I had a team sergeant that used to profess authoritatively about how SF should be it's own service component. He made so many logical points and he really sounded like he was the guy to do it if someone would just slap 4 stars on his chest. But he was nowhere in the realm of reality even if some of his points made sense. In the end, he was just some dude telling anyone who would listen what he would do if he was a king for day. Sounded great, tho...
XM7 worries from the field.
- Thread starter Terry Cross
- Start date
Yes, I’m tracking that. I was never a fan of the M24 conceptually or in execution, even though it was as you describe. I was always a gas gun proponent, and became a fan of the SR-25 once it was unveiled at the time.
Once I started shooting my 16” Grendel beyond 600yds, I felt cheated for ever having to lug the M24 around. I could self-spot with ease, enjoy better barrel life, and still hit steel with something that you can actually hear. There isn’t a single scenario where I could imagine wanting an M24 over a carbine Grendel AR-15. There are dozens of scenarios where I would have rather had the Grendel than the M24.
Barrel change on an AR at the unit-level is far easier to do with basic armorer training and some accuracy-enhancing techniques from the AMU already-known in the 1990s. No reason for weapons in a training capacity to be down long at all. I had this conversation with USMC Scout Sniper Instructors who had latched into Grendel independently. I just let them give their spiel without interruption, because it was like listening to myself, and we have never met prior to that.
The learning curve is so much faster with 6.5 Grendel in a Sniper or DM training setting as well, compared with 7.62 NATO, due to self-spot capability. With 7.62, you were almost always relying on spotter feedback, which didn’t build confidence at-first.
Bro, let me introduce you to Lucky Duck…
The difference is that after Army Ordnance Board under Dr. Carten officially declared the AR-15 totally unsuitable for military use and sent his findings back to the Pentagon, then the Ordnance Board received orders to begin type-classification of the AR-15 as the USAF’s new service rifle, because General Curtis LeMay ordered it.
Look at the SOPMOD kit:
SOPMOD enablers really came from aviation and JSOC originally. There was no retarded general or program manager in the way of the end-users when they explained to their Command that they need X, Y, and Z to accomplish National command priority mission sets.
So they got their NODs, LAMs, Carbines, suppressors, free-float tubes, AimPoints, SureFires, LPVOs, integrated buttons for LAM & WL activation, and rails, and then many years later, it trickled down into SOCOM.
People in the past have developed some very applicable solutions with Infantry small arms, but weren’t adopted. For example, the flat top upper with rail was already available in the 1960s for an evolved light Sniper DM rifle called the Colt 656:
The Army didn’t adopt it, but the railed upper showed up again for the ACR trials and submissions in the 1980s, along with the Elcan.
The original M4s were just Colt 727s basically, but got the flat top upper with 1913 rail due to “some user request” who was already using a lot of optics.
So big Army can’t claim responsibility for that either, nor can SF. SF was still using M16A2s on ODAs, old school SAWs with the metal stock, and M60s.
These and many other reasons why I’m an advocate for taking away small arms development responsibility from the Army, due to historically-demonstrated failures, right alongside a timeline in history where some of the greatest progression in small arms has taken place. The Army’s record is counter to the improvements, and habitually-so. XM7/M7/XM250 are just the latest chapter in that trend for Big Army.
I lived though it alongside everyone else. End result was the guys who typically used actual SR25s went 6mm ARC in small frame guns in the long-run.Oh boy...do we need to talk about how that turned out....
Big Army required HPT for the bolts on the M110, again another nail. Early SR25s had some issues like anything else. JSOC had theirs all tuned and tweaked in-house even before the Mk.11 existed. I transferred 86 of those rifles in the buy-back program, which were all spoken-for by end-users or Unit Armorers. I think they had all been re-barreled just because of their shoot schedule. Hart, Krieger, Obermeyer, and maybe some Douglas pipes if I recall, different lengths from 20"-24”.
Their head armorer said he’d take any of his SR25s up against any of our Rem 700 PSSs on the wall. This was 2003 fall timeframe if I remember it right. A lot of things changed with SR-25s since then.
While JSOC moved-on years ago, SOCOM is still messing around with awarding 2 different contracts for a 14.5” 6.5CM SR-25 basically, with 2 different barrel attachment methods.
So SOCOM seems to be infected with the same bureaucratic conundrums big Army has.
So SOCOM seems to be infected with the same bureaucratic conundrums big Army has.
How did you live through it? When did you get out of the Army and move to Finland? Delta developed the SR25 with KAC initially up until the MK11, about 2003'ish? and then it became a Navy item and very few certain SF units had them through rare funding lines. It wasn't until the M110 that any regular army dude would've had any professional interaction with an SR25?
From the early 1990s up through Mk.11. I enlisted in 1993. The only SR-25s I saw in the 1990s were pre-rail, pre-brass deflector, with the old black fiberglass tube handguards.
I think the first time I put hands on a Mk.11 was in 2002. They were even for sale on the civilian market at the time with the deployment case. Jim’s Gun Robbery had one for sale in Fayetteville even.
In late 2003, maybe early 2004, when I was at Bragg/Fayetteville, I handled the transfers for 86 of the buy-back SR-25s that were sent back to KAC when a Unit received newer SR-25s, and KAC offered the actual end-users the opportunity to buy back their own assigned Sniper Systems since they were heavily-modified, covered in bowflage and paint, old dope cards laminated to A2 stocks, some with foam cheek pieces, LSO pistol grips, and most or all of them rebarreled.
The SR-25 quad rail already existed, but wasn’t part of any of the original SR-25 contract guns to those units as it didn’t exist yet. It was developed some time along the way and standardized on the Mk.11, and I think there were 2 different variants for the Mk.11.
I was well out of the Army before the M110 became a thing. I know some units had bolt failures with it, and then went back to SR-25s, maybe in Ranger Regiment/RRD. Big Army touching the SR-25 turned the M110 into a not-so-good system. They thought the HPT bolt requirement of the M16/M4 was a good idea to demand of the M110. HPT isn’t appropriate for any of them, if you talk with Colt Canada, KAC, and other competent engineers in the firearms world who specialize in Stoner designs.
What job were you doing that had you transferring turn in directives? Do you count this is participating in gun R&D?
I mean, there are some here who are advocating we avoid R&D into small arms because of bad programs and should just continue using the M4 only.
China has a lot of gear now. But how much of it has been actually used and trained with in field conditions? And for their ships, how well were they made and how well is their damage control capabilities among the crew?
As for Russia being an ally, they should first abandon their invasion of their neighbor. There was a time when it seemed possible to have an ally in Russia, back in the early days of GWOT. We were both on that counterterrorism kick. Didn’t work out though.
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Shortened the barrel, reduced its profile, lightened the BCG, and not just a different silencer, but a shorter one.
There seem to be some good improvements to it, like extending the top picatinny and having a non-folding stock, but the 10.5” barrel sounds positively miserable, and I have no idea how reducing the profile will help the already mediocre accuracy. I’m also curious how the smaller silencer will be with the shorter barrel.
Having worked R&D programs with DARPA, AFRL, Army Futures, and ONR, my perspective is that the Army is far too near-term thinking. The Air Force is very forward thinking and heavily leverages advanced R&D from DARPA. They are fine with very low TRL research that may not go anywhere, or it may eventually transition to a fielded program down the line. This results in better new developments, as long as they’re patient. The Army, however, even in R&D with low initial TRL, they usually expect a fielded prototype at the end of the program. The Army has no patience, so you get rushed R&D that leads to cut corners in order to get some sort of product to a high enough TRL to keep the Army happy.
The Navy though, they’re as odd as their own nuke community. They prefer to do their own work rather than reach out to defense contractors when possible.
That was at a LGS in Fayetteville working as a civilian. The guys did their transfers through the store once KAC sent all the rifles there.
Has nothing to do with RDT&E, just noting one specific time frame where I saw a lot of different 1st Gen modified SR-25s pre-M110.
I have done RDT&E and QC though in the firearms sector since then. I look at things differently from a systems engineering and aerospace perspective, combined with the limits and capes of firearms metallurgy, composites, ergonomics, and Electro-Optical ancillary systems all being smashed together.
One area where the military aerospace sector is without-peer is systems integration. The firearms sector really sucks at this, because systems engineers are all snatched up by aerospace and higher-value industries with much better pay.
I mean, what’s not to like about a 270 Magnum 10.5” carbine?
Your comments are insightful about RDT&E and TRLs. In USAF, there are parallel TRLs that are understood to be on continuous paths of aggressive development, whether they be propulsion, Radars, materials science for structures and ablatives, Flight Control Systems, Man-Machine Interface, processing power, compactness, lightweight materials, improved weapons capes, transparencies, and VLO materials in RF and IR spectrums.
I was going to say that it always seemed like new program managers and short-term NCOs assigned to the particular program come and go in the Army, things are forgotten, then have to be re-learned or remain forgotten to time.
Your description of Army TRLs might be another way to explain that, where they want instant gratification. Instant Gratification was very prevalent in the Army culturally.
To stay relevant with this thread, here are some of the details with the new version of the XM7.
End result is 7.5lbs unloaded, but WITH the silencer. That’s a huge reduction in weight.
End result is 7.5lbs unloaded, but WITH the silencer. That’s a huge reduction in weight.
Rotating uniformed members is definitely a constant problem. And does seem to be more problematic in the Army. Maybe it’s partly because AF officers involved in R&D are often engineers themselves, or because they’re used to bigger/longer programs.
ATF started getting funding in 1981. Prototypes weren’t ready until 1990 for DEM/VAL.
I don’t think it’s unreasonable for the Army to expect faster timelines for small arms, but also keep in mind the XM4 program basically covers the ATF developmental timeline, and wasn’t made until 1994. Most of the work on it already existed with the Colt 653 and 723 anyway, so there’s no excuse.
I don’t think it’s unreasonable for the Army to expect faster timelines for small arms, but also keep in mind the XM4 program basically covers the ATF developmental timeline, and wasn’t made until 1994. Most of the work on it already existed with the Colt 653 and 723 anyway, so there’s no excuse.
Yeah, lighter, shorter, harder-kicking, louder, more fireball-thrower-y (but now not-folding!); lol wheeeeeee
=_=_=_=_=_=
On my peyote dream quest, I saw my future self at the range lot testing with my wood-stocked, hand-engraved, effete, European, straight-pull, near-silent/suppressed subsonic 22LR.
Then I heard a muffled boom.
Followed by a faint sound of a shotgun blast.
A motorcycle, yes, a v-twin rumbled into the range parking lot.
Foliage around me started to silently catch fire…
Sweat trickled down my left temple.
Without a sound, some disgusting mother-scratcher appeared besides me with one of those SIG 10.5” assholes.
He was horrible. The lone SIGGER of the apocalypse. Smelled like cigars and rotten teeth. A man with all the powers of Hell at his command.
My eyes widened. No! It cannot be! His SIG M7 was shorn with only a brake!!!
=_=_=_=_=_=
When I didn’t return home that day, the forensic team found my car in the lot and only some wisps of soot at bench #9.
Downrange, the smoldering embers of the target stands sizzled.
With thanks to some words & clips from Raising Arizona by the Coen brothers. An awesome movie. You should see it.
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So did you ever contribute to the development of the SR-25, procurement of the M110, or develop training solutions to put the SR25 or M110 in a medium range assaulter/ sniper role from a professional duty position or role? Or do you just mean that you observed the SR25 develop over the years through an enthusiast following?
The West instigated the entire conflict starting in the 80's and kicking things into high gear in 2014.
Russia did just what we would have done in the same circumstances. When they tried to negotiate a peace deal and reset 4 weeks after they started, we sent Boris Johnson with instructions for Ukraine to ignore their offer and keep fighting.
The Russian Federation was effectively painted as the bad guys and we are continuing to fan the flames. MSM is quite effective in shaping public opinion as proven by your statement.
That has already been hashed out in other threads.
We didn’t try to dissuade Russia, that’s for sure. But it is solely on Russia for Russia invading their neighbor. We didn’t force Russia to invade, we just didn’t try to calm them after they made completely unreasonable demands. Ukraine wanting to join the EU for economic reasons is not justification for invasion. Nor is it justification for the war crimes they’re committing in Ukraine. Nor is Ukraine’s overthrow of a Russian puppet government who bribed judges to ditch a part of their constitution. Maybe the CIA had a hand in encouraging the Revolution, but the hundreds of thousands of people who wanted a freer country were not CIA agents. The Ukrainians wanted the change. Nor is increasing NATO member a valid reason for the invasion, but I won’t fill this thread with the lengthy reasons why. I realize I won’t change your mind, and you won’t change mine. And this thread isn’t the place for a further discussion. I won’t answer any further about the matter in this thread. I just had to point out how patently NOT cut snd dry it is like you’re making it sound.
The improvements shown in the newer 10.5 are decent, but ditching the folding stock feels like a serious mistake with how much the US makes use of mounted transport.
Having looked at things a little closer since my last post, I’m pretty firmly convinced that the lowest hanging fruit is a 12.5” 6mm max with new projectile designs. Accomplishes the stated goals of soft armor defeat at extended range, doesn’t require any TDP changes or extreme pressures, and requires nothing more than a rebarrel, not even a new bolt or BCG. Magazines work but aren’t perfectly optimized, easy enough to fix over time. MGs using M27 links can continue to be used with a barrel change.
The 6.8 plant wouldn’t be a complete waste because the 6.8 does offer some reasonable advantages when used in place of the current 7.62x51 in MGs both crew served and in mounts, so the only write-off would be the abortion of the XM7
Edit: Going to see if I can make a few of the projectiles I described, 6.5 since I don’t have a 6max to use as a testbed. Hardest bit will be casting ULTEM into the aeroshell shape around the core/drive band
Having looked at things a little closer since my last post, I’m pretty firmly convinced that the lowest hanging fruit is a 12.5” 6mm max with new projectile designs. Accomplishes the stated goals of soft armor defeat at extended range, doesn’t require any TDP changes or extreme pressures, and requires nothing more than a rebarrel, not even a new bolt or BCG. Magazines work but aren’t perfectly optimized, easy enough to fix over time. MGs using M27 links can continue to be used with a barrel change.
The 6.8 plant wouldn’t be a complete waste because the 6.8 does offer some reasonable advantages when used in place of the current 7.62x51 in MGs both crew served and in mounts, so the only write-off would be the abortion of the XM7
Edit: Going to see if I can make a few of the projectiles I described, 6.5 since I don’t have a 6max to use as a testbed. Hardest bit will be casting ULTEM into the aeroshell shape around the core/drive band
Nah, just using 6.5 Creed as a testbed for the concept. Lathe-turn a penetrator core (and maybe a driving band if necessary) then cast the rest of the ballistic shape around the core in ultra light weight but durable ultem polymer since that can survive rifle shot temperatures and pressures (it’s what they made the SLAP sabots from).
Essentially it’s SLAP 2.0, but using a “polymer aeroshell” instead of a discarding sabot. Most of your projectile mass will be in the core long rod penetrator, but with proper geometry cast into the polymer shell you could get a fairly nice fragmentation effect of the polymer as well for soft targets.
While the goal for an intermediate cartridge variation would simply be oblique soft armor defeat out to 600yd, a version in a full rifle caliber using something like WHA as the core material will probably put holes in ESAPI fairly easily
If we’re throwing out alternate cartridges, I think the XM5/7 would have been great with a 25 GT with a 120ish grain A1 style projectile in a NAS3 case. Using a magazine that’s appropriately shorter than an SR25 mag and a receiver that’s smaller than an AR10 because it doesn’t need to handle the pressure of a 308 or Creedmoor.
* a 6.5 or 6.8 GT would likely be fine too, but it seems like the 25 would be a good optimization for the grain weight and BC.
* a 6.5 or 6.8 GT would likely be fine too, but it seems like the 25 would be a good optimization for the grain weight and BC.
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VETO. SGMs are going to lose their minds once all the troops start wearing their patrol caps with flat brims after they begin shooting a PRS cartridge
SGMs getting upset is a feature not a bad thing. This thread started out interesting but should be nuked.
I had zero input into SR-25 and M110 development, nor have I ever claimed to have had any. I did closely observe the life of the SR-25 and subsequent models from start to the current iterations, with more than enthusiast access, but not directly involved.
You just mentioned how M110 turned out as if I was unaware.
Everyone I knew who had gone to RRD or JSOC said the M110 was a POS, and stated they immediately started seeing issues with them, including bolt failures, when none could ever remember a bolt failure with any SR-25 in the past.
Even Trey Knight said the HPT requirement for the M110 bolt was stupid, and KAC strongly advised against it, but the Army insisted that M110 have it.
This all goes to show how the Army can take an already-working small arms system, including one that is made in very limited numbers with tighter requirements, and make it worse, while truly believing they improved it. Open comments from PEO soldier (General Moran if I recall), were blatantly-false at the time, about how the M110 had more effective range than the M24, and was more accurate. There was a bit of a dust-up over that, which I’m sure you remember.
This all proves the points I’ve been making though. What they’re doing with XM7/M7/M7A2 is even worse.
