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After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.
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Asiana 777 Crash at SFO - Page 38 - Airline Pilot Central Forums
A guide to crash speak
The more complicated planes get, the harder it is to fly them. There are more ways for pilots both to mess up and to compensate for their mess-ups, and there are more dials, flashing lights, and doodads for them to keep watch on. That said, there are a few basic principles of flying that apply to the Asiana crash, principles that might be obscured by some of the aviation lingo that's being thrown around. I'm not a pilot, and so I write only as an interested observer who is, himself, trying to understand what happened. My own definitions may not be precise enough for the FAA or Cockpit Confidential, but I hope they help explain some of the concepts.
First, a few words: Associate pitch with moving up or down, the "stick" with pitch, yaw with left or right horizontal movement, rudders with yaw, and thrust with force and speed.
How important was it that the glideslope wasn't working?
It's not an easy question. Potentially, very important — if the pilot really, really preferred to use this method. But practically, probably not. A glideslope refers to a beam of energy that's part of the Instrument Landing System and keeps a plane on a vertical descent line. When cleared by the tower for an ILS approach to a runway, you tune your plane to the frequency of the glideslope emission; you adjust your speed, using the throttle, and pitch, using the stick, to keep the glideslope line as close to the center-line of an indicator display in the cockpit as you can. Another beam provides lateral guidance, so you're using your rudder pedals to slightly adjust the yaw to keep the line as close to the horizontal center-line in the same indicator display. If the lines stay tight, you'll land precisely in the touchdown zone of the runway, which is usually about 1,000 feet in from the threshold, or the start, of the runway.
That's how planes land in bad weather. For most ILS approaches, though, the pilot has to make a decision at some point close to the ground. Regardless of what his instruments are showing, can she see the touchdown zone, enough of the runway, and the runway lights? This "threshold" changes depending on the runway, but it's usually between 300 and 500 feet, which will give the pilot enough time, if she doesn't see anything because it's too rainy, snowy, foggy or cloudy, to declare a "missed approach," throttle up, retract most of the drag-inducing flaps, and then retract the runway gear, and pitch up.
So how did the pilots know how to stay on the right path?
On a clear day with no visual distortions, there are other ways for a pilot to know if he's flying the correct approach path. Runway 28L had a functioning PAPI, or Precision Approach Path Indicator. The PAPI is a series of lights set to one side of the runway threshold. It doesn't matter precisely where. The angle at which the pilot's eyes catch the PAPI is key: if the pilot is on the correct glidepath, he will see two yellow lights next to two red lights. If the pilot is coming in high, he'll see three yellow lights and one red light. If he's coming in too low, he'll see three red lights next to one yellow light. If you're coming in too low, it means that you need to increase the ground speed of the plane relative to the rate of descent, so you push the throttle forward a bit, or perhaps adjust the pitch. If you're coming in too high, you ease back on the throttle or change the angle of the plane relative to the descent, pitching up a little. In any event, when you see the two-two configuration, you're good.
Is that the only way for a pilot to tell if she's going to land at the right spot?
No. Look at the landing threshold. It should be, relative to the rest of the stuff in your band of vision, at the same place it was when you first saw it. It'll get bigger and bigger, and bigger and bigger, but it won't move. Is that's the case, your ground speed is sufficient to land in the touchdown zone properly. So there were at least two cues — one electronic, and one visual, that the pilots were relying on.
What does it mean that the "speed" was too slow? How would they know what the right speed was?
The way you get a plane in the air is to generate enough thrust to overcome its weight, so that the thrust plus the weight of air itself is higher than the weight of the plane. The way you get a plane to land is to reverse the process that generates the thrust. This does not mean that you lower the power and point the nose toward the ground. It's kind of complex, because you want to land at a specific spot, like, say, on a runway, where you can burn off all the excessive energy that the plane has in a way that doesn't kill anyone or wreck the thing. The way to do this properly is to calculate a descent rate from a particular spot close to the runway threshold. The descent rate depends upon the weight of the airplane, because it represents the safest, slowest possible speed that the plane can lose its thrust, stay on an angle, and maintain control. Pilots will know that they'll need to land with a specific approach speed. Air Traffic Control will give them time to reduce their speed slowly; obviously, a plane can't fly at 300 knots until two miles out and then suddenly hope to slow down to between 150 and 160 knots right at the runway threshold without something going wrong. Usually, planes step down their speeds and altitudes gently, and are given several miles to set up their approaches — both the speed (the groundspeed, not the airspeed) and the angle (the glideslope). Generally, a plane's approach speed is a relative constant. The airframe accounts for a set weight, but variations in fuel aboard, the passenger count, the tailwinds on the ground and even the temperature can push the number higher or lower. The pilots and their dispatches can calculate the figure very quickly if conditions rapidly change. But they can't and never do ballpark the figure.
So how do pilots stay at the exact speed?
They adjust the thrust and the pitch of their aircraft. Generally, pilots will turn on the "autothrottle," and will use one of their several autopilots to set the speed. The plane, in theory, will then automatically adjust the throttle to make sure the speed is constant on the approach. Of course, the autopilots can't violate the laws of physics. Pilots themselves have to make sure the plane is within a certain set of physical parameters in order for the autopilot to work properly. Some pilots like to manually adjust the throttle to maintain the speed; some don't. And right before landing, the autopilot has to be disengaged because the plane is supposed to touch down and then slow down, something it can't do if the plane itself wants to keep the speed constant. (Some autopilots automatically disengage at a certain height). For all the talk of how "planes land themselves," pilots are the ones who decide when to disengage the autopilot and when to retard the throttle to idle, and how and when to begin the "flare" — which is that nose-up maneuver that both increases drag, slows down the plane, and allows the aircraft to touch down on its rear wheels as gently as possible. (Some planes can land themselves; these "category 3 ILS approaches" are still kind of rare, because airports have to be certified for them, pilots have to be trained extensively for them, and a lot of people still can't get over the idea of letting a plane decide when to cut off the autothrottle and automatically pitch up.)
What happens when the autothrottle is disengaged and the pilot must increase speed before the plane is over the runway?
Once the autothrottles have been disengaged, a pilot efficiently increases speed during landing by
(a) keeping the pitch constant and adding more thrust to the engines,
(b) and then very slowly adjusting the pitch down as the added thrust kicks in to make sure the plane's altitude aligns with the visual cues or ILS glidescope as necessary.
Problem is, if you're trying to do this 10 seconds from touchdown, the plane is usually not going to respond as quickly as you need it to.
If the pilot lowers the nose first, the altitude will drop before the speed increases, so pilots are instructed, generally, to not adjust the pitch of their aircraft when they're trying to make sure they're on a proper path to land until the plane has begun to speed up. The last thing these Asiana pilots needed to do was to go lower faster.
By the way, human instincts would have you pull back on the stick as soon as you can, because up is up, but pitching up quickly during landing will not increase the altitude quickly enough and will decrease speed too quickly. Pitch up, speed down. Pitch down, speed up. And when you're landing or taking off, the relative effects of these actions will differ too.
What's this about a "go-around?" Why didn't the pilots do this "go-around" thing if whatever they were doing wasn't right?
The latter question is hard to answer; perhaps the pilots genuinely did not notice they were in trouble until it was too late. For the most part, though, if a plane is more than 15 seconds from touching down, it can safely and seamlessly execute a go-around maneuver. The flaps and slats — the thingies that extend from the wings during takeoff and landing — are retracted to a takeoff posture; the throttle is pushed up; then the plane pitches up slightly; once positive climb (i.e., it's going up) has been established, then the pilots will retract the landing gear. Every runway comes with its own "missed approach fix," which is where a plane knows to go automatically if it can't stick the landing. Before landing, a pilot will input the height of that fix, usually around 3,000 feet, into an autopilot computer. It won't be activated, though. (Each plane you fly has at least two these days, two separate autopilots). The pilot flying the plane relies on his or her co-pilot to look at the electronic landing cues and instruments to make sure that the plane is on track for a landing. He or she is ready to perform the final landing maneuvers (see below), or switch gears and do a "TO/GA." What a cool button this is. It basically tells the plane to ignore everything, including the autopilots, and increase the throttle as quickly as possible. Once the engines have spooled up, a process that can take anywhere between eight and 10 seconds, then the pilot not flying might activate the autopilot with the missed-approach height setting.
A guide to crash speak - The Week
