How do the Taliban communicate? Are they all just independent groups that fight on alone, or do they work together in some small way? Do the Taliban trust each other, even the ones that know each other?
The Rhodesians had a little game they played. Put some small goups together that can fake being Taliban. Use Afghans to set up fake Taliban. Coordinate with each group and network against the leaders of the enemy. Not a total encompassing operation, just enough to create some distrust and competition against each other. Each tribe against the other, each village against the other, each minority against each other.
Selous Scouts.
If Johnny Walker Lind and Lawrence of Arabia could do it why can't we?
I hear that Osama was paid off by us a long time ago, we just pull him out once a year to stir up some interesting communication intercepts. Any other interesting ideas?
Semper Fidelis,
Tipy

He was convincing, IMO.

Here is another point of view.



http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2291

Fredo. Thanks for the link.


Perhaps I should have said something more about TIMING regarding Hoh's letter and subsequent interviews.

To what end, I ask? These Marines are both saying the same thing about the big picture. What results can you find if you don't know the question?

There is a lot of money to be made though...

An educated and perceptive soldier in the field can see solutions that the general in the bunker cannot. But if the Karzai government is corrupt and the insurgency grows because of that. All the whitewashing of a bond between rural Afghanistan and it's army/government will be just that.

Nato troops cannot bring about a "shotgun wedding" between the people of Afghanistan and a army/government that neither serves nor protects.

Don't want to leave the Army unrepresented.

Maj. Jim Gant's paper "One Tribe At A Time"

This is 45 pages.

http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf

Link to blog with responses to anticipated criticism.
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/

All in ASAP. If we pulled out,the troops who perished would be all for nothing.The politicians have to stop half assing the war and get it over with by totally kicking the crap out of the enemy ala WWII style. I'm no rocket scientist but I have a funny feeling that isnt going to happen.

With due respect to those who and served and fallen, I believe we are in a no win situation. We have no alternative that is palatable to anyone. We cannot bomb them into the stone age because they are already there, we cannot change there hearts and minds because of their cultural and religious orientations that are medieval, arcane and frankly irreconcilable with Western morays. We cannot wage the type of scorched earth war that many advocate, even if we could wage a war of attrition, I believe that the remnants of the country would gravitate back to the fractionated fiefdoms and religious fundamentalism that is the root of their problems. Regardless of troop increases or staying the course, we will continue to lose more precious lives and resources then it is worth. One day in future we will abandon this folly, I would say cut our losses now and focus on stabilizing and containing Pakistan.

Let loose the dogs of war and go WT Sherman on them. "War Is Hell"

I think we should do the same in the war on crime, and the drug war, the Pepsi-Coke war, March Madness (it's going to be war, baby...) since surely people can be brought to their senses and sit down and agree to an unconditional surrender, which, of course, would bring some things to an end...

"What do we learn Palmer?"

ahh, Burn After Reading quotes...priceless.
---

The following is written by a retired CSM who is now working the issue on the civilian side.

---
15 August 2009

Mehtar Lam, Laghman Province, Afghanistan -- AAR Notes: I'm sure I built this thesis on several false pretenses, but this is my After Action Review on the two-week training mission we just completed in Laghman Province. It builds on an already matured and developed opinion of the Afghan National Army.

The typical Afghan officer views his military employment as a paycheck instead of a profession and lacks all the competencies expected of a senior staff officer. To further those shortfalls, we are spending more time building relationships than capability. The most disconcerting part about the OCC-P staff is the extent of apathy rampant among them, as evidenced by their halfhearted work ethic. They were still asleep outdoors when we arrived each morning, and rose only in time for breakfast. They changed out of uniform every time the temperature rose above 85 degrees, spending the bulk of the day disrobed and very unproductive. If it wasn’t for mealtime protocols, they would’ve had no structure or organization at all.

The local Task Force has placed minimum expectations on the OCC-P, focusing on personnel and assets instead of performance. They have manned and equipped the force, but failed to train and employ them as coalition partners. The select, educate, and utilize pillars are grossly neglected, and yet they are surprised when the OCC partnership fails to integrate assets or meet expectations. We’ve set the bar pretty low and still failed to meet it.

The local commander has the ability to demand performance. He wields the coercive, reward, legitimate, and expert power to create dynamic improvements, but lacks the referent power and command presence to exercise these assets. He doesn’t recognize positive performance, demote or fire non performers, promote success, empower the OCC, or coach, teach, and mentor the staff. The OIC is sliced from a tenant unit on the FOB and isn’t supported by the Task Force outside of logistical assets. He isn’t included in targeting meetings or the development of operational plans and his insight is discarded without consideration. The TOC is unresponsive to SIGACTS and SITREPS and continually misses opportunities to integrate Afghan resources and build confidence in coalition capacity.

The OCC-P commander is BG Ghazimer, an artillery officer from previous regimes. Although equal to the task in military education and training, he is grossly lacking in the developed leadership attributes and experience typical of an armor or infantry commander. Throughout his career, combat commanders have told him where to go, which direction to orient his fires, and precisely when to shoot. Even his task, purpose, and concept were provided by another officer, someone who could visualize, describe, and direct the employment of forces. In this case, BG Ghazimer doesn’t provide direction or inspire initiative. He cannot create the inertia for action at any level, and he is only marginally productive with direct input from US or outside influences, and only then when within arms reach of the influence.

Instead of manning three complete eight-hour shifts with a full compliment of staff officers as outlined in their SOP, this command allots what amounts to a fireguard while the rest malinger in mass during the day shift and sleep through the night. The integrity of the night or afternoon watch is grossly understaffed, with no PIR or wake-up criteria, and no demands for monitoring radio traffic. Shift-change briefings are non-existent and teaching the format is an exercise in futility.

They can and sometimes do demonstrate moments of competence and an individual sense of ownership toward this OCC-P facility, but it is certainly an anomaly when it occurs. The NDS representatives and select ANP officers have slightly more adherence toward the OCC’s fundamental purpose and link to the National Defense Strategy, but again they are consumed by the apathy of the predominant ANA staff officers.

Although Afghans are an amicable and appreciative people, the ANSF officers do not possess the strength of character to defend themselves or their country. They are not courageous or indignant enough to defend their values, embrace nationalism, or patriotic enough to demonstrate the loyalty seen in other effective military organizations. At best, they will always be a people of puppets, readily subordinating themselves to any willing adversary or paying benefactor.

The US has created a welfare state within the Afghan National Army by giving them everything on a platter. Instead of a committed and competent coalition partner, we have an enormously pitiful covey of wet baby birds screeching for their next half-digested handout. I can’t begin to fathom how to correct the course of this disastrous program, but between now and Election Day it won’t be possible. The ANP and NDS alone may win the day for Afghanistan, leaving yet another bedsore in the prestige and esprit of the ANA, this one surely to fester for another four years.

Insurgents in the region maintain freedom of maneuver, creating havoc at will on the Afghan people while competent National Defense Policy goes unheeded by the very forces committed to security. Whereas the election provides an opportunity to demonstrate to the free world the resilience of the Afghan people and the resolve of the ANSF to secure their liberties and way of life, the apathy of the mid-level leadership will surely undermine coalition support and the political base worldwide to continue on the current path.

It is unthinkable that people wouldn’t embrace an opportunity of this magnitude, yet the willingness to stand idle while insurgents molest their motherland and infest their villages underscores the very lethargic nature and ineptitude of the Afghan defense forces and their unduly appointed leadership within. Instead of ensuring a stable environment for citizens and instilling the confidence to prosper and raise a family under a trusted and representative government with the security to worship in accordance with their faith, they fumble with inane reports and internal hierarchies that produce absolutely no level of security.

It will take an exceptional leader with a strong following of stout subordinate commanders to inculcate a warrior ethos into this force, and don’t expect it to happen any time soon with the rampant corruption and blatant self-serving leadership commanding at all levels of ANSF and the central government.

The essence of successful mentorship pivots on the values rooted in the Afghan Soldiers’ heart. If they embrace the sovereignty of Afghanistan, embody a Warrior-type Ethos, believe in their Service’s purpose, understand that they are a vital part of a team and value their place in it, then they will readily learn the requisite skills and attributes of the Profession of Arms and the specific knowledge requirements of their duty position, thereby becoming a vital instrument in the security of their people and defense of their homeland.

Individual values are first and foremost in the hierarchical attributes of effective leadership. Individual values, beliefs, and character precede technical and tactical knowledge, knowledge of self, and knowledge of human behavior. They are definitive precursors to providing purpose, motivation, and direction. Duty, honor, country. After that, everything else is academic.

The coalition emphasis must be placed on their values before any other form of leadership instruction can be of significance or importance. For if they don’t truly care about the national interest, strong central governance, and defeating a heartless insurgency to the extent of subordinating their own personal welfare to the cause at hand, they will not be able to provide or deliver the leadership and direction necessary for success.

Without that, the bulk of the US Army CSTC-A, MPRI, and ETT expertise is wasted on a corrupt or self-serving conglomerate of underdeveloped individuals. Such is not an Army for a nation-state but an imbalanced welfare state for an otherwise incorrigible caste system wrought with prejudice, self-preservation, corruption, and communal immorality.

The question then is how do we educate them on the absolute imperative for strong personal values, and then how do we instill a proper value system into the hearts and minds of all key leaders from corporal through general. We must re-focus our efforts to properly address who they are, what they believe in, and how their strength of character has to demonstrate those essential core values in everything they do. Ten years of Soviet rule and eight years of Taliban dominance have starved Afghans of their dignity and their identity. We must replace the lessons learned during their former military years with values and ethics centered on a collective morality central to the prosperity of the Nation. Where we grew up reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, listening to the National Anthem, honoring our veterans and fallen heroes, we often forget how deeply seated our values are.

When we figure out how to address and mentor their values, then and only then will we be able to steer them forward toward competent and honorable military service to their country.


SGM Curtis L. Regan
MPRI, Kabul Afghanistan

Cavscout, that was one great post. Thanks.

This is the key: "Although Afghans are an amicable and appreciative people, the ANSF officers do not possess the strength of character to defend themselves or their country. They are not courageous or indignant enough to defend their values, embrace nationalism, or patriotic enough to demonstrate the loyalty seen in other effective military organizations. At best, they will always be a people of puppets, readily subordinating themselves to any willing adversary or paying benefactor."

If they are not able to stand up and fight for ANYTHING, what the hell are we doing over there?

I read commentary about honoring the memory of the fallen. I would suggest we ask ourselves what they would say, knowing what they now know.

Here is a similar opinion of embedding small numbers on a tribe by tribe basis.

November 4, 2009, 5:04 pm
Going Tribal in Afghanistan
By James Dao
Chris Hondros/Getty Images Afghan Pashtun tribal elders in the village of Hazi Madad in Afghanistan’s Kandahar Province.

In Washington, the debate over Afghanistan seems to center around two broad ideas: counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism. Should the United States add troops for a more population-centric strategy, as Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal advocates? Or should it use a less ground-heavy approach, disrupting Al Qaeda with Special Operation Forces and unmanned drones, as Vice President Joseph Biden argues?

There is, of course, no shortage of other ideas, many of them afloat in the blogosphere. Among the more provocative ones has been posted on Steven Pressfield’s blog, It’s the Tribes, Stupid, and it comes from an Army Special Forces major who has spent much time in both Afghanistan and Iraq training indigenous fighters.

The 45-page paper, “One Tribe at a Time” by Maj. Jim Gant, argues that one way to undermine the insurgency is to return, in part, to the strategy that ousted the Taliban to begin with: Embed small, highly skilled and almost completely autonomous units with tribes across Afghanistan.

Much like the Green Berets who worked with the Northern Alliance to drive out the Taliban in 2001 and 2002, the units, which Major Gant calls Tribal Engagement Teams, would wear Afghan garb and live in Afghan villages for extended periods, training, equipping and fighting alongside tribal militias.

The goal would be to encourage what Major Gant sees as a natural antipathy between many tribes toward some of the more ideological, anti-American segments of the insurgency. Just as the Sunni tribesmen dubbed the Sons of Iraq turned against foreign al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq, Major Gant argues that Tribal Engagement Teams can counter al-Qaeda networks in Afghanistan by creating or strengthening indigenous fighting forces built upon local militias.

That kind of strategy has been discussed in Afghanistan, where critics argue that it would undermine the central government in Kabul and encourage warlordism. But as evidence that it can work, Major Gant cites his own experience as a Special Forces team leader who worked closely with a Pashtun tribe in Konar Province in 2003.

After gradually building the trust of village elders, including by supplying them with weapons, Major Gant said his team started receiving excellent intelligence on locally active insurgents, particularly the militant Islamist party of warlord Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Hizb-i Islami Gulbaddin.

Expanding the strategy to other tribes along the mountainous borderland would help stem the free flow of fighters and supplies from Pakistan into Afghanistan, Major Gant argues. But it would require not just recruiting and training engagement teams, but also giving them free rein to fight and die alongside Afghan militias.

“The risk averse nature of our current method of operating would have to change,” he writes. “American soldiers would die. Some of them alone, with no support.”

Major Gant acknowledges that not every tribe would welcome American units, no matter how small. He also acknowledges that Afghan distrust of Americans may have grown significantly since 2003. But that can change when small units start embedding in villages, he asserts.

“This is what the tribes want: a commitment,” he said in an e-mail message. “Some skin, some blood, some risk.”

Given the conservative nature of the American military, Major Gant’s ideas would be something of a culture shock. It is also hard to see precisely how the tribal engagement approach work with the counterinsurgency strategy championed by General McChrystal, which emphasizes building the central government over bolstering local tribes, many of which look on Kabul with suspicion.

Major Gant says he will explain in a future paper how tribal engagement is “counterinsurgency at its best.” He also makes an alluring argument for opponents of General McChrystal’s troop-heavy approach: his “light footprint approach,” he writes, “will not only work, but will help to ease the need for larger and larger numbers of U.S. soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan.

Major Gant, who had wanted to return to Afghanistan but is instead heading back to Iraq, where he won a Silver Star, is taking questions on Mr. Pressfield’s blog. It’s not clear whether General McChrystal or Vice President Biden have read the paper. But there’s plenty of dialogue on the Web, including here and here.

http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/going-tribal-in-afghanistan/

What the tribes want is not the point. What is more to the point is what would be reasonable to expect our young soldiers to do.

War is the consequence of failed diplomacy. Soldiering is what gets done in the shadow of that failed diplomacy.

When diplomacy is the task, the soldier is not the desired agent of that diplomacy. Asking him to do this is simply passing the buck. Not a reasonable part of his job description.

If diplomats can't do their jobs without military support, then diplomacy is premature. First you pacify, then you bring in the diplomats.

This bullsh*t about employing soldiers as diplomats is no more responsible than using cops for family counselling.

The jobs' reasonable limitations allows no such overlap.

Pampering tribal overlords and bending the rules of war to suit their volatile and superstitions sensibilities is simply an exercise in utter elitist stupidity.

Clearly define for them the limits of acceptable behavior. Eliminate the slow learners in as spectacular and unmistakable an object lesson as modern weaponry can provide.

Greg

Phil1,

That tribe-by-tribe embedding reminds me of 41's post referencing Ruyard Kipling... strong arming each tribe one by one, using intimate knowledge of that tribe's politics and players to play them off each other and enforce loyalty.

Sure, it might work. But the main problem is, this solution is not permanent -- once the money, pressure, local knowledge or tribal elder is gone, there goes the cooperation as well.

Bottom line, we'll still be there forever and a day, running on a treadmill.

I feel you have hit the nail on the head, quite squarely.

If the only reason people can give, is "to not let their deaths be in vain", when they've exhausted all logic and reason presented with the facts of failure both past and future, as indicated by the past (for contextual accuracy, I'll refer to this as "DOPE"), then perhaps we should realize that more dead and wounded is a cyclical travesty that has no point.

It sucks to know your friends have died for no real good reason at all. I don't want any more mothers or fathers to bury their son or daughter, on either side of the conflict.

Live and let live. Besides, most Wal-marts are open 24 hours now...dregs of society entertainment possibilities are endless without Fox news adding to it.

I think at least a few of them would be concerned that despite their best efforts, young people just like them continue to die at an unacceptable rate, and that justification for it is being sought in their name.

This coin indeed has two sides.

I too would be upset if their deaths were to be considered worthless. Their deaths pay for a costly lesson. The only really valid question is, has anybody figured out just what lesson is just yet?

Judging from this thread, it appears we're still fumbling around for that meaning.

So I go back to my original point. What would the dead say?

I think they can have the only truly relevent answer to this question.

I do know that don't have the right to speak for them; and that's for damned sure.

Greg

For a fantastic pictorial essay on Afghanistan, simply Click This Link.

Check out the Cpl with the baseplate...

The 36th photo down is a perfect example of why every beltfed should have cans.

http://www.sphere.com/2009/11/06/hunger-...ggest-killer%2F

Feed them and win?

If only they would use their fields to grow wheat instead of opium poppies, they could feed themselves.

Yeah but, since they are starving.

Nicely done! But to deter those that would fight military power and the will to use it must be demonstrated from time to time.

Deterrence was the product of two factors: military power and the will to use it. As a result, if you have the power but lacked the will you had nothing since any quantity, no matter how great, multiplied by zero is zero. --Dr. Louis J. Halle



(If you live in California, consider GUNNY POP on Tuesday!)

I agree wholeheartedly. Or, to paraphrase Madeleine Albright before the Kosovo Air War, what good is having the world's greatest military if you're afraid to use it?

Not to put words in your mouth, or anyone's mouth, but that leads me to the question... do we sometimes ask the ultimate sacrifice from our uniformed military personnel in order to provide a credible deterrence to our enemies?

I mean, there have been many postings in this thread about not letting the sacrifice of our soldiers be in vain. And even one death should never be in vain. But if we fight to a stalemate in Afghanistan (or anywhere else), with no real defeat or victory possible (because of the lack of American political will or tribalist facts on the ground), would the very fact that we deterred other potential aggressors with our demonstrated will to use military force be a good enough justification for the sacrifice of the lives of American men and women?

I don't know the answer, this wasn't rhetorical. I genuinely wonder.

She was smart but not All Bright. LOL. Like Halle, she was first and foremost a scholar. Halle article (you might need to be a subscriber to read the entire article - I don't remember).

To answer your question, yes, and maybe. The second question might be the crux of the issue. And, I wonder too. I have asked again and again when talking to friends returning home. Can we win it? The trends I see are that first they laugh and then they ask, "win what?" This from people that have been trained to avoid the media or if pressed have an answer prepared.

What you do not see on the news is that a great many would-be killers are checking out early. What you might see on your logic board is that the game can go on indefinitely...

Looks like this game may go on indefinitely after all.

CBS is reporting that Obama has decided to send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/09/world/main5592551.shtml



All I can say is, I hope and pray it works out well. Unfortunately, I feel a churning knot in my stomach, and it's not what I ate for lunch.

FOX is saying that he hasn't accepted the Military Plans. Maybe there's a reason most of us watch FOX, and not the Communist Broadcasting Service, or the Communist News Network.

I'm not military, never have been so take my opinion for what it is.

The way I see it, all actions such as the one in Afghanistan are completely fruitless. Just as we would continue and continue and continue to fight were a foreign army to come here and try and wipe out our own way of doing things, so will those in Afghanistan, Iraq and anywhere else in the world. These people (notice I wrote people; not a country or a military, but people), right or not, are fighting for what they believe in. They are fighting for their homelands and their way of life, and no army, no matter how strong or technologically advanced, can beat them. The USSR, which arguably had a bigger, badder army than we, couldn't do it after 10 years. We fought in Vietnam and killed an untold number of Vietnamese for over a decade. When we left, things were just the same as they were when the French decided to bug out before we arrived.

For them it's about defending everything they believe in (again, whether that is a good thing or not is for another debate). They are not going to give up no matter how many troops we commit, no matter how many bombs we drop, no matter how many guys we capture or kill. Simply put, we cannot win. A man protecting his home has no limits (I know that I would have no limits were, for instance, the Chinese to come in to the US to change the way we do things because they thought it wrong).

A man defending his home is the strongest man in the world.

Just ask the hodge podge army we put together to fight the British which was, by leaps and bounds, the most technologically advanced army in the world in the late 18th century. They were the bad asses of their time, and, perhaps because they were spread thin (as we are committing to two theaters simultaneously), but certainly because we were men defending our homes from what we perceived as an invading military force. They had no shot.

Even if we win every battle, they will win the war. It may take 10 years, or 20 years, or 100 years, but at some point we will have to withdraw, and things won't be any different than they were the day before we went in to begin with.

With all due respect to those who have fallen, isn't that line of thinking going against the adage "never throw good money after bad?"

War is nothing if not a huge gamble, calculated though it may be.

Afghanistan is a traumatized country. It will take a generation or more for the people and the culture to purge themselves of the pathologies that accompany thirty years of warfare and the suffering it brings. But we must be careful not to define victory as the removal of all 'western' soldiers from the region.

Too bad its over and its been over for a long long time. Red white and blue is just an illusion now days and poppets who are high on patriotism/nationalism are nothing more than empty headed slaves.

Remember, the war is about freedom and all that crap.......ahahahah yea freedom.......too funny.

If you have a 'radicalist' point of view on the topic presented, and you've thought about why you hold that point of view, then argue it instead of simply stating it:

What about it is over? How and why has it been that way for a 'long long time'? What is the illusion of patriotism, and what is the war in Afghanistan really about? Why is freedom 'crap' ? And what is the irony?

Looks like the C-in-C is going to be making a feeler bet, but not an all-in move... we'll see next Tuesday how he makes the sell for 30-35,000 more troops.

Not convinced this is the right move, but for the sake of our troops' safety and our security, I hope that it works out well.

Another angle I was thinking about as I listened to some analysis on the radio. How much of the decision to add more troops is a direct result of pressure from Pakistan? Conventional wisdom says Pakistan would be a big winner if the US withdrew from Afghanistan, but maybe they actually need us there in order to prevent the Taliban from turning back and biting the ISI hand that fed it for so long?

This is such an interesting discussion that i have to tag it for later.

The 'all-in or get out' question isn't about how to best apply our weapons. And the answer has nothing to do with the politics of oil, criticisms of false patriotism, or one's personal views of freedom.

We have always had greater firepower than the enemy. Yet the strategy of modern warfare requires the integration into the fight of the complexity of reality.

No doubt terrorists truly believe that killing themselves for their cause is a form of love. But it isn't. Because the form of 'love' shown by the killer is limited in scope, and destructive.

When we fight an ideological enemy it is our humanness that becomes our power and our confidence: when we expend our energy, together, as a nation, to prevent the subjugation of others and to help them improve their dignity, then the fight is already won.

The fight is only lost when we ourselves give up. Why? Because ours is a collective form of love that transcends self-interest and hatred.

It's the difference between builders and destroyers.

Corruption is out of control in Afghanistan. The war and drug lords still have control over there territory. Just like when the russians where there.Karzai's own brother is a well known drug lord.The tribes are loyal to each other and not a goverment.They are a people who only understand fear and it will take perseverance on our part to show them what they can have with the freedom we offer.

Let the soldiers on the ground fight the war. Not a man in an office that is 2000 miles away

What is the biggest nuke in your military? Pull out and drop all of them over there, hey the boys in the ISS need to see something shiny ever 90 minutes.

We should pull out of all conflicts. I am for war and defending our country. But nothing has been done and things are at a stalemate at the moment.

We should be at peace, we should warn the east and let them know we are serious about peace. Then say "If you fuck with our allies and our own soil it will be war without end"

We should display our power and words by taking a special ops team several of them and rescue the hikers in Iran and even destroy the nuke plant in Iran!

Money that is used for everything else should go to help the poor and hungry.

I'd be with you about pulling back to our own borders if it were not for the simple idea that once done, there's no place else to fight these threats besides here within our our borders, and retreating back here will do nothing to thwart or motivate those threats to stay where they are. As for warning them, I think they've pretty much got that nmessage jammed down their throats all the way to the hilt, and they're just not playing the game.

That's the whole point of forward deployment/engagement; you fight your wars on somebody else's ground, and not here at home. Rattle your sabers all you like, the time comes when you need to lean into it and kick some ass.

And that's the problem with all of this. Folks tend to think that the distance equates to a surreal quality, that such conflicts lend themselves to the musings of armchair generals. Wars project our National power, but they need to be managed by experienced people on the ground, and not by domestic intellects.

I have little patience left for 'hearts and minds', negotiated solutions, and such partway measures. We gave those concepts the full court press in 'Nam and the primary lesson that's clear out of all of that is that such strategies are fool's errands, and the ploys of those who have lukewarm intentions. Yet; here we are repainting all the pretty horses on that selfsame broken down merry-go-round.

This Nation, this entire Western society, hasn't actually tolerated the measures necessary to decisively resolve culture clashes since we defeated the Fascists.

They were harsh, they were often inhumane, and when we finished the task, we tried to wash our hands, and found that stains like those don't wash off. We didn't like ourselves so much after that, and we were gun shy about doing such things again.

So we then ended up with goatf**ks like Korea, Vietnam, and now, finally, the bizarre strategies of Afghanistan, and to some degree, Iraq.

We're bad at resolving culture conflicts, and we seem to forget that you can't deal with embedded war criminals separately. If we had tried to do that with the Fascists, we'd still be fighting WWII as an insurgency.

Distasteful as it is, one needs to prosecute such conflicts against entire populations, 'surgical' dithering and consensus/nation building kills Americans, postpones resolutions indefinitely, and not a hell of a lot else.

Until we go to war, really go to war, everybody loses. Ante up or fold, no feather merchants are allowed, no other options are permitted. Get it right.

Greg

This week a decision will be announced about how much to increase troop levels, based on a 'new strategy' for victory.

Arguing about troop numbers is a distraction. We already know that a successful strategy is not dependent on troop levels, having liberated the country with less than four hundred men. And we also know that new strategies are of no use without acceptance of the need for action.

Northrop Frye said that there can be no uncritical loyalties. Victory in Afghanistan will take more than blind loyalty, it will require an emotional commitment to the well-being of the Afghan people.

Hmmm... interesting. I find myself in agreement with both of you, contradictory though that may be. However, can we simultaneously be 100% committed to the well-being of the Afghan people while at the same time prosecuting a total war against... well, the Afghan people?

How about an emotional commitment to 'tough love'...?

If we look at the outcome for the German people, I think it's better than under the regime of a victorious Third Reich, although maybe less so lately...

Well, I would hope any outcome would be better than living under the Third Reich...

But your reference to the Allied occupation of Greater Germany after WWII makes me think. How come there wasn't the kind of insurgency in Germany and Austria after WWII that we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq? Certainly the Germans resented occupation as much as Afghans or Iraqis today?

I have an M1 Carbine marked "Bavarian Rural Police" from post-war Austria... it was issued by the US directly to the reformed Austrian police forces, whose job it was to keep the peace in the countryside of Salzburg (Western Austria/Eastern Bavaria, Germany). It was pretty high tech hardware (at least back then) to give to the enemy... makes me wonder if it was ever turned on the Allied occupiers in anger back then?

A. Carpet bombing does wonders for the insurgent spirit.

B. Having your nuts handed back in a jar the second time in 30 years reinforces this message. Germany was crushed by the burden of war... the first time. They lost nearly 10% of the population in WWII, with 7%+ being military. That's a loss we haven't seen recently. We didn't even lose 1% of our military in Vietnam, not even .1% of the population. Imagine the impact on morale of 100 Vietnam's in less time than we've been in Iraq.

C. The Russians stepped in with an iron fist and built an imposing wall as a message "Do not cross us." Dissent was met with disappearance and public death. Note Sadaam had relatively peaceful occupation as well. Coincidence, or does certainty in outcome sway behavior?

D. They were a western people fighting on the ideological basis of innate superiority. Even when you can claim as much math, physics, and music to be your own as they could, an ass-whoopin' is an ass-whoopin' and it sorta underscores some falsehood in the basic premise of the flag you've been fighting under. If they were fighting on a religious basis, especially with the "downside" being death followed by guaranteed salvation, I would wager a different outcome. If they were fighting for freedom, I would wager a different outcome, but still not until another generation had grown bold. It only took one post-war generation to reunify, peacefully.

If you remove 7%+ of the population in Afghanistan, and make them all young males the most eager to fight, you will have won the hearts and minds of the rest, to the extent that dissent becomes a whispered act for many years. That would mean a ballpark 20% of eligible fighters just gone. 20% of fathers and husbands, replaced by women, children, and the elderly. After wiping out 1/5th of the most piss and vinegar, just throw on a randomly sampled extra 3% of the population and kill them too for good measure. The only possible result is a major attitude adjustment, or continuance to the point that your society is all dead.

Historically, someone sees enough bodies and decides an attitude adjustment is in order, at least for their generation. The next one never learns, but what can you do?