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Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault
John J. Mearsheimer

The Real History of the War in Ukraine

A Chronology of Events and Case for Diplomacy


JEFFREY D. SACHS
JUL 17, 2023


By Jeffrey D. Sachs, Special to The Kennedy Beacon

The American people urgently need to know the true history of the war in Ukraine and its current prospects. Unfortunately, the mainstream media—The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, MSNBC, and CNN—have become mere mouthpieces of the government, repeating US President Joe Biden’s lies and hiding history from the public.

Biden is again denigrating Russian President Vladimir Putin, this time accusing Putin of a “craven lust for land and power,” after declaring last year that “For God’s sake, that man [Putin] cannot stay in power.” Yet Biden is the one who is trapping Ukraine in an open-ended war by continuing to push NATO enlargement to Ukraine. He is afraid to tell the truth to the American and Ukrainian people, rejecting diplomacy, and opting instead for perpetual war.

Expanding NATO to Ukraine, which Biden has long promoted, is a U.S. gambit that has failed. The neocons, including Biden, thought from the late 1990s onward that the US could expand NATO to Ukraine (and Georgia) despite Russia’s vociferous and long-standing opposition. They didn’t believe that Putin would actually go to war over NATO expansion.

Yet for Russia, NATO enlargement to Ukraine (and Georgia) is viewed as an existential threat to Russia’s national security, notably given Russia’s 2,000-km border with Ukraine, and Georgia’s strategic position on the eastern edge of the Black Sea. U.S. diplomats have explained this basic reality to U.S. politicians and generals for decades, but the politicians and generals have arrogantly and crudely persisted in pushing NATO enlargement nonetheless.

At this point, Biden knows full well that NATO enlargement to Ukraine would trigger World War III. That’s why behind the scenes Biden put NATO enlargement into low gear at the Vilnius NATO Summit. Yet rather than admit the truth – that Ukraine will not be part of NATO – Biden prevaricates, promising Ukraine’s eventual membership. In reality, he is committing Ukraine to ongoing bloodletting for no reason other than U.S. domestic politics, specifically Biden’s fear of looking weak to his political foes. (A half-century ago, Presidents Johnson and Nixon sustained the Vietnam War for essentially the same pathetic reason, and with the same lying, as the late Daniel Ellsberg brilliantly explained.)

Ukraine can’t win. Russia is more likely than not to prevail on the battlefield, as it seems now to be doing. Yet even if Ukraine were to break through with conventional forces and NATO weaponry, Russia would escalate to nuclear war if necessary to prevent NATO in Ukraine.

Throughout his entire career, Biden has served the military-industrial complex. He has relentlessly promoted NATO enlargement and supported America’s deeply destabilizing wars of choice in Afghanistan, Serbia, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and now Ukraine. He defers to generals who want more war and more “surges,” and who predict imminent victory just ahead to keep the gullible public onside.

Moreover, Biden and his team (Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, Victoria Nuland) seem to have believed their own propaganda that Western sanctions would strangle the Russian economy, while miracle weapons such as HIMARS would defeat Russia. And all the while, they have been telling Americans to pay no attention to Russia’s 6,000 nuclear weapons.

Ukrainian leaders have gone along with the US deception for reasons that are hard to fathom. Perhaps they believe the US, or are afraid of the US, or fear their own extremists, or simply are extremists, ready to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to death and injury in the naïve belief that Ukraine can defeat a nuclear superpower that regards the war as existential. Or possibly some of the Ukrainian leaders are making fortunes by skimming from the tens of billions of dollars of Western aid and arms.

The only way to save Ukraine is a negotiated peace. In a negotiated settlement, the US would agree that NATO will not enlarge to Ukraine while Russia would agree to withdraw its troops. Remaining issues – Crimea, the Donbas, US and European sanctions, the future of European security arrangements – would be handled politically, not by endless war.

Russia has repeatedly tried negotiations: to try to forestall the eastward enlargement of NATO; to try to find suitable security arrangements with the US and Europe; to try to settle inter-ethnic issues in Ukraine after 2014 (the Minsk I and Minsk II agreements); to try to sustain limits on anti-ballistic missiles; and to try to end the Ukraine war in 2022 via direct negotiations with Ukraine. In all cases, the US government disdained, ignored, or blocked these attempts, often putting forward the big lie that Russia rather than the US rejects negotiations. JFK said it exactly right in 1961: “Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.” If only Biden would heed JFK’s enduring wisdom.

To help the public move beyond the simplistic narrative of Biden and the mainstream media, I offer a brief chronology of some key events leading to the ongoing war.

January 31, 1990. German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich-Genscher pledges to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that in the context of German reunification and disbanding of the Soviet Warsaw Pact military alliance, NATO will rule out an “expansion of its territory to the East, i.e., moving it closer to the Soviet borders.”

February 9, 1990. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III agrees with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.”

June 29 – July 2, 1990. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner tells a high-level Russian delegation that “the NATO Council and he [Woerner] are against the expansion of NATO.”

July 1, 1990. Ukrainian Rada (parliament) adopts the Declaration of State Sovereignty, in which “The Ukrainian SSR solemnly declares its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles: to accept, to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons.”

August 24, 1991. Ukraine declares independence on the basis of the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty, which includes the pledge of neutrality.

Mid-1992. Bush Administration policymakers reach a secret internal consensus to expand NATO, contrary to commitments recently made to the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

July 8, 1997. At the Madrid NATO Summit, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic are invited to begin NATO accession talks.

September-October, 1997. In Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct, 1997) former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski details the timeline for NATO enlargement, with Ukraine’s negotiations provisionally to begin during 2005-2010.

March 24 – June 10, 1999. NATO bombs Serbia. Russia terms the NATO bombing “a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter."

March 2000. Ukrainian President Kuchma declares that "there is no question of Ukraine joining NATO today since this issue is extremely complex and has many angles to it.”

June 13, 2002. The US unilaterally withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Weapons Treaty, an action which the Vice-Chair of the Russian Duma Defense Committee characterizes as an “extremely negative event of historical scale.”

November-December 2004. The “Orange Revolution” occurs in Ukraine, events that the West characterizes as a democratic revolution and the Russian government characterizes as a Western-manufactured grab for power with overt and covert US support.

February 10, 2007. Putin strongly criticizes the U.S. attempt to create a unipolar world, backed by NATO enlargement, in a speech to the Munich Security Conference, declaring: “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion … represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”

February 1, 2008. US Ambassador to Russia William Burns sends a confidential cableto U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, entitled “Nyet means Nyet: Russia’s NATO Enlargement Redlines,” emphasizing that “Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region.”

February 18, 2008. The US recognizes Kosovo independence over heated Russian objections. The Russian Government declares that Kosovo independence violates “the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia, the Charter of the United Nations, UNSCR 1244, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework and the high-level Contact Group accords."

April 3, 2008. NATO declares that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.” Russia declares that “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.”

August 20, 2008. The US announces that it will deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Poland, to be followed later by Romania. Russia expresses strenuous opposition to the BMD systems.

January 28, 2014. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt plot regime change in Ukraine in a call that is intercepted and posted on YouTube on February 7, in which Nuland notes that “[Vice President] Biden’s willing” to help close the deal.

February 21, 2014. Governments of Ukraine, Poland, France, and Germany reach an Agreement on settlement of political crisis in Ukraine, calling for new elections later in the year. The far-right Right Sector and other armed groups instead demand Yanukovych’s immediate resignation, and take over government buildings. Yanukovych flees. The Parliament immediately strips the President of his powers without an impeachment process.

February 22, 2014. The US immediately endorses the regime change.

March 16, 2014. Russia holds a referendum in Crimea that according to the Russian Government results in a large majority vote for Russian rule. On March 21, the Russian Duma votes to admit Crimea to the Russian Federation. The Russian Government draws the analogy to the Kosovo referendum. The US rejects the Crimea referendum as illegitimate.

March 18, 2014. President Putin characterizes the regime change as a coup, stating: “those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots.”

March 25, 2014. President Barack Obama mocks Russia “as a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors — not out of strength but out of weakness,”

February 12, 2015. Signing of Minsk II agreement. The agreement is unanimously backed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2202 on February 17, 2015. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel later acknowledges that the Minsk II agreement was designed to give time for Ukraine to strengthen its military. It was not implemented by Ukraine, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged that he had no intention to implement the agreement.

February 1, 2019. The U.S. unilaterally withdraws from the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. Russia harshly criticizes the INF withdrawal as a “destructive” act that stoked security risks.

June 14, 2021. At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, NATO reconfirms NATO’s intention to enlarge and include Ukraine: “We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance.”

September 1, 2021. The US reiterates support for Ukraine’s NATO aspirations in the “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership.”

December 17, 2021. Putin puts forward a draft “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees,” based on non-enlargement of NATO and limitations on the deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

January 26, 2022. The U.S. formally replies to Russia that the US and NATO will not negotiate with Russia over issues of NATO enlargement, slamming the door on a negotiated path to avoid an expansion of the war in Ukraine. The U.S. invokes NATO policy that “Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council on the basis of consensus among all Allies. No third country has a say in such deliberations.” In short, the US asserts that NATO enlargement to Ukraine is none of Russia’s business.

February 21, 2022. At a meeting of the Russian Security Council, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov details the U.S. refusal to negotiate: “We received their response in late January. The assessment of this response shows that our Western colleagues are not prepared to take up our major proposals, primarily those on NATO’s eastward non-expansion. This demand was rejected with reference to the bloc’s so-called open-door policy and the freedom of each state to choose its own way of ensuring security. Neither the United States, nor the North Atlantic Alliance proposed an alternative to this key provision.” The United States is doing everything it can to avoid the principle of indivisibility of security that we consider of fundamental importance and to which we have made many references. Deriving from it the only element that suits them – the freedom to choose alliances – they completely ignore everything else, including the key condition that reads that nobody – either in choosing alliances or regardless of them – is allowed to enhance their security at the expense of the security of others.”

February 24, 2022. In an address to the nation, President Putin declares: “It is a fact that over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.”

March 16, 2022. Russia and Ukraine announce significant progress towards a peace agreement mediated by Turkey and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. As reported in the press, the basis of the agreement includes: “a ceasefire and Russian withdrawal if Kyiv declares neutrality and accepts limits on its armed forces.”

March 28, 2022. President Zelenskyy publicly declares that Ukraine is ready for neutrality combined with security guarantees as part of a peace agreement with Russia. “Security guarantees and neutrality, the non-nuclear status of our state — we’re ready to do that. That’s the most important point ... they started the war because of it.”

April 7, 2022. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov accuses the West of trying to derail the peace talks, claiming that Ukraine had gone back on previously agreed proposals. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett later states (on February 5, 2023) that the U.S. had blocked the pending Russia-Ukraine peace agreement. When asked if the Western powers blocked the agreement, Bennett answered: “Basically, yes. They blocked it, and I thought they were wrong.” At some point, says Bennett, the West decided “to crush Putin rather than to negotiate.”

June 4, 2023. Ukraine launches a major counter-offensive, without achieving any major success as of mid-July 2023.

July 7, 2023. Biden acknowledges that Ukraine is “running out” of 155mm artillery shells, and that the US is “running low.”

July 11, 2023. At the NATO Summit in Vilnius, the final communique reaffirms Ukraine’s future in NATO: “We fully support Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements. Ukraine’s future is in NATO … Ukraine has become increasingly interoperable and politically integrated with the Alliance, and has made substantial progress on its reform path.”

July 13, 2023. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reiterates that Ukraine will “no doubt” join NATO when the war ends.

July 13, 2023. Putin reiterates that “As for Ukraine’s NATO membership, as we have said many times, this obviously creates a threat to Russia’s security. In fact, the threat of Ukraine’s accession to NATO is the reason, or rather one of the reasons for the special military operation. I am certain that this would not enhance Ukraine’s security in any way either. In general, it will make the world much more vulnerable and lead to more tensions in the international arena. So, I don’t see anything good in this. Our position is well known and has long been formulated.”

A primer on whatever’s going on there!



Nuclear weaponry and fallout fantasies between 32:54 and 46:18!

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Play your favorite nuclear detonation simulations here!

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Will your family, friends, and loved ones get their property value dragged down by lousy neighbors?

Click here and find out!
 
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“…rewarding Putin,” the talking head says.

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I suppose that’s exemplary of our collective Anglosphere’s thought process.

How can we be “rewarding Putin” when we incited all the trouble in the first place? I suppose this idea jives with “American Innocence, American Fragility.”

For a moment there, I thought that was Jack Kirby :ROFLMAO:
 
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US Navy submarines to re-arm with nuclear cruise missiles after 3 decades​

The SLCM-N would fulfill a critical role as a sea-based nuclear deterrent below the strategic level on the nuclear escalation ladder.​

Kapil Kajal, https://interestingengineering.com/military/us-navy-submarines-nuclear-cruise-missiles
Updated:
Nov 22, 2024 01:46 PM EST.

In a surprising development, the US Navy has released a Request for Information (RFI) regarding the development of a Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N).

The initiative aims to establish a modular and resilient cruise missile system that delivers a proportional response while ensuring essential adversary targets remain vulnerable.

The goal is to deploy an operational system by fiscal year 2034, with prototype tests anticipated within the next three years.

Sea-launched nuclear cruise missile​

The SLCM-N will be launched from Virginia-class attack submarines and is centered around an “All Up Round” (AUR) concept.

This includes an expendable booster, a nuclear-capable cruise missile, and a launch canister, allowing underwater launches from Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) or Virginia Payload Modules (VPM).

Additionally, the Navy seeks missiles that are “as modular as possible,” incorporating both software and hardware, to ensure that modifications to the missile’s body or shared tactical systems don’t necessitate changes to the warhead payload interfaces or avionics related to the nuclear mission.

“The open system approach is being adopted to facilitate future technical upgrades or technology enhancements as needed throughout the SLCM-N program’s lifespan,” the Navy’s request indicates.

The United States originally introduced nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles during the mid-1980s with the deployment of the TLAM-N, a nuclear variant of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile.

These missiles, which had a range of about 2,500 kilometers (approximately 1,550 miles), were positioned on both surface vessels and attack submarines.

After 3 decades​

In 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared the withdrawal of all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, resulting in the removal of TLAM-N missiles by the middle of 1992.

The Navy kept the option to redeploy them on attack submarines if necessary. However, in 2010, the Obama Administration recommended decommissioning the TLAM-N system, considering it redundant in light of other available nuclear capabilities. This retirement was finalized in 2013.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) under the Trump Administration advocated for the development of a novel nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, now referred to as SLCM-N.

This initiative aimed to provide a “non-strategic regional presence” and fulfill the need for “flexible and low-yield options” within the US nuclear arsenal.

The SLCM-N was designed to enhance deterrence against regional threats and reassure US allies.

Allocation of funds​

In its Fiscal Year 2022 budget proposal, the Biden Administration allocated funding for the research and development of the SLCM-N.
Nonetheless, the 2022 NPR suggested discontinuing the program, indicating that current capabilities were adequate to meet deterrent requirements.

Despite this, Congress continued to fund the SLCM-N and its associated warhead. The Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act required the executive branch to ensure the SLCM-N’s initial operational capability. Following this, the Administration has begun to take steps to implement the program.

Supporters of the SLCM-N contend that it provides a flexible and survivable nuclear option capable of deployment in various regions without needing to station nuclear assets on allied territories.

The SLCM-N would fulfill a critical role as a sea-based nuclear deterrent below the strategic level on the nuclear escalation ladder, emphasizing that the commander-in-chief should have access to such options.

Similar to its predecessor, the Navy’s discontinued TLAM-N, the SLCM-N is envisioned as a lower-yield nuclear weapon launched from submarines that would add a new dimension to the maritime segment of the nuclear triad, allowing the United States to respond proportionately to a limited nuclear attack by an adversary.
 
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US Navy submarines to re-arm with nuclear cruise missiles after 3 decades​

The SLCM-N would fulfill a critical role as a sea-based nuclear deterrent below the strategic level on the nuclear escalation ladder.​

Kapil Kajal, https://interestingengineering.com/military/us-navy-submarines-nuclear-cruise-missiles
Updated:
Nov 22, 2024 01:46 PM EST.

In a surprising development, the US Navy has released a Request for Information (RFI) regarding the development of a Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N).

The initiative aims to establish a modular and resilient cruise missile system that delivers a proportional response while ensuring essential adversary targets remain vulnerable.

The goal is to deploy an operational system by fiscal year 2034, with prototype tests anticipated within the next three years.

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I thought the U.S. Navy's much - vaunted "Project 33" was due in 2027?

Totally incongruent goals and timelines...
 
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Similar to its predecessor, the Navy’s discontinued TLAM-N, the SLCM-N is envisioned as a lower-yield nuclear weapon launched from submarines that would add a new dimension to the maritime segment of the nuclear triad, allowing the United States to respond proportionately to a limited nuclear attack by an adversary.

I suppose this is in line with current American strategic planning which considers "limited" nuclear conflicts "okay."
 
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Sent this to a former business colleague living in the area.

Probably too dense to get the reference - using that cartoon character was my grandson's idea :ROFLMAO:
 
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So which US city will get nuked by the home team and blamed on Russia or China or NK or Iran to get WWIII kicked off in earnest?
I think it will be a close US ally instead. Probably also geographically close to get the population really worried. The deep state would rather not be on the hook for something this big in the US. Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, or Montreal would be my guess. WTF is Canada going to do about it either way?
 


Times have changed, too…

Long ceased to have been an exclusive club.

Makes you wonder what color of glass the White House or Capitol Hill would make.

Honestly,...

...in the spirit of an armed (global) society being a polite society…

everybody should have nukes!
 
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Bible Verses About Nuclear War​

Bible verses related to Nuclear War from the King James Version (KJV) by Relevance


Zechariah 14:12 - And this shall be the plague wherewith the LORD will smite all the people that have fought against Jerusalem; Their flesh shall consume away while they stand upon their feet, and their eyes shall consume away in their holes, and their tongue shall consume away in their mouth.

Matthew 24:22 - And except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved: but for the elect's sake those days shall be shortened.

2 Peter 3:10-13 - But the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up. (Read More...)

Isaiah 24:19-20 - The earth is utterly broken down, the earth is clean dissolved, the earth is moved exceedingly. (Read More...)

© 2025 King James Bible Online™
 


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Watched this one ages ago.

Bumped into it purely by chance as a video YouTube recommended.

Knew this one was the same video from ~ two decades ago because they even featured the pool.

Where seamen do seamen things, I suppose :ROFLMAO:
 
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Imagine, an underwater Harley :ROFLMAO:

The Toshiba - Konsberg Scandal definitely didn’t benefit this model or generation, based on the dates alone :ROFLMAO: I still remember reading all about it in some periodical - might have been Jane’s.
 
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Iranian Nuclear Stuff for Dummies

On June 22, the United States struck three Iranian nuclear sites, entering the Iran-Israel conflict that began nine days prior when Israel launched an attack against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. While the U.S. entry into the campaign is political and its merits can be debated, understanding the technical realities of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could make for a more intelligent conversation.

There is no debating that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. But, as of yet, it is not building a nuclear weapon. Iran has enriched uranium far beyond what is necessary for either civilian energy or medical use, but has stayed short of the threshold of a weapon, leaving public uncertainty.

And that uncertainty has produced some confusion within the Trump administration. Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 25 that the intelligence community “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon,” and President Trump told reporters in June that “I don’t care what she said, I think they were very close to having one.”

But, these two positions don’t actually contradict each other. Iran has intentionally stayed in a gray area on the road to a nuclear weapon—it’s already completed the heavy lifting required, but has not begun the final steps. Whether the U.S. and Israeli strikes have seriously delayed an Iranian effort to complete a warhead is still in question, but we do know the technical reality of Iran’s infrastructural capabilities, giving us some clues as to what might come next.

Iran’s Uranium Campaign

Atomic weapons are a technology of the 1940s. Today the hardest part isn’t the physics, it’s getting the right material.

In nature, uranium is more than 99 percent U-238, a stable isotope that does not easily split. Less than 1 percent is U-235, which is the kind that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction. That’s the type that the weapons builders care about.

To build a weapon, you need to “enrich” uranium to raise the proportion of U-235. The uranium used in power reactors, like the one at Bushehr in southern Iran, only needs to be enriched to about 3-5 percent U-235. That is known as low-enriched uranium, or LEU, and it cannot be used for a nuclear weapon. Weapons-grade uranium, by contrast, is usually enriched to around 90 percent U-235

The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran has enriched uranium to 60 percent, far beyond what’s needed for civilian energy or medical uses. There is a small research reactor in Tehran, but that doesn’t need uranium enriched to high levels. High-enriched uranium can be used to make medical isotopes, but it is not essential for that purpose. Iran does not have any civilian hardware that needs uranium enriched that high. This is either a program to build a weapon or reduce the time needed to build one if the country later decides to do so, or an effort to enhance the country’s power and influence by reaching the edge of the nuclear club.

Enrichment is not the entire story. The uranium that comes out of a mine is a metal, and is typically converted into a compound called uranium hexafluoride to be enriched. Uranium hexafluoride becomes a gas at relatively low temperatures. That gas is spun through high-speed centrifuges to separate out more and more U-235. Iran’s enriched uranium is in this chemical form. To actually make a weapon, that enriched gas must be converted back into solid metal, specifically shaped and machined for detonation.

So, when Gabbard testified that the U.S. intelligence community didn’t see signs of Iran building a weapon, this may have been a simplified way of saying that Iran is not yet taking those steps: pushing the enrichment up to 90 percent and then converting the uranium hexafluoride back into a metal. It’s not just a question of how much enriched uranium Iran has, it’s what physical form it’s in, and what’s being done with it.

But uranium isn't the only path to a weapon. Some countries, like India and Israel, used plutonium instead, a different element which is created in uranium-powered reactors. Unlike uranium, plutonium doesn’t need to be enriched. Certain isotopes of plutonium, especially plutonium-239, split very easily and can sustain a fast chain reaction, making them ideal for weapons use. If a country has a reactor capable of producing plutonium and a facility to chemically extract it from spent fuel, it can bypass the need for enrichment beyond the low levels needed for reactor fuel. The drawback is that this chemical plant is expensive and obvious.

Iran’s Progress: The Heavy Lifting is Done

When people ask whether Iran is “close” to a weapon, they’re usually thinking about the end result: a warhead on a missile. While Iran has not done that yet, by already enriching uranium to 60 percent U-235, Iran’s progress to building a simple nuclear weapon is nearly complete. Enriching uranium to 60 percent may not sound close to the 90 percent typically used in weapons, but in terms of the physics and engineering effort required, the difference between natural uranium and 60 percent is far more significant than the final push to 90 percent. Natural uranium is one part U-235 in 141 parts U-238. Low-enriched uranium is roughly 7 parts in 141, and the enrichment level that the International Atomic Energy Agency says that Iran has reached is about 85 parts in 141. To get from there to 90 percent, or 127 parts in 141, is not nearly as much work as has already been done.

Iran has had about two decades, though, to take that step, and hasn’t done it. This is not for lack of centrifuge capacity. Instead it has gone right up to the line, essentially creating a bargaining chip, and positioning itself to make a nuclear weapon quickly, while still being able to say for almost all the development period that it didn’t have uranium enriched enough to make one. Call it “implausible deniability.”

And combined with its extreme rhetoric against Israel, plus support for three militant groups that have inflicted substantial damage on Israel (Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis), Israel and the United States have taken the threat seriously. The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, has been warning for decades that Iran was close, and that, too, does not contradict the facts as we know them at this time.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said that Iran had about 400 kilos of high-enriched uranium hexafluoride, and since the U.S. attack, there has been a lot of speculation about whether that material could have been scattered into the environment. The International Atomic Energy Agency says that there was no detected increase in radiation. There is also the question of whether the material was moved in advance of the bombers. But this may not be a mystery to the military.

Uranium hexafluoride is kept in heavy steel cylinders that can be moved by truck, which would be visible to satellites and aerial surveillance. If Iran moved the cylinders, the Pentagon may know where at least some of them are. Israel may too. So more bombing is a possibility.

An open question is whether Iran has spare centrifuges in some other location. Those might be hard to locate at first, but historically, Iran has had trouble keeping secrets like that.

How Does Iran Get from Here to a Nuclear Weapon?

If Iran resumes enrichment and gets to the 90 percent threshold, the uranium hexafluoride would still have to be “de-converted” back to metal. Those steps could be done in days, depending on the capacity of the chemical plant and assuming that neither the US Air Force or the Israel Defense Forces haven’t taken out all the deconversion plants.

After that comes making a bomb. The secret of nuclear weapons is that there is no secret. The design isn’t difficult; in 1976, a junior at Princeton designed one for his physics homework. And that was for a plutonium bomb; uranium is easier.

The first nuclear weapon used in combat, the Hiroshima bomb, was a simple gun firing a wedge of uranium into a uranium target, into which it fit like a 3-D puzzle. When it hit the target, a critical mass—the minimum amount necessary to sustain a chain reaction—was formed. It was not tested beforehand, because the United States did not have enough U-235 for a test, and because the designers were certain it would work.

The Hiroshima bomb may have been fairly simple, but it was of a size and shape that required delivery by an airplane, letting gravity do its job. Japan at the time had limited air defenses, but Israel is more capable. Using a plane to bomb Israel is something Iran probably can’t do at the moment, because Israel’s air defenses are strong. Iran does, however, make sophisticated missiles, some of which evade Israeli defenses.

But building a uranium warhead that will fit on a missile is much harder. A warhead of the size and shape that would fit atop a missile needs sophisticated electronic switches to control the conventional explosives that compress the uranium into a critical mass. Various countries have those, including North Korea and probably Pakistan. Whether Iran could import them is another question.

And U.S. nuclear weapons have some highly sophisticated enhancements that get more yield out of the uranium. But for Iran, it’s probably not necessary to get the biggest possible bang out of a quantity of uranium. A simple multi-kiloton open-air test in the desert would make the point, no matter what the device's efficiency. Or they may prefer nuclear ambiguity.

Demonstration explosions are the way that India introduced itself into the “nuclear club,” with a “peaceful nuclear device.” Pakistan followed immediately with a series of tests. It’s also the way that the United States introduced the hydrogen bomb.

What Does This Mean for Nuclear Energy?

Understanding the Iranian path towards a nuclear weapon should help us re-calibrate the nuclear proliferation calculation and its relevance to nuclear energy. Experience is showing us that the preferred path to weapons-grade nuclear material is centrifuges (Pakistan, Iran) or research reactors to make plutonium (India, and Israel).

India and Israel did not use power reactors to make plutonium. Iran has one power reactor, but Russia, which supplies the fuel, takes it back after use. Real-world experience is that power reactors do not seem to be attractive choices to would-be nuclear states.

A country that has its own enrichment capability can make weapons-grade uranium. But there is an irony here; if it has a civilian nuclear program, then developing weapons could put the civilian energy program at risk of sanctions. In that sense, developing civilian reactors may be a deterrent to weapons, not an adjunct. Nicholas L. Miller, a nonproliferation researcher and associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, made the case in 2017 that “Although such programs increase the technical capacity of a state to build nuclear weapons, they have important countervailing political effects that limit the odds of proliferation. Specifically, nuclear energy programs increase the likelihood that parallel nuclear weapons programs will be detected and face counterproliferation pressures; they also increase the costliness of nonproliferation sanctions.”

The distinctions are important for nuclear energy production in the United States and around the world, because they concern the fuel cycle for civilian reactors.

For example, one of President Trump’s recent executive orders seeks to encourage reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, which means using a chemical plant to extract the plutonium produced in ordinary reactor operations, plus the uranium that was not consumed in the reactor.Presidents Ford and Carter banned that technology because they thought it would set a bad example for other countries, which might see that route to a nuclear weapon.

But reprocessing makes good use of components in spent nuclear fuel, and makes the remainder easier to dispose of. In the real world, as Iran shows, it’s not the method of choice for countries that want to enter the nuclear club. The easier route is uranium centrifuges or research reactors.

It follows that exports of power reactors do not appear to be relevant to proliferation. A policy of “energy dominance” that includes robust American exports does not provide a route to nuclear weapons for our friends—or even our friends who later become enemies, a category that includes Iran, which got a research reactor under President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program.

In the short term, whether Iran has civilian nuclear power has little to do with the future of its weapons program. Iran’s choice to remain ambiguous when it comes to nuclear weapons capabilities likely produced some geopolitical benefits, until it prompted a strong military rebuttal from Israel and the United States. Whether or not Iran will choose to continue a strategy of nuclear ambiguity—one in which it remains close to a nuclear weapon, but far enough away to leave space for denials, however implausible—is the question of the day. But its relevance to nuclear energy is limited.
 
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