It seems that the AMD-65s that have been supplied to the Afghan National Police are receiving a bad rap from their ungrateful recipients, mostly because they aren't perceived to be as militarily capable as other possible AK variants.
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/2...-repercussions/
From the commentary:
<div class="ubbcode-block"><div class="ubbcode-header">Quote:</div><div class="ubbcode-body">The whole issue of supplying the Afghan National Policewith the AMD-65 or even the AK-47 is syptomatic of the larger problems/conceits of US counterinsurgency strategy, which all too often regards the local forces as a mere auxiliary to the "more professionally competent" US forces which are expected to do the heavy lifting of defeating the the LLF (Local Liberation Front) of the current conflict. This attitude ignores the fact that the local forces, if properly trained and led, can equal or even exceed US forces in terms of competency and professioanlism, at least on a tactical level, and have the additional advantage of knowing the language, customs, people and terrain. It also ignores the basic truth that counterinsurgencies are ultimately won by the local forces, with the external (US, Nato, Commonwealth) forces ultimately assuming less and less of a role. The Sunni Awakening is a classic example. Finally, the arming of the ANP with an inferior rifle probably reflects the institutional bias of the US military against "civilian" police in favor of regular military, although history shows that counterinsurgencies are won by focusing on intelligence and security - basic police functions, rather than closing with and destroying the enemy by fire and movement (the definition of infantry combat).
The real answer is for the US, military or otherwise to focus on creating well trained and led paramilitary forces, more akin the French Gendarmie or Italian Carabinerie, which have sufficient firepower and tactical organization to operate in the field against the Taliban, but have an essentially police outlook. Creating such organizations, military or paramilitary, requires the investment of a lot of time and human capital and does not lend itself to quick mass production solutions, which is the American way. What both the ANP and the ANA need more than a "better rifle" is good leadership and an honest and effective logisitical support, again something that takes time and human effort. To achieve this, and defaeat the Taliban, will take far beyond July 2011 and require a focus on people rather than the right rifle.</div></div>
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/2...-repercussions/
From the commentary:
<div class="ubbcode-block"><div class="ubbcode-header">Quote:</div><div class="ubbcode-body">The whole issue of supplying the Afghan National Policewith the AMD-65 or even the AK-47 is syptomatic of the larger problems/conceits of US counterinsurgency strategy, which all too often regards the local forces as a mere auxiliary to the "more professionally competent" US forces which are expected to do the heavy lifting of defeating the the LLF (Local Liberation Front) of the current conflict. This attitude ignores the fact that the local forces, if properly trained and led, can equal or even exceed US forces in terms of competency and professioanlism, at least on a tactical level, and have the additional advantage of knowing the language, customs, people and terrain. It also ignores the basic truth that counterinsurgencies are ultimately won by the local forces, with the external (US, Nato, Commonwealth) forces ultimately assuming less and less of a role. The Sunni Awakening is a classic example. Finally, the arming of the ANP with an inferior rifle probably reflects the institutional bias of the US military against "civilian" police in favor of regular military, although history shows that counterinsurgencies are won by focusing on intelligence and security - basic police functions, rather than closing with and destroying the enemy by fire and movement (the definition of infantry combat).
The real answer is for the US, military or otherwise to focus on creating well trained and led paramilitary forces, more akin the French Gendarmie or Italian Carabinerie, which have sufficient firepower and tactical organization to operate in the field against the Taliban, but have an essentially police outlook. Creating such organizations, military or paramilitary, requires the investment of a lot of time and human capital and does not lend itself to quick mass production solutions, which is the American way. What both the ANP and the ANA need more than a "better rifle" is good leadership and an honest and effective logisitical support, again something that takes time and human effort. To achieve this, and defaeat the Taliban, will take far beyond July 2011 and require a focus on people rather than the right rifle.</div></div>
