Again as outsider -- seems to me that if a new rifle is considered, you would ask first the riflemen who will be asked to use it, and then the armorers who will have to fix it, and the trainers who have to train the users on marksmanship. Then, somewhere much later, the paper-pushing officers who talk to the mfr reps and get schmoozed, they should receive maybe 15-25% of the weight based on their schmoozing. Maybe. But that would be too logical I guess.
The absolute last soldiers the US Army senior leadership are interested in listening to are Skill Level 1 Riflemen in the Infantry. They not only couldn’t care less about them, but take sadistic pleasure in bending them over and screwing them over as a form of pleasure. I present to you the MILES gear as exhibit #1. Also keep in mind that General Officers are generally incompetent when it comes to small arms, marksmanship, dismounted Infantry tasks, and things they see as far beneath them in the massive list of things they have to worry about.
We had a string of exceptions to this rule in the 1970s-1990s, with several GOs who had significant experience in Vietnam as junior leaders, to include a few that were in SOG and SF as enlisted or junior officers, who later went into senior levels in JSOC and SOCOM, back and forth between Ranger Regiment and some of the JRDF Combat Divisions like 82nd, 101st, 10th MTN, 25th ID, and 7th ID.
Guys like General Shelton, General Bowra, General Bargewell, and General Downing come to mind. Totally different type of leaders than what were cultivated during the Clinton years-forward. These guys commanded genuine respect from enlisted soldiers no matter where they went. Their reputations proceeded them and they mentored and trained a lot of good officers along their long paths.
They wouldn’t allow something like NGSW to materialize from the bad idea fairy that concocted it, since they know what it’s like to have to hump and employ small arms, as well as manage the logistics for them.
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