XM7 worries from the field.
- Thread starter Terry Cross
- Start date
The buzz of “overmatch” contradicts that…
Lots of Schatz PowerPoints on that
Not saying I disagree with you but it’s a thing…or was at least
Overmatch is a thing with some weapon systems. This was the argument we used when scoping the PSR requirement after the Seals proposed the ONS. I was just a lowly SFC then helping draft the requirements document as a Sniper SME. We pointed at all of our European partners that had been rocking 338L's for years.
That's why I specified small arms. This particular weapon and ammo is focused on opponents body armor, not trying to out-reach them.
Was more making light of that old presentation of 54R vs 51….and all that stuff that was not all that accurate
Anywho….
Do the Chinese (or whoever has the baddest armor we want to poke) have enough of the plates to warrant significant fielding? What warrants us to commit to the change? Mere existence….limited experimentation…a percentage of general issue?
Are they assuming they’ll be facing every body with an M7 and x sapi (or whatever’s the baddest plate now) on our end?
Has there been a small arms rifle solicitation put out by the US military that includes in its specification:
System weight and round count seem to be extremely important.
Speaking from ignorance here.
- the weight of the rifle to not surpass our current rifle (perhaps with optics, full mag, suppressor, etc), and
- the weight of X number of rounds? As in equal weight to the ammo load out and round count of our current weapon.
System weight and round count seem to be extremely important.
Speaking from ignorance here.
The Chinese spent $1.85 billion for 1.4 million SAPI-equivalent hard plate sets to outfit the People's Liberation Army and People's Armed Police with fielding starting in 2025.
Joe Biden has already equipped the Taliban.
It wasn't meant as preaching at all. If it came across that way, I'm sorry.
It was meant as a Red Team angle of debating this topic.
I'm not trying to predict anything at all about M4s and M855. The M4 has certainly evolved for the better and the ammo has evolved past M855 as well. Who knows what tomorrow will bring.
My stance is that of course we should constantly review our gear and our TTPs with realistic expectations. If anything is truly underperforming, then it should be addressed whether it is fighter aircraft or cold weather socks.
What I AM saying is that we shouldn't field an entirely new program just for the sake of chasing a pseudo goal. Double shame on us when the new program is already exhibiting several mechanical points of failure, is less controllable and adds too much weight to each man's load while simultaneously reducing the number of rounds each man can carry. Don't forget that out of necessity, the program has to include building a completely new logistics chain at a crazy amount of $.
Could we literally get more bang for our buck by focusing that time and energy on something else?
I certainly don't have any sway on the direction of any of those programs but it is entertaining to discuss the pros and cons.
DoD: "The GWOT is over! The era of Great Power Competition and Major Regional Contingencies is back!"
Also DoD: "You know what would be awesome? Adopting a rifle that isn't compatible with Allied supply systems."
I know what serious looks like, and this ain't it.
-Stan
Also DoD: "You know what would be awesome? Adopting a rifle that isn't compatible with Allied supply systems."
I know what serious looks like, and this ain't it.
-Stan
How do you know the M4 isn't underperforming?
What is the pseudo goal? What should the goal be?
Believe it or not, it probably takes knowing some facts to make decisions or pass judgement. I'm not defending the SIG itself. Or even the Army's decision to innovate. Because whether I'm defending DODs decision to innovate or not, it's going to happen. I see what's happening inside the force and then I see yester-years thought process on this thread. There's a huge gap in understanding the environment here and I'm trying to coach you all into seeing the future.
It's a lot like the current state of AI development. There's a feverish panic to leap ahead of your competitors out of the fear that your going to wake up one day and be so far behind that you can't overcome the capability gap quick enough. In a flash of a crisis you find out that you failed to assess the enemy correctly and position yourself to win and the first test that exposes it, was the critical or decisive action. Like companies losing money right now investing in AI, betting the future of the farm on AI because if they don't, they may wake up in 10 years and be so far behind, they're dead in the competitive space. "What happens if I invest in AI and it's not the game changer we think it's going to be? We lose a lot of money today. What happens if I don't invest in AI today and in 10 years it is the game changer and we missed the boat? We're dead. Game over." So, frankly it's just the safe bet.
That's my assessment of the mindset in DOD right now. This current pause is seen as a critical time to prepare. You can look across the globe and see competitive enemy states consolidating, prepping the environment, maneuvering themselves into positions of advantage under the threshold of all out acts of war. There's a sense in the air that putting your head in the sand right now would be fatal. This is why I think this program is gaining traction. I don't look at the scale of it's implementation as a sign that we're 100% adopting it, especially the current version, so I don't feel like I need to yell chicken little over the issues the gun is having right now. I see it as an expensive experiment. I could be wrong; have been before. I thought when people decided to put ATRAG and AB into the Kestrel it would be dumb as fuck. "How are you going to be able to enter and configure all that information that we were doing on PDAs on that tiny little screen with 5 buttons? That's going to be miserable." Well, apparently it worked out great, lol. So who knows... We all get to watch and see.
Some of the greatest military minds in the world, right here on Snipers Hide. If you unleashed these guys from their jobs at the dealership or back accounting office at the hardware store, they would change the world. Or maybe it's just an online E4 mafia.
I don't.
What is "underperforming" anyway?
Is the new weapon system going to remedy whatever metric they decide the M4 underperformed on only to introduce a rifle system that underperforms or fails in other categories?
A goal that is targeting a problem that is framed in such a way as to justify a new weapons program.
Killing and breaking shit.
If it can't do that better than the current system, shitcan it.
If it does it better in one category but at a major penalty in other categories, is it actually changing the final outcome in a positive manner?
100% agree.
That is exactly why I stated that I am not qualified and informed. Simply debating based on the small fraction of the big picture we are allowed to see. That's why my opinion doesn't mean shit.
To be clear, I am not indicting Sig. They are merely trying to respond to and deliver on what the DoD nerds are requesting.
Innovating = change. Change does not necessarily equate to better results in reality.
Super duper cool.
Even to the ignorant motherfuckers here that you are trying to coach, some of the information being shared from this program smells like a protected goat fuck.
Which is exactly why the fleeting time and limited money should be carefully focused on the most efficient path to improved lethality.
If you think most of us are putting our heads in the sand and trying to ignore reality, you are reading the room completely fucking wrong. You seem to be jumping to that conclusion simply because there are points of debate that counter your own views and perceptions.
China is evolving and scaling way past us. Russia is dangerously underestimated by the masses while simultaneously being painted as the booger man (which is a shame because they could and should be brought into our orbit as a nice ally/asset.) All this while the US has a possibly overconfident mindset.
We need to get with the program starting yesterday.
I literally think that the mindset and leadership change is going to have a bigger impact on our effectiveness and lethality than any small arms program. The meeting SECWAR had with all the top cheese this week laying out changes back to a warrior mindset is a perfect example of building a better foundation that the rest of the warfighting should be built on.
Innovate and prepare for future threats. Absolutely. But time is fleeting and miss-steps will be costly.
It’s an undefinable parameter. Something will always “underperform” at something, and that something is subjective to whoever is “examining” said equipment and roles.
What’s the next goalpost?
I like analogies, so I’m going to speak analogously…
My primary rifle for deer hunting is a 12” 6.5 Grendel. It is sufficiently accurate to the distances I typically hunt. It is light weight, short, semi-automatic, and even wearing a suppressor it is still lighter and shorter than many of the other rifles in my inventory.
My primary match rifle is a bolt action 6.5 creedmoor. It is measurably more precise than my hunting rifle, at distances well beyond what I would consider the effective range of my hunting rifle. But, it is substantially heavier and longer than my hunting rifle, and it is a bolt action.
Recently, I won a guided hunt and a stipulation of the hunt was a firearm that shoots a 150 grain bullet. Neither of the rifles above shoot a 150 grain bullet. But, I also have a 7mm rem mag and the factory 162 grain eld-m load from Hornady shoots very well from it. This rifle is lighter than my match rifle, and still shorter when suppressed. It fires a significantly higher performance cartridge than the 6.5 Grendel, while also being more precise than that rifle.
Looking at the rifles on paper, the 7mm rem mag is lighter than the match rifle, while being higher performance than the hunting rifle, thus it should be the clear winner in “what should I be taking hunting.” However, I will continue to carry the 6.5 Grendel while in the field in the future in the majority of my applications. The Grendel is sufficient, and the added capabilities of the 6.5 creedmoor and 7mm rem mag- while very real- are not necessary, and come with significant down sides.
With that… is the m4 sufficient? Are the added capabilities of the xm7 necessary? Do these added capabilities bring with them downsides (length, weight, bulk, limited ammo capacity, reliability, etc) that out-weight the benefits?
My primary rifle for deer hunting is a 12” 6.5 Grendel. It is sufficiently accurate to the distances I typically hunt. It is light weight, short, semi-automatic, and even wearing a suppressor it is still lighter and shorter than many of the other rifles in my inventory.
My primary match rifle is a bolt action 6.5 creedmoor. It is measurably more precise than my hunting rifle, at distances well beyond what I would consider the effective range of my hunting rifle. But, it is substantially heavier and longer than my hunting rifle, and it is a bolt action.
Recently, I won a guided hunt and a stipulation of the hunt was a firearm that shoots a 150 grain bullet. Neither of the rifles above shoot a 150 grain bullet. But, I also have a 7mm rem mag and the factory 162 grain eld-m load from Hornady shoots very well from it. This rifle is lighter than my match rifle, and still shorter when suppressed. It fires a significantly higher performance cartridge than the 6.5 Grendel, while also being more precise than that rifle.
Looking at the rifles on paper, the 7mm rem mag is lighter than the match rifle, while being higher performance than the hunting rifle, thus it should be the clear winner in “what should I be taking hunting.” However, I will continue to carry the 6.5 Grendel while in the field in the future in the majority of my applications. The Grendel is sufficient, and the added capabilities of the 6.5 creedmoor and 7mm rem mag- while very real- are not necessary, and come with significant down sides.
With that… is the m4 sufficient? Are the added capabilities of the xm7 necessary? Do these added capabilities bring with them downsides (length, weight, bulk, limited ammo capacity, reliability, etc) that out-weight the benefits?
1911 still going strong along with M2 50 cal and B52
You tell me. I'm using your words from post #257
Is that the actual goal of the program, or just your way to demonize it?
Great answer. Basically you don't have a fact based objective. By definition an E tool will accomplish your goal.
Do better at what? See what I mean? There are metrics and planning factors that this all has to be judged against. All generated from an operational needs and threat assessment. And you have to know what they are to understand if the aging M4 and EPR is "underperforming". And if the program is needed or just self licking.
Correct, that's why they are two different words in the English language and have two different definitions. Change does not equal Innovation. But It is fair to say that a lot of people fuck up innovation. I have a love-hate relationship with the current idea of innovation in the military. Over the last 4 years our organization has been encouraging "innovation" at all levels. Anything goes. Any object, process, or tactic can be thrown out the window and reinvented using Bro-Science just to demonstrate innovation. Drove me crazy. The force is very young right now. People with less than 10 years in service still need to learn their jobs. Which means they need to learn doctrine or unit SOPs. They need to learn the basics and the things that the people that came before them knew. AFTER you demonstrate mastery of the basics, you perform sets and reps. You gain experience doing the basics. Then you perform them in multiple deployments and environments. So you have perspective and wisdom that allows you to synthesize as a part of critical thinking. You see shortcomings and strengths, come to know constraints and limiting factors. THEN you are ready to innovate. When you arrive in a new theater and asses the operational environment, pull from your playbook the normal tactics and SOPs, you adapt them to compensate for a shortcomings or get around a constraint. Or gain an advantage. It is specific, timed, and with a specific goal in mind. You don't need to innovate react to contact, squad attack, or break contact. Those are the basics. Just do them well and innovate an overall scheme of maneuver to fit a specific objective.
So I get it. I understand the difference between change for changes sake and innovation.
Nope. I got to that conclusion by all the comments saying we should stick with the M4 and just supe' up 556. Or that a rifleman's rifle doesn't matter in modern combat so what's the point. Or even the fence riders that think 6mm and ICAR is the answer. That's what the room said. That's why I asked the question that no one seems comfortable answering. Are we just going to stick with the M4 for the next 100-200 years? Really? At some point we have to develop a new rifle. At some point. And there's probably going to be experimentation involved which means failures and iterative generations. Have some combat patience; don't get all tied up in a knot over it. Calm breeds calm.
For sure. But they can both happen at the same time. Doesn't have to be mutually exclusive.
Look, all I'm saying is prison sex. It's going to happen one way or the other. Fight it, and it's going to hurt. Lean into it, and you just might enjoy it a little. I'm kidding, just trying to add some levity to ease up the back and forth
How is the 1911 still going strong? Riddle me that. Where? With whom?
The M2 is an awesome gun, but we've been patching the shit out of it for a while. Hell,.it couldn't penetrate mud walls. SLAP rounds, changing the dangerous headspace and gauge procedure, and at the end of the day... it's still too heavy and lacks penetration.
I don't know shit about airplanes
I think your analogy has merit when it comes to my experience shooting 22ARC, 6mmAR, and 223 in gas gun matches. Though you should get better ballistics at range, nothing beats a 223 in the AR for accuracy and reliability, in practice. As a parts builder, I just don't have the control or expertise to modify my AR to make the platform allow those cartridges their full potential. The best I can do on my kitchen table is follow in the footsteps of the people that made the 223 perform great in the AR15. (You know, like the AR Stoner brand from the MidwayUSA flyers) And that's kind of the point, my experience building Aero 's on my kitchen table just isn't very relevant to developing weapons technology for the most powerful military in the world.
Or dangerous(lazy, same same) leadership that FAILED to teach their subordinates how to do it correctly BEFORE shit hit the fan?
Ideally, sure. But headspace'ing the barrels that way was an output of manufacturing when the M2 was designed. We can do better than that these days. It's just unnecessary. And the proof is in the pudding. Because we did.
I don’t think there is any real incentive for buy-in across NATO and Pacific allies to switch the basic small arms cartridge right now, given how volatile everything is.
It feels like the geopolitical situation is making everyone averse to tampering with proven things, especially in a space that is so inconsequential for Full-Scale warfare.
The technical and small arms industry side in the US is ready for a change, but the logistics isn’t based on the assumption of impending and already-existing large-scale conflict. This makes the Army’s insistence on doubling-down on 6.8x51 even more perplexing.
Hence the private sector is the real market for any changes right now.
This shows you are digesting anything I type as me demonizing the program.
Attempting to debate pros and cons has somehow morphed into demonizing?
You are simply shutting down any dissent to your view.
That's cool.
Carry on.
They’ve already had Russians surrendering to ground robots while aerial drones over-watched.
And this is in a protracted conflict where neither side had modern, at-scale net-centric capabilities, widespread PGMs, advanced night operations capabilities for air assets, or high-end platforms to work with. It’s why it’s inappropriate to use all of what we see from Ukraine as some type of example for conflicts that the US might be involved in.
The 6.8 NGSW wouldn’t even fit into the DM/Sniper roles there well at all, since it isn’t accurate or precise with that mongoloid barrel mating and handguard abortion, with an external piston to-boot.
The factories cranking-out PGMs, loitering munition UAS, and Kamikazee drones are only increasing in order and production volume.
Their force posture ordnance inventories in forward-deployed aircraft, ships, and subs are already structured where critical enemy nodes have multiple PGMs assigned to them. It’s easier to build a PGM than it is a Command & Control Center, a ship, airbase, submarine, fighter, EW aircraft, bunker, supply truck, etc.
So an assumption of PGMs expended = all TGTs serviced and no enemy remaining with any combat or logistics distribution power.
Same with advanced fighters. They are attrition-generators, not something that sees high attrition.
In ODS, we fought an Air Force that had 768 tactical combat aircraft, tons of mobile theater ballistic missile platforms that were almost impossible to find, and the most heavily-defended, layered integrated air defense network at the time.
The idea of man vs man in trenches as an outcome of how we prosecute LSCO doesn’t materialize when I war-game it out. The kill web timeline and logistics war don’t show anything of the kind happening. Dismounted soldiers don’t even have time to be deployed, unless they’re already in-theater guarding staging areas, and would be withdrawn from vulnerable areas that didn’t have enough Air Defense and counter-UAS to protect juicy mass-casualty TGTs of Joes sitting around in tents, waiting for Mission orders that never come.
Weirdly, creativity thrives when there are restraints. Often creativity stalls when all worlds are possible.
Hypothesize the problem with a very small team. Frame it. Realize you can’t boil the ocean.
Who you choose for the team is extremely important. They better be good, and aren’t the type that says “No” when faced with a new idea. Riffing types of people are key. Give them a lot of autonomy.
Consider capping their budget. Restraints & creativity, again. Later, consider uncapping it if an idea has merit.
But don’t tell the team that beforehand.
Then (or concurrently) go research the current state state of the world and think about the future state.
Get in the mindset that everything is a prototype. Everything. And use a very small team of very talented people to brainstorm and try things, over and over.
Test your solution in the real world, quickly, often, and in sample sizes that give you confidence in the data. Increase the sample sizes as your team gets more confident in the prototype idea.
Scaling too quickly is like turning up the heat in the oven to 600° so you can bake the cake faster.
My 2¢
Hypothesize the problem with a very small team. Frame it. Realize you can’t boil the ocean.
Who you choose for the team is extremely important. They better be good, and aren’t the type that says “No” when faced with a new idea. Riffing types of people are key. Give them a lot of autonomy.
Consider capping their budget. Restraints & creativity, again. Later, consider uncapping it if an idea has merit.
But don’t tell the team that beforehand.
Then (or concurrently) go research the current state state of the world and think about the future state.
Get in the mindset that everything is a prototype. Everything. And use a very small team of very talented people to brainstorm and try things, over and over.
Test your solution in the real world, quickly, often, and in sample sizes that give you confidence in the data. Increase the sample sizes as your team gets more confident in the prototype idea.
Scaling too quickly is like turning up the heat in the oven to 600° so you can bake the cake faster.
My 2¢
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You could take 4 of us from this thread and make a dramatically-superior NGSW submission plus a superior DM carbine than anything that has been submitted to DoD in generations.
That includes the LMG, DM Weapon, and Individual Carbine.
You can exceed the velocity thresholds of the 6.8x51 by 300-500fps with less pressure than 5.56x45, and increase the overall round count in the Unit from what it currently is at.
You can take the KAC AMG and chamber it in a more efficient intermediate cartridge and deliver performance more like an M240, with 50% or less recoil, and less chamber pressure, with gunners able to just watch there sight picture and easily self-spot.
We can keep 5.56x45, reduce the barrel length even more to 11.5” for most duty positions, while achieving 16-18” barrel muzzle velocities without any structural or metallurgical changes to TDP.
Basically do a mix of the High Performance Intermediate Cartridge for DMs and LMG gunners that eventually phases out 7.62 NATO for dismounts, and do NAS 5.56 from 11.5” for:
Company HQ and Senior Leaders, PLs, PSGs, Combat Medics, Attchments, etc.
Weapons Squad pack mules (AGs & ABs)
WPNs Squad Leader could take the DM weapon or 11.5” per arms room concept
Grenadiers would get the smallest version of the carbine or PDW as possible. That duty position is already being looked at to carry a counter-UAS 30mm self-loader that looks a lot like what SPIW did in the 1960s, without the direct fire double weapon.
Riflemen could be equipped with either the 11.5” carbine, or DMC, depending on theater, AOR, and marksmanship abilities.
Same for Rifle Squad Leaders and Fire Team Leaders.
So I’m definitely not advocating for stagnation or “M4 is good enough perpetually”. We have some excellent basic firearms designs already that are known quantities in reliability and accuracy.
Nobody has been able to make a semi-automatic rifle that has more accuracy potential than the Stoner system, so until there is a breakthrough in mechanical advantages over it, it makes no sense to g backwards in time with external pistons and Cohen-suit designs from SIG for the MCX Spear abortion of barrel mate-up and handguard attachment.
Any .473” case head design will not get us more round count added to the force. And they’re already looking at adding 2 more Radio-sized Counter-UAS emitters/jammers to the soldiers load.
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You can take 4 from this thread and talk about submitting dramatically-superior NGSW.
But executing, not even close.
Right on.
Best talent with freedom of movement within the problem solving realm. Have that throttled by having to meet/exceed real-world thresholds. Ideally land a workable solution that also has room for future growth built into the basic architecture.
Yeah. You get it.
I mean…the best next rifle might not even be a rifle.
Now where’s that peyote button man
If you had given me a tiny fraction of NGSW’s budget, there would already be an 11.5” upper fielded to early units with the moderator, KAC AMGs having been through however many months/years of testing & refinement needed for the High Performance Intermediate Cartridge, and the DM Carbine already done and dusted with a Division and Brigade-level DM programs embedded into the Army from OSUT, NCOPD, and into Infantry-specific courses already being run by 4th RTB and others.
There would also be NAS high-performance 5.56 available for the OCONUS use, while continuing to mass-produce a more-affordable training 5.56 load that doesn’t require the EPR projectile, but generates the same pressures and pressure curve with mass and shank length.
A fraction of the budget could have been used to refine and develop the Intermediate Cartridge with a range of projectiles to cover the LMG tracer, EPR, training FMJ, and DM high BC options. From a 12” barrel, you can already achieve 3400fps with an EPR, before we even go to NAS cases. This has been demonstrated already with at least 2 different intermediate cartridge designs, one pushing only 55ksi, the other 50-52ksi. One of those has more barrel life than 7.62x51/.308 Win.
The real challenge is in systems integration with all the enablers. The private sector is inching closer and closer, but there are yards to go. Most of the innovation is happening because of hog hunters with thermals, LRFs, and other electro-optical aiming/illumination emitters and sensors being crammed into single units now, but the man-machine interface is atrocious by aerospace standards and thinking. Not everyone needs a full-capability Electro-Optical Aiming System with integral LRF and ballistics computer though.
There would also be NAS high-performance 5.56 available for the OCONUS use, while continuing to mass-produce a more-affordable training 5.56 load that doesn’t require the EPR projectile, but generates the same pressures and pressure curve with mass and shank length.
A fraction of the budget could have been used to refine and develop the Intermediate Cartridge with a range of projectiles to cover the LMG tracer, EPR, training FMJ, and DM high BC options. From a 12” barrel, you can already achieve 3400fps with an EPR, before we even go to NAS cases. This has been demonstrated already with at least 2 different intermediate cartridge designs, one pushing only 55ksi, the other 50-52ksi. One of those has more barrel life than 7.62x51/.308 Win.
The real challenge is in systems integration with all the enablers. The private sector is inching closer and closer, but there are yards to go. Most of the innovation is happening because of hog hunters with thermals, LRFs, and other electro-optical aiming/illumination emitters and sensors being crammed into single units now, but the man-machine interface is atrocious by aerospace standards and thinking. Not everyone needs a full-capability Electro-Optical Aiming System with integral LRF and ballistics computer though.
At least 2 of the 4 have already executed, not just talkers.
1 was instrumental in the development and fielding of Mk.262 77gr, for example.
Others have worked in the development of weapons systems that exceed anything the US Army has ever, or likely will ever have in terms of explosive weight delivery, survivability, and lethality, in program management schedules and oversight that see the entirety of the US Small arms as a small rounding error in the budget.
Nah, this is just your avoidance of debating on merit. You have plenty of opportunity to debate pros and cons. You just need to present facts.
Uh huh, sure. Everyone talks a big game until they're in a position of responsibility.
You know who you remind me of? Theis.
As a completely outside observer of this conversation, it seems to me that you are awfully sensitive and defensive about this, in addition to your hubris on the subject. If I didn’t know any better, and I don’t, I’d think that you are integrally involved in the XM7 project and feel attacked.
Or else maybe you are Theis?
They recently released a photo of a shortened XM7 with 10.5” barrel and a labyrinthine suppressor.
That’s their answer to reducing size and weight. Only problem is when you reduce size and weight with a weapon firing a cartridge that has 44gr of powder, the recoil gets worse.
That’s their answer to reducing size and weight. Only problem is when you reduce size and weight with a weapon firing a cartridge that has 44gr of powder, the recoil gets worse.
How much time did Theis spend in DoD aerospace developmental programs or as an 11B? Didn’t Theis scam a bunch of people out of thousands of dollars on this site? Not seeing any parallels with him.
I don’t expect dismounted soldiers to understand the vast majority of the force structure or much of the technologies involved in systems they’ll never have their hand on, as it isn’t necessary. None of the Army officer corps, outside of Aviation and Air Defense, are keen to most of the big picture and the technologies involved.
Same way I don’t expect a guy on a carrier maintaining catapults to understand the metallurgy in turbofan high pressure blades, or the infinitesimally-small microprocessors on a modern chip, or thermal efficiency of an advanced semiconductor used in sensors.
But small arms are at a place where some of the aerospace tech can trickle down and better integrate the enablers.
The AR-10 and AR-15 already came from aerospace materials science for the frame and weight-savings, using aircraft-grade aluminum and a gas tube that looks a lot like hydraulic lines. I’ve always suspected Stoner and Fairchild used those because of their aerospace backgrounds. Stoner was an aviation ordnance guy in the Marines during the War, then a machinist for the Whittaker aircraft company making valve and hose-fittings after WWII.
Fairchild was of course an aircraft company with lots of experience with metallurgy, high-grade aluminum, and stringent specifications for products that had to adhere to DoD specs. Small Arms wasn’t their focus though, so they sold the patents to Colt.
You know what boggles me about you and why I said that? Who the fuck has a day job and can post all these long ass dissertations complete with 1980's Soldier of Fortune pictures in 30 mins?! That is a developed skill that takes dedication. Does that sound like someone working their ass off in real job?
You are completely unmatched in your diatribes on this forum.
I’ve spent many decades dealing with the same and other people in decision-making and DoD program management, on multi-billion dollar programs that bring far more destructive power into the force.
The difference between the aerospace programs is that they are extremely successful and the envy of our allies and enemies.
When it comes strictly to small arms development and the US Army, the track record is much different (M14, M60, M9, etc.). As I mentioned before, the US Army has not envisioned and managed a successful rifle program since the Garand. The best General Purpose Machinegun ever fielded in US military history is the FN MAG58, type-classified as the M240 in US service. This is part of the historical record that we all can see independently.
You would think the Army, of all organizations, would be able to handle something as simple as small arms, but time and again over the last 85+ years, they have managed to screw it up as a rule.
My personal observations, which may be totally flawed, are that when the Army is managing its people, it places the smartest ones in career management fields where they can handle developmental programs with more lethality and survivability requirements, and the less-capable thinkers are assigned to less-demanding CMFs where the leaders have less access to things that go boom. When I was younger, I didn’t understand this because of Infantry bias, but now I understand why they would manage people that way. The best and brightest are not typically assigned to small arms development, when they need them for aviation, missiles, artillery, armor (in the past), Electronic Warfare, Comms, etc.
The success of the AR-15 proliferation was because of a combination of the USAF and 1960s SOF units demanding it, once they saw how lightweight, low-recoil, and effective it was. The success of the design was because of innovation from marginal aspects of the aerospace industry. The AR-15 got its DNA from aerospace, not the antiquated wood and steel designs from the previous centuries.
The difference between the aerospace programs is that they are extremely successful and the envy of our allies and enemies.
When it comes strictly to small arms development and the US Army, the track record is much different (M14, M60, M9, etc.). As I mentioned before, the US Army has not envisioned and managed a successful rifle program since the Garand. The best General Purpose Machinegun ever fielded in US military history is the FN MAG58, type-classified as the M240 in US service. This is part of the historical record that we all can see independently.
You would think the Army, of all organizations, would be able to handle something as simple as small arms, but time and again over the last 85+ years, they have managed to screw it up as a rule.
My personal observations, which may be totally flawed, are that when the Army is managing its people, it places the smartest ones in career management fields where they can handle developmental programs with more lethality and survivability requirements, and the less-capable thinkers are assigned to less-demanding CMFs where the leaders have less access to things that go boom. When I was younger, I didn’t understand this because of Infantry bias, but now I understand why they would manage people that way. The best and brightest are not typically assigned to small arms development, when they need them for aviation, missiles, artillery, armor (in the past), Electronic Warfare, Comms, etc.
The success of the AR-15 proliferation was because of a combination of the USAF and 1960s SOF units demanding it, once they saw how lightweight, low-recoil, and effective it was. The success of the design was because of innovation from marginal aspects of the aerospace industry. The AR-15 got its DNA from aerospace, not the antiquated wood and steel designs from the previous centuries.
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I haven’t been on a W-2 in many, many years. I’ve also been working on the problem set that NGSW aims to address since 2005, after what I saw with Land Warrior and basically smashing mega-geek aerospace thinking with mega-grunt cave man understandings about how small arms and aiming/illumination systems are actually used in a variety of environments.You know what boggles me about you and why I said that? Who the fuck has a day job and can post all these long ass dissertations complete with 1980's Soldier of Fortune pictures in 30 mins?! That is a developed skill that takes dedication. Does that sound like someone working their ass off in real job?
You are completely unmatched in your diatribes on this forum.
Not everyone bought into the debt slave caste that others have created for them. The whole reason I logged-on today was to post in the Investor forum, and I saw hits from this thread, was expecting to see the 10.5” NGSW photos, but nope.
< bong hit >
You can tear people (or ideas) down, or build them up. Or ignore them.
Mumbo jumbo.
It’s up to you. The process, the rifle, the whatever is right there, in your mind’s eye.
Mumbo jumbo.
That whatever is ready for someone (you?) to take hold of. To create. Are you ready, is it time?
Or,
will you say
(again?)
it’s all
mumbo
jumbo
?
You can tear people (or ideas) down, or build them up. Or ignore them.
Mumbo jumbo.
It’s up to you. The process, the rifle, the whatever is right there, in your mind’s eye.
Mumbo jumbo.
That whatever is ready for someone (you?) to take hold of. To create. Are you ready, is it time?
Or,
will you say
(again?)
it’s all
mumbo
jumbo
?
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I love you’re, “I’m just a guy on the ground and therefore I know all and see all.” hubris. It’s refreshing. Really!
You have me convinced!
Thread-swerve: Take any money you’re spending on beer, dip, cigarettes, peyote, weed, coffee, whatever you’re addicted to, and put it into investments.
There are more opportunities to make money now that any time in history, and you’re in the best position if you live in the US due to how diverse and wealthy each market is.
Among younger workers with steady incomes and relatively-secure industries (like healthcare, DoD, legal profession, and skilled trades) I see a lot of terrible financial decisions being made, especially with regard to automobile financing.
Financing new or relatively-new vehicles is one of the worst decisions you can make, especially with brands who literally build their profit strategies on services.
Even if you don’t invest, it cuts into your ammo budget. Cue the video of the guys showing up to a machine-gun shoot in the little beater sedan with its trunk full of belt-feds and ammo dragging the back-end in the mud.
This will be interesting once they bring the 6.5 CM and 6 ARC variants out. 308 gives 200fps increase in all barrel lengths and similar for the 556 as well... Larger case volume = lower pressure = ability to push velocity higher with more powder before hitting max pressure
I remember that (I kept tabs on each year’s International and SF Sniper Competitions), and heard similar details about PSR FUBAR from other guys in this very thread who had close proximity or inside FOV. The one that stood out more to me was the Team who won using 7mm SAUM AR-10s back in the early-mid 2000s if I recall.
I had already been shooting .338 LM regularly with the Finns since 2005 and a US competitor for PSR who already had a switch-barrel/caliber system in 2008. I first met them at 2008 SHOT. I was a regular attendee or helping booths with several companies at SHOT from 2008-2019.
I was sure SF would get their .338 LM PSR sniper system, but then the Navy insisted .300 Win Mag was fine with a new bullet and jamming more powder into the case. I also knew Federal engineers who explained what the throat/barrel life was when doing that, with some throats eroding unacceptably within 100rds in a tighter firing schedule.
I grew up with the M21 and M24, but we used the M24 for pretty much all of our Sniper Sustainment training in 3 different Scout Sniper Platoons. M21 was being used at Benning for stalks still. M24 was great for flat range, KD, some UKD, but not something I ever saw as a good solution for going outside the wire with, at least for Battalion Recon Platoon Sniper Sections. I know plenty who did it in early days of GWOT with the PVS-10 mounted on top, but their ability to shoot and move was extremely limited, and almost totally-reliant on Team members to protect them.
I’ve also seen .338 LM do fine at sea level conditions out to ELR, or high humidity arctic and summer conditions in Finland, as well as high altitude in the mountains here in CO, UT, and ID. The Finns were testing GS Customs monoliths for armor defeat as well. We shot deep into APC armor at 500m at one of their ranges on a day when doing practical wind-reading and range estimation exercises. That solid bullet was brutal on armor defeat without even using any type of tungsten penetrator.
I think with PSR, there were way too many cooks in the kitchen, and some of them didn’t even know how to cook, even with a much longer Sniper school in their community. They never placed in SF Sniper Competition either, never even broke over 50% in the past 21 years. Foreign teams, other services (USMC, National Guard) have won and/or placed regularly.
I had already been shooting .338 LM regularly with the Finns since 2005 and a US competitor for PSR who already had a switch-barrel/caliber system in 2008. I first met them at 2008 SHOT. I was a regular attendee or helping booths with several companies at SHOT from 2008-2019.
I was sure SF would get their .338 LM PSR sniper system, but then the Navy insisted .300 Win Mag was fine with a new bullet and jamming more powder into the case. I also knew Federal engineers who explained what the throat/barrel life was when doing that, with some throats eroding unacceptably within 100rds in a tighter firing schedule.
I grew up with the M21 and M24, but we used the M24 for pretty much all of our Sniper Sustainment training in 3 different Scout Sniper Platoons. M21 was being used at Benning for stalks still. M24 was great for flat range, KD, some UKD, but not something I ever saw as a good solution for going outside the wire with, at least for Battalion Recon Platoon Sniper Sections. I know plenty who did it in early days of GWOT with the PVS-10 mounted on top, but their ability to shoot and move was extremely limited, and almost totally-reliant on Team members to protect them.
I’ve also seen .338 LM do fine at sea level conditions out to ELR, or high humidity arctic and summer conditions in Finland, as well as high altitude in the mountains here in CO, UT, and ID. The Finns were testing GS Customs monoliths for armor defeat as well. We shot deep into APC armor at 500m at one of their ranges on a day when doing practical wind-reading and range estimation exercises. That solid bullet was brutal on armor defeat without even using any type of tungsten penetrator.
I think with PSR, there were way too many cooks in the kitchen, and some of them didn’t even know how to cook, even with a much longer Sniper school in their community. They never placed in SF Sniper Competition either, never even broke over 50% in the past 21 years. Foreign teams, other services (USMC, National Guard) have won and/or placed regularly.
The M24 will still do the job today that it was designed for. It was fairly durable, very reliable, and just dead simple. It could have done with the M24A2 upgrade in the mid-90's. Suppressor, DBM, and 300WM barrel (a long with the INOD upgrade), but it still wouldn't be a switch barrel 338, would it? And it never could. We had to develop something new to get there. See why my perspective is what it is?
Another example where Big Army bent SF over in small arms was with the LMT Enhanced BCG for the M4.
It was a good, working solution for the excess gas from the CLGS and especially CLGS + KAC QDSS NT4 suppressor, in addition to a bolt that wouldn’t break within 6-12k rds.
Big Army said, “But if it ends up in a 20” RLGS M16, it will short-stroke, so we can’t let that maybe happen with these BCGs in the inventory.” Someone needed to be in a position to shoot down that argument, with authority.
At some point, we have to face the fact that the Army sucks at imagining, developing, and fielding small arms. Someone needs to take that ball away from them, and place it in competent hands. There are all kinds of highly-capable engineers, technicians, and end-users, but every time, the decision-makers manage to eliminate great solutions and designs from being adopted, and go with retarded fecal-blast abortions.
The example of SOCOM monkey-humping the PSR doesn’t bode well for SOCOM being front-and-center either, due to the cooks-in-kitchen analogy. How the crap did so many NATO partner nations, who don’t even speak a common language besides English, manage to adopt .338 LM fairly so seamlessly?
This is why I already concluded years ago that the US Army will never deliver a viable or competent solution in the small arms space. It’s a waste of time for any company to try to help them either. They can’t be told because of institutional echo chambers, not realizing they haven’t delivered a successful Infantry rifle/carbine in generations.
It was a good, working solution for the excess gas from the CLGS and especially CLGS + KAC QDSS NT4 suppressor, in addition to a bolt that wouldn’t break within 6-12k rds.
Big Army said, “But if it ends up in a 20” RLGS M16, it will short-stroke, so we can’t let that maybe happen with these BCGs in the inventory.” Someone needed to be in a position to shoot down that argument, with authority.
At some point, we have to face the fact that the Army sucks at imagining, developing, and fielding small arms. Someone needs to take that ball away from them, and place it in competent hands. There are all kinds of highly-capable engineers, technicians, and end-users, but every time, the decision-makers manage to eliminate great solutions and designs from being adopted, and go with retarded fecal-blast abortions.
The example of SOCOM monkey-humping the PSR doesn’t bode well for SOCOM being front-and-center either, due to the cooks-in-kitchen analogy. How the crap did so many NATO partner nations, who don’t even speak a common language besides English, manage to adopt .338 LM fairly so seamlessly?
This is why I already concluded years ago that the US Army will never deliver a viable or competent solution in the small arms space. It’s a waste of time for any company to try to help them either. They can’t be told because of institutional echo chambers, not realizing they haven’t delivered a successful Infantry rifle/carbine in generations.
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There is no perfect process.
Even within USSOCOM there are different equities, preferences, prejudices, wants, and demands. What works for frogmen doesn't necessarily work in the Hindu Kush.
For Big Leg Army the requirements writers and developers are nowhere near the shooters nor the intel folks who stare at threat changes daily.
The resource bean counters and facilities people have already built the 6.8 line at Lake City and started building war stock -- while the rifle shoots up to 8 and 9 minute groups.
Even within USSOCOM there are different equities, preferences, prejudices, wants, and demands. What works for frogmen doesn't necessarily work in the Hindu Kush.
For Big Leg Army the requirements writers and developers are nowhere near the shooters nor the intel folks who stare at threat changes daily.
The resource bean counters and facilities people have already built the 6.8 line at Lake City and started building war stock -- while the rifle shoots up to 8 and 9 minute groups.
