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An outdated letter to Garcia...

MarinePMI

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  • Jun 3, 2010
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    I often think about Stephen Ambrose lamenting that Lt's and Capt's won WWII. As the article discusses the outdated concept of immediate, obedience to given orders without thought, I find myself thinking, "If Lt's and Capt's won WWII, GWOT will be one won on the shoulders of Sgt's and Cpl's. It will be won down at the team level."

    An Outdated Letter to Garcia: Why Hubbard's Essay Needs to be Shelved for Good. - Modern War Institute

    Long a staple of military professional reading lists, “A Message to Garcia,” written by Elbert Hubbard continues to be considered among the most important literary works on leadership—and followership. It held a place of prominence on the Marine Corps Commandant’s reading list from the first list in 1989 all the way through 2015. We have both personally witnessed it being praised in various military education and professional development venues. And our experiences raised serious questions about the work’s enduring value. The lesson intended to be derived from the story is unclear, and its applicability to the modern military professional is far from certain. Despite being written over a century ago for a world that no longer exists, “A Message to Garcia” is still frequently referenced as a seminal text for young officers and NCOs. It’s time to retire it from that vaunted position in the professional development canon.

    The tale of young Lt. Andrew Rowan completing a relatively straightforward mission during the opening phase of the Spanish-American War is an oversimplified and antiquated addition to professional reading. In fact, the style of leadership and decision-making it espouses is downright dangerous for today’s military leaders.

    The 1,500-word essay was written in the Industrial Age, and in the context of Industrial Age warfare, but the nature of our world and how we wage armed conflict has changed dramatically. The Industrial Age gave way to the post-Industrial era, a time when technological advances such as additive printing and artificial intelligence are being integrated into society at a dizzying rate. Warfare has expanded into new domains, such as cyberspace, that were hardly contested or non-existent in previous conflicts. Any junior military leader today can tell you that the digital age and complex geopolitical environment of the twenty-first century are not conducive to Hubbard’s simplistic leadership philosophy. According to Hubbard, there is no expectation of fighting Charles Krulak’s “three block war” or having to understand newly emergent domains, and there is no room for the “strategic corporal” or disruptive thinkers. For Rowan, it’s do, not ask: over the top, into the breach, and accomplish the mission.

    Hubbard’s notion of the importance of initiative and determination are not wrong; these are traits that are absolutely necessary for military leaders of the past, present, and future. But his essay worships these traits to a point where they supersede everything else:
    It is not book-learning young men need, nor instruction about this and that, but a stiffening of the vertebrae which will cause them to be loyal to a trust, to act promptly, concentrate their energies; do the thing.​
    In this damning line, Hubbard conveys little regard or use for professional reading or critical thinking, which are both critical aspects of professional military education. Rowan blindly accepts his mission without asking any questions (or conducting a back brief), and recklessly continues without assessing the risk of losing his life and consequently failing to complete the mission. To Hubbard, the mission is all that matters. Rowan completed his mission by delivering the message to Garcia, but did he seek the assistance of a criminal group to guide him through the jungle? Were civilians bribed, coerced, or even threatened in order for Rowan to succeed in his mission? Could Rowan’s conduct (or misconduct) fuel a successful enemy information campaign, squandering any gains of delivering a message to Garcia? For Hubbard, these subsidiary considerations, and their second- and third-order effects, have no consequences; a servant is all that is required.

    The British poet Alfred, Lord Tennyson also wrote of such unflinching obedience to orders in his tragic poem, “The Charge of the Light Brigade”:
    Theirs not to make reply,
    Theirs not to reason why,
    Theirs but to do and die.​
    Many of our mentors admit to being praised for “being like Rowan” at some point in their military careers, despite being an inadequate leadership style for modern warfare. This comparison commends decisiveness, but does so at the cost of essential leadership values such as critical and disruptive thinking. Being like Rowan goes against the Army’s own philosophy of Mission Command, which seeks to “empower adaptive and agile leaders” through a clear understanding of the rationale and intent that underlie their assigned tasks.

    Today’s challenges faced by the military are complex and multifaceted. The environment is ambiguous, and while war has immutable continuities, warfare today is nowhere near as straightforward as that of the Industrial Age. To be successful, military leaders in the post-Industrial Age require critical thinking, an understanding of the mission at hand, and a willingness to provide further clarification when necessary. An understanding of physical, cognitive, information, and cyber domains—and their convergence—is also necessary, often down to the squad level. While initiative and self-determination are extremely valuable traits, the problems facing military professionals are not as simple as sending a message to Garcia.

    So what should a Lt. Rowan of the post-Industrial Age look like? Motivated and self-determined for sure, but also a lifelong learner willing to accept calculated risk after thoroughly understanding the mission and purpose. Our post-Industrial Age Rowan will seek to understand the mission—an imperative for Mission Command—and the complex operational environment, through a variety of mediums (not just military ones). He will place the mission first, even if that means sacrificing his reputation and challenging his superiors’ instructions (or lack thereof).

    “A Message to Garcia” had its long moment in the sun, but its place now is behind museum glass where it can no longer do any harm. Rowan’s determination and initiative still bear value, but Hubbard’s worship of fealty without critical thinking will get soldiers killed. The essay may never be fully removed from professional military education, so one can only hope that junior officers understand its selective application in the context of modern warfare and seek more relevant sources of learning elsewhere.

     
    You will need to change the "zero mistakes" mentality before that can happen.

    I think at the higher levels the goal is always to be one rung below the level of strict accountability so that if shit goes wrong there is a place to point the finger.

    In order for the above to be successful command has to be willing to share goals at least down to the level of fire team leader in the Marine Corps so that a Lance Corporal could succeed in changing orders on the fly perhaps resulting in the failure of a personal assignment while ensuring the mission that was being supported succeeds.

    That requires sharing information and a willingness to blur rank structure. If a unit is not so completely attuned to working as a cohesive unit so that its intuitive what its leaders will do when meeting obstacles or opportunities that could go bad quick.

    Longer enlistments, less movement among units, actual education regarding strategy vs tactics and more field problems would enable this to work.

    How did my watching military history channel education work on this topic?
     
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    Actually so much can go wrong with this now that I think about it....

    So say if the fire team is assigned taking out a fixed MG and on the way to complete that mission sees an enemy assault team preparing to hit a command unit. The lance corporal diverts to take out the assault team.

    Well command had a reserve that could have handled the assault and the MG the fire team should have cleared decimated the rest of the unit. Does the L/Cpl need to know that that was the reserve assignment? Sounds like a lot for the 18 year old that is about to face 650 rpm to have to carry on his plate. His whole emphasis should be on head down accomplish his one big task, come back with 4 guys.

    Ive never been in war (which just by admitting that makes my opinions worth all the Call of Duty anyone is willing to play) but I got to imagine shit just doesn't work as planned and more often than not, like taking a test, you are better going with the answer you had rather than changing the answer. As fucked up as one team is the opposing team is likely equally so encountering issues and becoming fucked up.

    Perhaps the team that maintains discipline and is capable of meeting most of its goals, perhaps a gentleman's C, can carry the day.

    When everything goes to shit I guess Rowan's position is the default solution and sticking with what you have been tasked to do will allow higher to concentrate on handling the unknown and not have to second guess what its own people could possibly be doing.


    Can I have a Brigadier star now?
     
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    Actually, I think the point of the article is that today's knuckle draggers are anything but, and must be treated accordingly. And a dogmatic approach to treating door kickers as automatons, to be used as mere chess pieces on the field are a thing of days past. Embrace that fact, that today's war fighters are much smarter and more educated than generations past, if for no other reason than sheer access to information (be it geopolitics, history, tactics, strategy etc.). It is not about relinquishing (or lessening) discipline and obedience to orders, more so, it is about embracing this generation of warriors that have this increased level of intelligence. And with that embrace comes an ability to greatly decentralize control, and let teams perform with greater latitude to inject initiative and problem solving, to meet mission requirements.

    In the past an example would be "Take that hill, because it is the next hill and I said so." Today it should be more of a "Take that hill, it controls the high ground for the three converging valleys that are the main arteries of this Provence. We need it secured within 72 hrs of this time and you have support via indirect and CAS for the next 48hrs. Any questions? Okay, go get it done."

    Don't control the method of meeting the goal, just set the goal and deadline. Trust your folks to get it done, with the resources you have given them.

    I think that is the gist of the article, and how it is at odds with the old mentality of "Do what I say, now. And don't ask or worry about why."
     
    That is understandable. There is no denying that the volunteer military tends to be a more professional and dedicated military. Not slighting the previous motivation during the conscription era nor their intelligence, there were plenty of examples of guys going into service out of necessity that just had the talents naturally but didn't want to be there - Major Dick Winters being an example.

    Small unit action independent action works and examples are plenty. Marines in the Banana Wars one example. I think Iraq and Afghanistan post the big push also should incorporate the free thinking style

    but....

    what do you do if we ever get back into peer type Army/Divisional, big front, slug fest? I guess the whole thing than just comes down to attrition and brute force.

    but...once in that situation if you are stupid enough to stay there you are involved in the worst form of war. "Thinking outside the box", hate that term, is required to break the horror and create a rapid war of mobility to lessen casualties on both sides. France and Britain were criminal fro staying in trench warfare for so long. I know it wasn't just a simple decision they came up with one day "Hey, lets live underground", supply, manpower and technology played a role but the fact they didn't overcome the problems faster sucks. In the end it was "post Rowan" thinking that actually returned maneuver to the field and broke the stalemate.

    The Spanish-American War to us seems like small scale war but at the time it was kind of a big thing for the US to undertake. Sure Spain was the sick man of Europe at the time but they were still one of the traditional "Great Powers". The winning of the Spanish-American War is what put US on a world stage footing.

    I wonder if there is a constant that determines "Peer to Peer" fighting requires a more controlled style of operation and "Small Unit" requires a more fluid style of command?

    At what level is the unit just a Cog or the entire Machine?

    Sorry if this seems inane or boring - just interested in the ideas.