Ukraine war Bullshit.
- Thread starter JAS-SH
- Start date
I call B/S across the board. All your posts are there for anyone to read just like mine & everyone else's. Unlike you & your other trolls most of us shoot, and don't have to use google, to partake of any subject on this sight. There are subsections here the answers can't be googled, I've never seen you and your ink in them. Why would that be?
for example?
And I shoot. Every weekend.
Then what triggers you so much about me, read my posts or skip them. Why don't you ask me something? Find out where I was and where I wasn't?
I've already answered here a few times. I was there. Now at home.
If you want evidence then go private.
If the goal is different climb a dick.
No, I don't know.
Do you know what's on my avatar?
But I know for sure that a word like yaserka is not typical for your ear and very typical for Russian.
Why is the guy ashamed of his nickname?
And during those wars, who did you vote for who ultimately sent young men to die?
You didn't get the word??
Trump was on the phone with Winnie the Pooh today explaining his global rolling surrender doctrine and how it works.
No new tariffs, guaranteed for at least 6 months!
Thank you for your attention to this matter!
Who will ream Trump's heinie tomorrow?
Elon (some more?)
J-state?
Harvard?
a Judge?
I bet $1 on Iran.
site
/sīt/
noun
an area of ground on which a town, building, or monument is constructed.
"the proposed site of a hydroelectric dam"
a website.
"the site has no ads and is not being promoted with banners"
verb
verb: site;
fix or build (something) in a particular place.
"the rectory is sited behind the church"
sight
/sīt/
noun
noun: sight; plural noun: sights
the faculty or power of seeing.
"Joseph lost his sight as a baby"
a thing that one sees or that can be seen.
"John was a familiar sight in the bar for many years"
a device on a gun or optical instrument used for assisting a person's precise aim or observation.
"there were reports of a man on the roof aiming a rifle and looking through its sights"
verb
manage to see or observe (someone or something); catch an initial glimpse of.
"tell me when you sight London Bridge"
WHY IS IT ALWAYS THE ILLITERATES????
Your deflection is a none starter, troll.You didn't get the word??
Trump was on the phone with Winnie the Pooh today explaining his global rolling surrender doctrine and how it works.
No new tariffs, guaranteed for at least 6 months!
Thank you for your attention to this matter!
Who will ream Trump's heinie tomorrow?
Elon (some more?)
J-state?
Harvard?
a Judge?
I bet $1 on Iran.
site
/sīt/
noun
an area of ground on which a town, building, or monument is constructed.
"the proposed site of a hydroelectric dam"
a website.
"the site has no ads and is not being promoted with banners"
verb
verb: site;
fix or build (something) in a particular place.
"the rectory is sited behind the church"
sight
/sīt/
noun
noun: sight; plural noun: sights
the faculty or power of seeing.
"Joseph lost his sight as a baby"
a thing that one sees or that can be seen.
"John was a familiar sight in the bar for many years"
a device on a gun or optical instrument used for assisting a person's precise aim or observation.
"there were reports of a man on the roof aiming a rifle and looking through its sights"
verb
manage to see or observe (someone or something); catch an initial glimpse of.
"tell me when you sight London Bridge"
WHY IS IT ALWAYS THE ILLITERATES????
That’s quite the post.You didn't get the word??
Trump was on the phone with Winnie the Pooh today explaining his global rolling surrender doctrine and how it works.
No new tariffs, guaranteed for at least 6 months!
Thank you for your attention to this matter!
Who will ream Trump's heinie tomorrow?
Elon (some more?)
J-state?
Harvard?
a Judge?
I bet $1 on Iran.
site
/sīt/
noun
an area of ground on which a town, building, or monument is constructed.
"the proposed site of a hydroelectric dam"
a website.
"the site has no ads and is not being promoted with banners"
verb
verb: site;
fix or build (something) in a particular place.
"the rectory is sited behind the church"
sight
/sīt/
noun
noun: sight; plural noun: sights
the faculty or power of seeing.
"Joseph lost his sight as a baby"
a thing that one sees or that can be seen.
"John was a familiar sight in the bar for many years"
a device on a gun or optical instrument used for assisting a person's precise aim or observation.
"there were reports of a man on the roof aiming a rifle and looking through its sights"
verb
manage to see or observe (someone or something); catch an initial glimpse of.
"tell me when you sight London Bridge"
WHY IS IT ALWAYS THE ILLITERATES????
What do you think @LuckyDuck ?
You didn't get the word??
Trump was on the phone with Winnie the Pooh today explaining his global rolling surrender doctrine and how it works.
No new tariffs, guaranteed for at least 6 months!
Thank you for your attention to this matter!
Who will ream Trump's heinie tomorrow?
Elon (some more?)
J-state?
Harvard?
a Judge?
I bet $1 on Iran.
site
/sīt/
noun
an area of ground on which a town, building, or monument is constructed.
"the proposed site of a hydroelectric dam"
a website.
"the site has no ads and is not being promoted with banners"
verb
verb: site;
fix or build (something) in a particular place.
"the rectory is sited behind the church"
sight
/sīt/
noun
noun: sight; plural noun: sights
the faculty or power of seeing.
"Joseph lost his sight as a baby"
a thing that one sees or that can be seen.
"John was a familiar sight in the bar for many years"
a device on a gun or optical instrument used for assisting a person's precise aim or observation.
"there were reports of a man on the roof aiming a rifle and looking through its sights"
verb
manage to see or observe (someone or something); catch an initial glimpse of.
"tell me when you sight London Bridge"
WHY IS IT ALWAYS THE ILLITERATES????
+
Why?You didn't write yasherka or krysa or Volk and then you can't explain when people ask what it is
Okay.
Googled it.
I see you were hanging out on the old m14 forum. It looks like you're
conducting weapons training. Are you satisfied?
So what do you say about the lizard, because it's giving me no peace.
And the main question is what are you looking for in this topic where there are so many lies?
Is it entertainment?
Concern about the fate of the country?
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I've never conducted weapons training on or thru that forum. Have no clue as how you arrived at that.
Remoras (sucker-fish) attach their selves to a larger host fish to feed from their scraps, they are an opportunist, Ring a bell?
You more clueless, than your midget idol.
Laughing, w/o the west that would have been a 2 week boy scout romp.
it is strange that the EU leaders and our deep state lizards want to start nuc war. insane but that seems to be the case. do they think they will survive it? do they think they will rule after it ends? i know we have "secure" places for the pres and others to go. i assume the Chinese and Russians do as well. a lot of government members will be in targeted areas. any ability to produce food,manuf goods,clean water will mostly be destroyed. i doubt every ruling war monger is as well provided for as ours. very strange actions. a lot of talk and no sense of reality. you know they have advisors that might have a brain. WTF?
Ever wonder why Ukraine is a complete shit hole.
Ukraine is a middle-income country. Its GDP per capita is somewhere around $13000, which is similar to Libya or Paraguay. That’s not terrible, but what is terrible is how Ukraine has stagnated since the fall of the Soviet Union. By the World Bank’s reckoning, Ukraine is about 20% poorer now than it was in 1990!
If Ukraine had experienced growth similar to that of Poland or Romania since the fall of communism, it would now have a GDP in the $30,000-$35,000 range, and would essentially be a developed country. Even if it had only managed to match Belarus’ performance, it would be half again as rich as it is now. As things stand, Ukraine’s economic failure has left it less capable of defending itself. It also might have made Russia’s public more likely to support intervention in Ukraine, as Putin’s portrayal of Ukraine as a basket case has been a key part of his justification for aggression.
So why did this happen? Why has Ukraine failed economically? One obvious culprit is the war itself, which since 2014 has chilled foreign investment and forced the government to divert resources toward the military. In my over view of Warsaw pact countries, I concluded that Rule #1 for economic development was not to piss off Vladimir Putin. But looking at the graphs above, it’s very clear that that can’t be the whole story, because Ukraine’s problems began well before 2014.
So let’s break those problems down by time period. Essentially, we need to ask why Ukraine’s GDP fell by so much in the 90s, and why it failed to climb faster between 2000 and 2014.
In general, the rule for countries is that they’re poor until something happens to make them rich. Thus, many disappointing growth stories (Pakistan) can be explained simply by a lack of pro-development policy. But with Ukraine that’s not quite true. Looking at the graphs above, we can see that although all of the Eastern Bloc countries suffered some kind of economic damage from the collapse of communism, Ukraine suffered the worst — even worse than Russia or Belarus. Why?
One reason was hyperinflation. This afflicted most of the post-communist countries, but was worst in Ukraine. In Russia, inflation peaked at around 2500% in 1992, and in Belarus at around 2200% in 1994, but in Ukraine it hit 10,000% in 1993. It’s not clear why this was higher; Ukraine’s budget deficit was actually slightly lower than Russia’s, and all of these countries were financing their borrowing via money creation (generally believed to be the thing that sparks hyperinflation). One possibility is corruption; special interest groups in Ukraine were more powerful than elsewhere, and threatened to block fiscal consolidation. But in any case, macroeconomics seems to have dealt Ukraine a particularly severe blow.
Microeconomics probably hurt it as well. The Soviet economy was really bad at manufacturing, but wasn’t that terrible at extracting natural resources, which is why the resource-dependent Central Asian countries didn’t suffer as much from the fall of the USSR as their counterparts in East Europe. Russia has a lot of natural resources, so it was sort of halfway between East Europe and Central Asia in this regard. But Soviet Ukraine’s economy was more dependent on manufacturing, so it probably suffered more from the collapse of the inefficient Soviet system. As for Belarus, it actually kept much of its soviet manufacturing going; it wasn’t very efficient, but Russia did it a big favor by continuing to buy its goods and give it cheap fuel. Ukraine proceeded with shock therapy, and in proportional terms it had the most to shock.
So that pretty much answers the question of why Ukraine took such a huge hit in the early and mid 1990s. But by 2000 the macroeconomic situation had stabilized and shock therapy had run its course and Ukraine started to grow again. Why didn’t it grow faster?
In my series of posts about economic development, I’ve tried to analyze each country through the lens of what I call the Chang-Studwell model of industrial policy. This model was laid out by the economist Ha-Joon Chang and the author Joe Studwell in the 2000s and 2010s, though they weren’t the first to think of most of the ideas therein. One core idea is that exporting manufactured goods is the best way to boost a country out of poverty. Countries that specialize in resource extraction or agriculture, or which fail to make their products competitive in global markets, tend to fall behind in the development race. This is especially true for a country like Ukraine, which lacks Russia’s rich endowments of oil, gas, and other natural resources.
So when I think about a country’s development, the first thing I do is go to the OEC and look at what a country exports.
Do this exercise for Poland, Romania, or Turkey — three countries that have enjoyed rapid growth and are now on the cusp of developed-country status — and you’ll see that they all export a lot of cars car parts and some electronics, with Germany and the other rich countries of Europe as their biggest markets. I’ll write a post about these countries later, but basically it looks like they’ve become a sort of Tennessee/Kentucky for Europe — a cheap zone for high-value manufacturing.
But look at Ukraine, and we see that it mostly exports very basic, simple, low-value stuff — food, metals, and minerals.
Manufacturing itself comprises a lower percent of GDP in Ukraine (10%) than in Poland, Romania, and Turkey (16-19%).
It’s clear that Ukraine missed a key opportunity here. From 2000 to 2014, having weathered the worst of the post-Soviet crisis, Ukraine might have been able to hop on the same growth train that Poland, Romania, and Turkey were on. This could have resulted in faster growth during those years, and it might also have made Europe more willing to defend Ukraine from Russian attack (in order to protect its investments). So I think it’s worth asking why this didn’t happen.
The report draws a strong contrast between Ukraine and Poland where very strong manufacturing FDI from Germany etc. was a key part of the growth story.
Maybe the rich countries of Europe simply had a limited amount of investment capital, which they focused on countries that were a little more advantageous than Ukraine. Maybe in a few years, if war with Russia hadn’t broken out, costs in Poland, Romania, and Turkey would have risen and manufacturers would have migrated to Ukraine in search of cheaper labor (the flying geese theroy).
But it’s still worth asking why Ukraine wasn’t as attractive of a manufacturing platform as the other countries. Being part of the EU would have helped, certainly, but Turkey didn’t join the EU, so that can’t be the whole story. Basically, there are two main categories of explanations here:
Unfortunately, this probably killed Ukraine’s chances to use the Chang-Studwell model of development in the 2000s. It created a huge, bloated financial sector — a development no-no. And it also set Ukraine up for a huge disaster, because finance and real estate were the industries that got clobbered in the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Take a look at the growth graph at the beginning of this post, and you’ll see that after 2008, Ukrainian growth flatlines utterly while Russian, Belarusian, Romanian and Polish growth quickly resumes (or in Poland’s case, doesn’t even pause!).
But Ukraine also hit another big shock right around this same time: The end of cheap Russian gas. In Soviet times Russia had piped cheap gas to Ukraine to subsidize the area’s inefficient heavy industry, and this policy basically continued after 1991. But from 2007 through 2009, Russia mostly ended this deal, raising the prices Ukraine would have to pay for gas. This dealt a blow to Ukraine’s inefficient, oligarch-controlled manufacturing sector. In 2010 the cheap gas subsidy was partly restored when Ukraine elected a pro-Russian president (Yanukovych) who negotiated a new discount. But of course that ended in 2014 when Yanukovych was ousted and the war began.
So Ukraine made a big mistake in its FDI policy, which left it vulnerable to the twin shocks of the global financial crisis and the end of cheap Russian gas.
The other factor that everyone mentions when it comes to Ukraine’s poor performance is corruption. This is hard to measure (it mostly relies on subjective impressions), but everyone seems to agree it’s a problem. Ukraine’s economy, like Russia’s, is particularly dominated by rich oligarchs:
This creates several problems. First, as the Carnegie article points out, it makes it hard to raise tax revenue, which forces tax rates to be higher, which forces much of the economy off the books. In 2014, Ukraine’s shadow economy was estimated to comprise 50% of the totall. That in turn encourages a pervasive culture of bribe-taking and extralegal means of property protection and contract enforcement (i.e. organized crime), which exacts its own toll on the economy in myriad ways.
Oligarchs’ political power can also prevent good industrial policy, as we saw with the case of FDI policy during the 2000s. What’s good for enriching the country is not always the same as what’s good for enriching oligarchs.
Official corruption also inhibits good governance. The Yanukovych administration is thought to have been especially corrupt, with tens of billions vanishing from government coffers during his rule. Those kinds of “rents” reduce the leadership’s incentive to invest in public goods; why build roads and schools and export industries to make your country rich, when you can just raid its treasury to enrich your own family and depend on Russia for protection?
Now, of course, Russia is no longer providing protection — quite the opposite — and Ukraine’s government, pressed by the urgency of national unity in the face of external threat, is making some attempts to reign in the entitled barons. But it’s going to be slow going.
SO WHAT CAN UKRAINE DO???
Nothing, these idiots are fucked. They are slowly imploding on them selves and pissing off the entire world. Hope fully the online trolls will stop fucking up this forum, get to the front and eat a FAB 500.
Ukraine is a middle-income country. Its GDP per capita is somewhere around $13000, which is similar to Libya or Paraguay. That’s not terrible, but what is terrible is how Ukraine has stagnated since the fall of the Soviet Union. By the World Bank’s reckoning, Ukraine is about 20% poorer now than it was in 1990!
If Ukraine had experienced growth similar to that of Poland or Romania since the fall of communism, it would now have a GDP in the $30,000-$35,000 range, and would essentially be a developed country. Even if it had only managed to match Belarus’ performance, it would be half again as rich as it is now. As things stand, Ukraine’s economic failure has left it less capable of defending itself. It also might have made Russia’s public more likely to support intervention in Ukraine, as Putin’s portrayal of Ukraine as a basket case has been a key part of his justification for aggression.
So why did this happen? Why has Ukraine failed economically? One obvious culprit is the war itself, which since 2014 has chilled foreign investment and forced the government to divert resources toward the military. In my over view of Warsaw pact countries, I concluded that Rule #1 for economic development was not to piss off Vladimir Putin. But looking at the graphs above, it’s very clear that that can’t be the whole story, because Ukraine’s problems began well before 2014.
So let’s break those problems down by time period. Essentially, we need to ask why Ukraine’s GDP fell by so much in the 90s, and why it failed to climb faster between 2000 and 2014.
In general, the rule for countries is that they’re poor until something happens to make them rich. Thus, many disappointing growth stories (Pakistan) can be explained simply by a lack of pro-development policy. But with Ukraine that’s not quite true. Looking at the graphs above, we can see that although all of the Eastern Bloc countries suffered some kind of economic damage from the collapse of communism, Ukraine suffered the worst — even worse than Russia or Belarus. Why?
One reason was hyperinflation. This afflicted most of the post-communist countries, but was worst in Ukraine. In Russia, inflation peaked at around 2500% in 1992, and in Belarus at around 2200% in 1994, but in Ukraine it hit 10,000% in 1993. It’s not clear why this was higher; Ukraine’s budget deficit was actually slightly lower than Russia’s, and all of these countries were financing their borrowing via money creation (generally believed to be the thing that sparks hyperinflation). One possibility is corruption; special interest groups in Ukraine were more powerful than elsewhere, and threatened to block fiscal consolidation. But in any case, macroeconomics seems to have dealt Ukraine a particularly severe blow.
Microeconomics probably hurt it as well. The Soviet economy was really bad at manufacturing, but wasn’t that terrible at extracting natural resources, which is why the resource-dependent Central Asian countries didn’t suffer as much from the fall of the USSR as their counterparts in East Europe. Russia has a lot of natural resources, so it was sort of halfway between East Europe and Central Asia in this regard. But Soviet Ukraine’s economy was more dependent on manufacturing, so it probably suffered more from the collapse of the inefficient Soviet system. As for Belarus, it actually kept much of its soviet manufacturing going; it wasn’t very efficient, but Russia did it a big favor by continuing to buy its goods and give it cheap fuel. Ukraine proceeded with shock therapy, and in proportional terms it had the most to shock.
So that pretty much answers the question of why Ukraine took such a huge hit in the early and mid 1990s. But by 2000 the macroeconomic situation had stabilized and shock therapy had run its course and Ukraine started to grow again. Why didn’t it grow faster?
In my series of posts about economic development, I’ve tried to analyze each country through the lens of what I call the Chang-Studwell model of industrial policy. This model was laid out by the economist Ha-Joon Chang and the author Joe Studwell in the 2000s and 2010s, though they weren’t the first to think of most of the ideas therein. One core idea is that exporting manufactured goods is the best way to boost a country out of poverty. Countries that specialize in resource extraction or agriculture, or which fail to make their products competitive in global markets, tend to fall behind in the development race. This is especially true for a country like Ukraine, which lacks Russia’s rich endowments of oil, gas, and other natural resources.
So when I think about a country’s development, the first thing I do is go to the OEC and look at what a country exports.
Do this exercise for Poland, Romania, or Turkey — three countries that have enjoyed rapid growth and are now on the cusp of developed-country status — and you’ll see that they all export a lot of cars car parts and some electronics, with Germany and the other rich countries of Europe as their biggest markets. I’ll write a post about these countries later, but basically it looks like they’ve become a sort of Tennessee/Kentucky for Europe — a cheap zone for high-value manufacturing.
But look at Ukraine, and we see that it mostly exports very basic, simple, low-value stuff — food, metals, and minerals.
Manufacturing itself comprises a lower percent of GDP in Ukraine (10%) than in Poland, Romania, and Turkey (16-19%).
It’s clear that Ukraine missed a key opportunity here. From 2000 to 2014, having weathered the worst of the post-Soviet crisis, Ukraine might have been able to hop on the same growth train that Poland, Romania, and Turkey were on. This could have resulted in faster growth during those years, and it might also have made Europe more willing to defend Ukraine from Russian attack (in order to protect its investments). So I think it’s worth asking why this didn’t happen.
The report draws a strong contrast between Ukraine and Poland where very strong manufacturing FDI from Germany etc. was a key part of the growth story.
Maybe the rich countries of Europe simply had a limited amount of investment capital, which they focused on countries that were a little more advantageous than Ukraine. Maybe in a few years, if war with Russia hadn’t broken out, costs in Poland, Romania, and Turkey would have risen and manufacturers would have migrated to Ukraine in search of cheaper labor (the flying geese theroy).
But it’s still worth asking why Ukraine wasn’t as attractive of a manufacturing platform as the other countries. Being part of the EU would have helped, certainly, but Turkey didn’t join the EU, so that can’t be the whole story. Basically, there are two main categories of explanations here:
- Macroeconomic mistakes and bad luck
- Corruption and institutional failure
Unfortunately, this probably killed Ukraine’s chances to use the Chang-Studwell model of development in the 2000s. It created a huge, bloated financial sector — a development no-no. And it also set Ukraine up for a huge disaster, because finance and real estate were the industries that got clobbered in the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Take a look at the growth graph at the beginning of this post, and you’ll see that after 2008, Ukrainian growth flatlines utterly while Russian, Belarusian, Romanian and Polish growth quickly resumes (or in Poland’s case, doesn’t even pause!).
But Ukraine also hit another big shock right around this same time: The end of cheap Russian gas. In Soviet times Russia had piped cheap gas to Ukraine to subsidize the area’s inefficient heavy industry, and this policy basically continued after 1991. But from 2007 through 2009, Russia mostly ended this deal, raising the prices Ukraine would have to pay for gas. This dealt a blow to Ukraine’s inefficient, oligarch-controlled manufacturing sector. In 2010 the cheap gas subsidy was partly restored when Ukraine elected a pro-Russian president (Yanukovych) who negotiated a new discount. But of course that ended in 2014 when Yanukovych was ousted and the war began.
So Ukraine made a big mistake in its FDI policy, which left it vulnerable to the twin shocks of the global financial crisis and the end of cheap Russian gas.
The other factor that everyone mentions when it comes to Ukraine’s poor performance is corruption. This is hard to measure (it mostly relies on subjective impressions), but everyone seems to agree it’s a problem. Ukraine’s economy, like Russia’s, is particularly dominated by rich oligarchs:
This creates several problems. First, as the Carnegie article points out, it makes it hard to raise tax revenue, which forces tax rates to be higher, which forces much of the economy off the books. In 2014, Ukraine’s shadow economy was estimated to comprise 50% of the totall. That in turn encourages a pervasive culture of bribe-taking and extralegal means of property protection and contract enforcement (i.e. organized crime), which exacts its own toll on the economy in myriad ways.
Oligarchs’ political power can also prevent good industrial policy, as we saw with the case of FDI policy during the 2000s. What’s good for enriching the country is not always the same as what’s good for enriching oligarchs.
Official corruption also inhibits good governance. The Yanukovych administration is thought to have been especially corrupt, with tens of billions vanishing from government coffers during his rule. Those kinds of “rents” reduce the leadership’s incentive to invest in public goods; why build roads and schools and export industries to make your country rich, when you can just raid its treasury to enrich your own family and depend on Russia for protection?
Now, of course, Russia is no longer providing protection — quite the opposite — and Ukraine’s government, pressed by the urgency of national unity in the face of external threat, is making some attempts to reign in the entitled barons. But it’s going to be slow going.
SO WHAT CAN UKRAINE DO???
Nothing, these idiots are fucked. They are slowly imploding on them selves and pissing off the entire world. Hope fully the online trolls will stop fucking up this forum, get to the front and eat a FAB 500.
I do not think "they" want a nuclear war but to keep a major land war percolating for years so that "they" can get rich off the grift associated with wars, MIC, etc. The GWOT fizzled out and - wow - a major land war starts in the Ukraine. If Ukraine cools off - then maybe India vs Pakistan next?
could be. the worry is that some desperate gonna be loser like Z or Starmer will know they are losing and send one out of spite,fear,whatever. or,some Muslim fanatic in Pac do the same. that will start an escalation with an end of it all outcome.
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Ukies conomic hardships also stem out of them wanting to sucker up to the west and accepted their “economic solutions” which were neocolonial in essence, give credit they are unable to pay, promote corruption through NGOs and owned politicians. Same thing EU does as its economic goal is to make national states interdependent from one another and none totaly self sufficient. I think its clear why so as independent self sufficient countries cannot be bullied by unelected bureaucrats.
Also important communism fell because of economic hardship and not vice versa, its important to be aware of that as western system will also implode or is imploding and resolution to that implosion can be: nuclear war, nationalist revolution, neofeudal darkages, civil and racial war with total chaos.
Some say its only natural and cycle that cannot be beat and for those aware best action to take is to pour nice cold one, fuck if still able, eat something nice, have fun with friends while it lasts and take at least ine SoB to the underworld when time comes.
Also important communism fell because of economic hardship and not vice versa, its important to be aware of that as western system will also implode or is imploding and resolution to that implosion can be: nuclear war, nationalist revolution, neofeudal darkages, civil and racial war with total chaos.
Some say its only natural and cycle that cannot be beat and for those aware best action to take is to pour nice cold one, fuck if still able, eat something nice, have fun with friends while it lasts and take at least ine SoB to the underworld when time comes.
I see your point as this is a difficult one. Good thing you called in the expert for this situation.
To your question though- on one hand this post does meet a sufficient length AND also makes adequate use of paragraphs (and that goes a long way with me) so it's easily digestible to the reading audience. They also were able to incorporate a multi-quote and that shit isn't necessarily easy and certainly demonstrates some observable skill.
However- I'd be remiss if I didn't point out that over 50% of that post was comprised of copy & paste information and lacking in original content/thoughts. I do understand that was still factual information though and can relate to their original intention to use data to support their point. Unfortunately that point was thinly defended from the onset so on a scale of 1-10, I'd have to personally award that post a...
Now don't be dismayed by the '4' as I'm typically a hard grader on these type of matters. And this is a rating of one post and one post only in a thread that spans 59 pages. So please take that rating within the proper context. I'd like to see a bit more vigor and original content from @kalashnikev and truth be told I think they're capable and up for it. So while I'm not overly impressed by that singular post, I still think there's plenty of potential and talent there that could result in a much more favorable scoring in the future.
I'd be remiss if I didn't point out that I noticed that their profile indicates they have their 44th birthday coming up in just over 2 weeks so wanted to throw in a quick plug out to @kalashnikev and wish them a sincere and happy (upcoming) birthday if that's in fact accurate.
-LD
Two companies of paratroopers from Feodosia were surrounded in the Kursk region in Tyotkino
So Tyotkino is finally returning home. Like the sugar and vodka factory that the Ukrainians Tereshchenko built.
This is where I built my defensive positions on the border.
Still operational .
Vodka is a strategic product for the Ivans.
This hurts more than airplanes.
Recently, our favorite oil depot in Engels put out a fire, so we had to light it again.
And this is PodolskMoscow region
Ryazan.
Explosions and fire in the area of the Diaghilev airfield, where the Russian strategic aviation is located! – Russian media.
And this is PodolskMoscow region
Ryazan.
Explosions and fire in the area of the Diaghilev airfield, where the Russian strategic aviation is located! – Russian media.
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