I would say this: It's all a lot more simple than most people would make it. You either design the chessboard, set the pieces where you want them, and make the rules that others follow. Or you get placed on the chessboard and get the rules dictated to you.
This right here. Americans don’t understand our context in the world because our progenitors have built the luxury of being #1 for us generation after generation. Monroe Doctrine wasn’t about isolationism, but combatting European influence in the Americas. Once The Great War set the tone for waning European dominance in the world, and WWII finalized it with the US emerging as the unexpected top dog, it was only natural for our influence and rule-making to expand (Bretton Woods).
If China had a Navy, Air Force, and Army like we do, they would not be so benevolent to anyone, starting with their own people, then working outward through the Island rings of the Pacific until they at least controlled the choke points for ocean trade there. Then they would assert their power in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. They have already planted the seeds for these strategic pretexts if you look at Djibouti, diplomatic scheming on Seychelles and Mauritius, buying off Australian, Taiwanese, Japanese, South Korean, Filipino, Hawaiian, Canadian, and mainland US politicians.
They would like to avoid open conflict unless all the odds were in their favor and it helped them somehow (demographic pressure release on 45 million + males aged 0-49 with no female counterparts due to One Child as an example). Instead, if they can bribe their way into dominance in the Pacific without firing a shot, that’s the preferred route.
What does any of this have to do with NGSW? They’re watching us openly talk about them as our #1 military pacing threat, especially after Russia has demonstrated gross military incompetence for 3 years. So they will more likely trigger an asymmetric series of events to knock us off that strategic military focus in the Pacific and India, which is exactly what 9/11 did 24 years ago.
Notice how 9/11 got us to knee-jerk into one of the most wasteful series of military campaigns that degraded high-level combat systems in multiple COIN environments, while also sucking hundreds of billions into low-capability Army programs with almost zero return on investment back into the high capability force posture. The biggest force structure loss we suffered from 9/11 was not going into Full-Rate Production with the F-22A, and a group of traitors within 2 White Houses and DoD made sure to do China’s bidding by killing the Raptor before it could be mass-produced. Notice that Obama kept Bush’s SECDEF on, Robert Gates. What did he say? “We don’t need F-22s to bomb the Taliban."
So a new bogeyman (or the old bogeyman reimagined) has already been constructed for us by China, that will be as geographically-far from them as possible, designed to trigger more emotional responses that will be fed with hundreds of billions in wasteful, misplaced military spending, vs high-capability Pacific-oriented regional combat systems that keep them in check.
A conversation about Infantry weapons is so far removed from the high-capability strategic threats as to be irrelevant.
We don’t fight dismounted Infantry with Infantry, so any talk about armor-piercing heavy carbines is moot in that regard and would lead to our soldiers being out-gunned and run-down anyway.
The only real roles for US Infantry in LSCO are security in rear areas or initial security for airfields and basing as heavier forces deploy and stage in-theater. For COIN, we need a lighter, adaptable force mix that works closely with Intel, its own Recon Elements who are augmented with UAS and language-speakers, SF who have already been working in that part of the world for generations to brief on cultural norms/terrain/area study basics/key nodes/smuggling routes/various actors, and limited air support with their support assets and basing.
We don’t need huge conventional forces dumped into the area with Burger King, swimming pools, shopping areas, massive logistics footprints with FOBBITs and contractors galore as fresh targets for insurgents to constantly hit and feed the emotional trigger response or entanglement.
We certainly don’t need Infantry armed with mongo-blasters chambered in 77-80ksi cartridges with a reduced basic load, LMGs with no quick-change barrel capability that separates bi-metal cases, and $13/rd ammunition that automatically kills live-fire training budgets. That is a recipe for even more failure. Insurgents will be trained, equipped, and led by foreign intelligence services whose sole mission is to keep us tied-up in some pointless campaign, so if we can avoid that entirely and hit them asymmetrically ahead-of-time, then run them on our loop, that would be preferred.
The whole mindset, that we need to
react to China is how you play into China’s hands. NGSW further’s China’s strategic objectives by robbing the budgets of actually-useful systems even within the Army. If I could wave a magic wand, I would at least have taken almost every dime from NGSW and given it to PrSM, M-SHORAD (Stryker with Stingers and Hellfires), Stryker DE M-SHORAD with 50kw High Energy Laser that zaps drones, LTAMDS Radar, and more ENVG-Bs Thermal/NV BNVDS. I say that as a die-hard 11B.
For small arms down at the Infantry Platoon, Squad, and Fire Team Level, why are we still even using these antiquated MTO&E structures that date back to the 1950s? Is it because of institutional inertia/failure to adapt, with senior NCOs and careerist officers who can’t think outside of the low-GT score box they’re trapped in after most of the good NCOs went to SOF?
