, argues that one way to undermine the insurgency is to return, in part, to the strategy that ousted the Taliban to begin with: Embed small, highly skilled and almost completely autonomous units with tribes across Afghanistan.

Much like the Green Berets who worked with the Northern Alliance to drive out the Taliban in 2001 and 2002, the units, which Major Gant calls Tribal Engagement Teams, would wear Afghan garb and live in Afghan villages for extended periods, training, equipping and fighting alongside tribal militias.

The goal would be to encourage what Major Gant sees as a natural antipathy between many tribes toward some of the more ideological, anti-American segments of the insurgency. Just as the Sunni tribesmen dubbed the Sons of Iraq turned against foreign al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq, Major Gant argues that Tribal Engagement Teams can counter al-Qaeda networks in Afghanistan by creating or strengthening indigenous fighting forces built upon local militias.

That kind of strategy has been discussed in Afghanistan, where critics argue that it would undermine the central government in Kabul and encourage warlordism. But as evidence that it can work, Major Gant cites his own experience as a Special Forces team leader who worked closely with a Pashtun tribe in Konar Province in 2003.

After gradually building the trust of village elders, including by supplying them with weapons, Major Gant said his team started receiving excellent intelligence on locally active insurgents, particularly the militant Islamist party of warlord Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Hizb-i Islami Gulbaddin.

Expanding the strategy to other tribes along the mountainous borderland would help stem the free flow of fighters and supplies from Pakistan into Afghanistan, Major Gant argues. But it would require not just recruiting and training engagement teams, but also giving them free rein to fight and die alongside Afghan militias.

“The risk averse nature of our current method of operating would have to change,” he writes. “American soldiers would die. Some of them alone, with no support.”

Major Gant acknowledges that not every tribe would welcome American units, no matter how small. He also acknowledges that Afghan distrust of Americans may have grown significantly since 2003. But that can change when small units start embedding in villages, he asserts.

“This is what the tribes want: a commitment,” he said in an e-mail message. “Some skin, some blood, some risk.”

Given the conservative nature of the American military, Major Gant’s ideas would be something of a culture shock. It is also hard to see precisely how the tribal engagement approach work with the counterinsurgency strategy championed by General McChrystal, which emphasizes building the central government over bolstering local tribes, many of which look on Kabul with suspicion.

Major Gant says he will explain in a future paper how tribal engagement is “counterinsurgency at its best.” He also makes an alluring argument for opponents of General McChrystal’s troop-heavy approach: his “light footprint approach,” he writes, “will not only work, but will help to ease the need for larger and larger numbers of U.S. soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan.

Major Gant, who had wanted to return to Afghanistan but is instead heading back to Iraq, where he won a Silver Star, is taking questions on Mr. Pressfield’s blog. It’s not clear whether General McChrystal or Vice President Biden have read the paper. But there’s plenty of dialogue on the Web, including here and here.

http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/going-tribal-in-afghanistan/

What the tribes want is not the point. What is more to the point is what would be reasonable to expect our young soldiers to do.

War is the consequence of failed diplomacy. Soldiering is what gets done in the shadow of that failed diplomacy.

When diplomacy is the task, the soldier is not the desired agent of that diplomacy. Asking him to do this is simply passing the buck. Not a reasonable part of his job description.

If diplomats can't do their jobs without military support, then diplomacy is premature. First you pacify, then you bring in the diplomats.

This bullsh*t about employing soldiers as diplomats is no more responsible than using cops for family counselling.

The jobs' reasonable limitations allows no such overlap.

Pampering tribal overlords and bending the rules of war to suit their volatile and superstitions sensibilities is simply an exercise in utter elitist stupidity.

Clearly define for them the limits of acceptable behavior. Eliminate the slow learners in as spectacular and unmistakable an object lesson as modern weaponry can provide.

Greg

Phil1,

That tribe-by-tribe embedding reminds me of 41's post referencing Ruyard Kipling... strong arming each tribe one by one, using intimate knowledge of that tribe's politics and players to play them off each other and enforce loyalty.

Sure, it might work. But the main problem is, this solution is not permanent -- once the money, pressure, local knowledge or tribal elder is gone, there goes the cooperation as well.

Bottom line, we'll still be there forever and a day, running on a treadmill.

I feel you have hit the nail on the head, quite squarely.

If the only reason people can give, is "to not let their deaths be in vain", when they've exhausted all logic and reason presented with the facts of failure both past and future, as indicated by the past (for contextual accuracy, I'll refer to this as "DOPE"), then perhaps we should realize that more dead and wounded is a cyclical travesty that has no point.

It sucks to know your friends have died for no real good reason at all. I don't want any more mothers or fathers to bury their son or daughter, on either side of the conflict.

Live and let live. Besides, most Wal-marts are open 24 hours now...dregs of society entertainment possibilities are endless without Fox news adding to it.

I think at least a few of them would be concerned that despite their best efforts, young people just like them continue to die at an unacceptable rate, and that justification for it is being sought in their name.

This coin indeed has two sides.

I too would be upset if their deaths were to be considered worthless. Their deaths pay for a costly lesson. The only really valid question is, has anybody figured out just what lesson is just yet?

Judging from this thread, it appears we're still fumbling around for that meaning.

So I go back to my original point. What would the dead say?

I think they can have the only truly relevent answer to this question.

I do know that don't have the right to speak for them; and that's for damned sure.

Greg

For a fantastic pictorial essay on Afghanistan, simply Click This Link.

Check out the Cpl with the baseplate...

The 36th photo down is a perfect example of why every beltfed should have cans.

http://www.sphere.com/2009/11/06/hunger-...ggest-killer%2F

Feed them and win?

If only they would use their fields to grow wheat instead of opium poppies, they could feed themselves.

Yeah but, since they are starving.

Nicely done! But to deter those that would fight military power and the will to use it must be demonstrated from time to time.

Deterrence was the product of two factors: military power and the will to use it. As a result, if you have the power but lacked the will you had nothing since any quantity, no matter how great, multiplied by zero is zero. --Dr. Louis J. Halle



(If you live in California, consider GUNNY POP on Tuesday!)

I agree wholeheartedly. Or, to paraphrase Madeleine Albright before the Kosovo Air War, what good is having the world's greatest military if you're afraid to use it?

Not to put words in your mouth, or anyone's mouth, but that leads me to the question... do we sometimes ask the ultimate sacrifice from our uniformed military personnel in order to provide a credible deterrence to our enemies?

I mean, there have been many postings in this thread about not letting the sacrifice of our soldiers be in vain. And even one death should never be in vain. But if we fight to a stalemate in Afghanistan (or anywhere else), with no real defeat or victory possible (because of the lack of American political will or tribalist facts on the ground), would the very fact that we deterred other potential aggressors with our demonstrated will to use military force be a good enough justification for the sacrifice of the lives of American men and women?

I don't know the answer, this wasn't rhetorical. I genuinely wonder.

She was smart but not All Bright. LOL. Like Halle, she was first and foremost a scholar. Halle article (you might need to be a subscriber to read the entire article - I don't remember).

To answer your question, yes, and maybe. The second question might be the crux of the issue. And, I wonder too. I have asked again and again when talking to friends returning home. Can we win it? The trends I see are that first they laugh and then they ask, "win what?" This from people that have been trained to avoid the media or if pressed have an answer prepared.

What you do not see on the news is that a great many would-be killers are checking out early. What you might see on your logic board is that the game can go on indefinitely...

Looks like this game may go on indefinitely after all.

CBS is reporting that Obama has decided to send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/09/world/main5592551.shtml



All I can say is, I hope and pray it works out well. Unfortunately, I feel a churning knot in my stomach, and it's not what I ate for lunch.

FOX is saying that he hasn't accepted the Military Plans. Maybe there's a reason most of us watch FOX, and not the Communist Broadcasting Service, or the Communist News Network.