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WW1 British Expeditionary Force Marksmanship Standards

Forgetful Coyote

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Everyone always mentions what a squared-away group the British Expeditionary Force was in early WW1. Do any yall know the marksmanship standards they were required to acheive/perform? The show "Our War" certainly does make the rifleman seem impressive, while making it seem as if the machine gunners is the destination for the f*ck-ups, and decidedly less impressive.
 
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The show “Our War” would be wrong. (Or our World War).

Actually the Machine Gun Corps were elite units. The expertise involved in setting up fields of fire, math, plunging fire, etc. meant that to be a machine gunner, you had to be tier-one in the IQ department. And capable of handling significant amounts of math along with complex tactical decisions.

At the early stages of the war, rifle volley fire was still the rule and riflemen were trained as such.

Though the BEF was head and shoulders above Kitcheners volunteers, they were mostly wiped out in the early days of the war that they all figured would be over by Christmas 1914. Largely by German machine gunners... who were also elite.


If there any wastrels and idiots to be found... look at the Officers Corps. Who had not the foggiest idea of what they were getting into in 1914. As the saying went, the British troops were a “generation of lions, led by donkeys.”

As for “Our World War,” it is a drama series and based on recollections of three soldiers. And what soldier thinks their unit or branch or specialty is not the best? So the recollections, now all written or oral histories, must be viewed through the lens of one mans experience... and then expanded by BBC screenplay writers who we all know are PhD historians, right? Dedicated to historical accuracy and not just trying to write entertaining material that will keep viewers watching between soap commercials?

Evaluating the MG Corps based on a WWI drama is like trying to understand the history of the Korean War by binge watching MASH.

Which is why there are libraries and things called books out there that answer deep questions and help people comprehend history before posting silly statements based on BBC wartime soap operas. Just sayin.

Sirhr

PS. Bomb Girls is also largely made up. And Hogans Heroes is not how POW’s lived. Don’t even get me started on Rat Patrol.
 
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The show “Our War” would be wrong. (Or our World War).

Actually the Machine Gun Corps were elite units. The expertise involved in setting up fields of fire, math, plunging fire, etc. meant that to be a machine gunner, you had to be tier-one in the IQ department. And capable of handling significant amounts of math along with complex tactical decisions.

At the early stages of the war, rifle volley fire was still the rule and riflemen were trained as such.

Though the BEF was head and shoulders above Kitcheners volunteers, they were mostly wiped out in the early days of the war that they all figured would be over by Christmas 1914. Largely by German machine gunners... who were also elite.


If there any wastrels and idiots to be found... look at the Officers Corps. Who had not the foggiest idea of what they were getting into in 1914. As the saying went, the British troops were a “generation of lions, led by donkeys.”

As for “Our World War,” it is a drama series and based on recollections of three soldiers. And what soldier thinks their unit or branch or specialty is not the best? So the recollections, now all written or oral histories, must be viewed through the lens of one mans experience... and then expanded by BBC screenplay writers who we all know are PhD historians, right? Dedicated to historical accuracy and not just trying to write entertaining material that will keep viewers watching between soap commercials?

Evaluating the MG Corps based on a WWI drama is like trying to understand the history of the Korean War by binge watching MASH.

Which is why there are libraries and things called books out there that answer deep questions and help people comprehend history before posting silly statements based on BBC wartime soap operas. Just sayin.

Sirhr

PS. Bomb Girls is also largely made up. And Hogans Heroes is not how POW’s lived. Don’t even get me started on Rat Patrol.
It's interesting watching "Time Team". Tony Robinson produces it ..and produces most of the drama. Which is somewhat funny... sometimes. But, the archeologists who dig the digs are really interesting to watch. One show was a dig on a WWI machine gun training camp and it's just as sirhr say's, they were the elite and had to show it in those camps that trained them. I believe they had from five weeks to two months, depending on what you did, to drive the point home how important it was. If you failed, you went to the regular army.

This is a big difference from the time I was in where you got training on the M60 in AIT, and then learned when you got to the unit. Starting as either an ammo bearer or AG. Each giving you some time on the gun. The Marines have this as a separate MOS. Which shows a little more importance to how it's done. We in the Rangers did a LOT of cross training. So, you could each expect to have some time on the gun, even if you weren't in Weapons Squad (M60's only). I don't know how the rest of the Army handled it.
 
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It's interesting watching "Time Team". Tony Robinson produces it ..and produces most of the drama. Which is somewhat funny... sometimes. But, the archeologists who dig the digs are really interesting to watch. One show was a dig on a WWI machine gun training camp and it's just as sirhr say's, they were the elite and had to show it in those camps that trained them. I believe they had from five weeks to two months, depending on what you did, to drive the point home how important it was. If you failed, you went to the regular army.

This is a big difference from the time I was in where you got training on the M60 in AIT, and then learned when you got to the unit. Starting as either an ammo bearer or AG. Each giving you some time on the gun. The Marines have this as a separate MOS. Which shows a little more importance to how it's done. We in the Rangers did a LOT of cross training. So, you could each expect to have some time on the gun, even if you weren't in Weapons Squad (M60's only). I don't know how the rest of the Army handled it.
Time Team is an outstanding show. Free on YouTube.

Baldrick has done more for conflict archaeology than anyone in history, IMHO. By making it interesting, exciting and within reach of a generation. Such a great show!

If only they would stop saying “Geo-fizz.“

I have seen that episode, Sand. And it is a good one!!

Sirhr
 
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The show “Our War” would be wrong. (Or our World War).

Actually the Machine Gun Corps were elite units. The expertise involved in setting up fields of fire, math, plunging fire, etc. meant that to be a machine gunner, you had to be tier-one in the IQ department. And capable of handling significant amounts of math along with complex tactical decisions.

At the early stages of the war, rifle volley fire was still the rule and riflemen were trained as such.

Though the BEF was head and shoulders above Kitcheners volunteers, they were mostly wiped out in the early days of the war that they all figured would be over by Christmas 1914. Largely by German machine gunners... who were also elite.


If there any wastrels and idiots to be found... look at the Officers Corps. Who had not the foggiest idea of what they were getting into in 1914. As the saying went, the British troops were a “generation of lions, led by donkeys.”

As for “Our World War,” it is a drama series and based on recollections of three soldiers. And what soldier thinks their unit or branch or specialty is not the best? So the recollections, now all written or oral histories, must be viewed through the lens of one mans experience... and then expanded by BBC screenplay writers who we all know are PhD historians, right? Dedicated to historical accuracy and not just trying to write entertaining material that will keep viewers watching between soap commercials?

Evaluating the MG Corps based on a WWI drama is like trying to understand the history of the Korean War by binge watching MASH.

Which is why there are libraries and things called books out there that answer deep questions and help people comprehend history before posting silly statements based on BBC wartime soap operas. Just sayin.

Sirhr

PS. Bomb Girls is also largely made up. And Hogans Heroes is not how POW’s lived. Don’t even get me started on Rat Patrol.
Wasn’t evaluating them at all nor trying to, nor making a statement about something which I wasn’t there to witness. Simply making a statement about what a show that I thought was decent, showed. Nevertheless, you’re correct. It wasn’t my intention at all to demean their abilities, tho I reckon I could see how it could come across that way. Only wanted to point out that there seems to be a consensus the riflemen of the Brit Expeditionary were elite. (I don’t think the pals battalions was such a great idea tho)
Anyhow, does anyone know the standards to which the BEF riflemen had to perform?
 
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And McBrides book The Emma Gees. Where he talks about his life in the machine gun corps.

both reprinted. Both must reads. We should require them as precursors to asking questions in Vintage ;-)

Sirhr

Farrow's "How I Became a Crack Shot" is another interesting read into marksmanship of over a century ago (circa 1882).
 
Have not seen that. I will order a copy tonite! Thanks!
I'm assuming you've also read this one:

Another interesting read about experiments into understanding ballistics by Franklin W. Mann. LOL! There's some interesting stories in there as well...
 
As sihr mentions above, I wonder how much of the BEF's reputation was based on individual marksmanship, or on "musketry" in the sense of massing directed rifle fires on area targets. The two can go hand-in-hand, but doctrine at the time was probably more based on the latter.

If there any wastrels and idiots to be found... look at the Officers Corps. Who had not the foggiest idea of what they were getting into in 1914. As the saying went, the British troops were a “generation of lions, led by donkeys.”

To be fair, no one did. It makes for a clean narrative, but with some exceptions I think they get a worse rap than they deserve.
 
To be fair, no one did. It makes for a clean narrative, but with some exceptions I think they get a worse rap than they deserve.

I'd tend to agree with you. At battalion level and below, the Officers would show a fair amount of compassion and tended to be relatively competent. In terms of the grand strategy, it was often hampered by poor communications. Where local breakthroughs occurred, it was often very difficult to follow up in any meaningful way as the comms chain was not especially robust (reliant on telephone lines that were often cut, or runners who would often not make it).

A notable exception is Gallipoli. We absolutely had the element of surprise and if we hadn't spent a month 'softening' up the Turkish positions (there weren't many Germans there initially) we could have achieved much greater success. The senior Artillery Officer on scene (a Brigadier, if I recall) had just come from the Western Front and was horrified by the idea of attacking without a preliminary bombardment. Lo and behold, a month of shelling made the Turks sit up and realise we were up to something. They reinforced their positions and called for reinforcements. The rest is history!
 
As sihr mentions above, I wonder how much of the BEF's reputation was based on individual marksmanship, or on "musketry" in the sense of massing directed rifle fires on area targets. The two can go hand-in-hand, but doctrine at the time was probably more based on the latter.



To be fair, no one did. It makes for a clean narrative, but with some exceptions I think they get a worse rap than they deserve.

That is a fair assessment in some cases. Everyone thought the 'war would be over by Christmas' and would be a Jolly Little affair... a fun little vacation in France to whip the Hun and come home. The BEF had no idea what lay ahead... and the early volunteers, Edwardian lads looking for adventure, got a rude awakening.

But there were an awful lot of folks who should have seen things coming. That is what General Staff's and "Plans and operatrations" staffs should be able to do. And darn sure Von Schleiffen (and his successors) had more of an idea of modern warfare than the British and French, who spent the entire Edwardian period polishing their boots and playing polo and thinking about fighting 'splendid little wars' here and there. The "Small Wars" manual had even been written in this time.

Now I will admit, we are looking at them through the lens of historians almost exactly 106 years ago... and with the experience of a lot more conflicts and access to information. But I will make the argument that it was the job of the British General Staff to have been prepared for a 'big war' in Europe. The Battleship races and arms races had been going on 20 years. The cookie-pushing diplomats had created a web of treaties that the Generals should have understood and been prepared to defend. And there were precedents that the general staffs and their plans and operations (and training) people should have paid attention to. But they were so ossified and sure of their own brilliance and invincibility that they never bothered.

Again... we have more experience today with analyzing things. But here are a few of the things that the senior officers should have taken into account prior to 1914:

-- The last months of the American Civil War. A war of attrition with siege/trench warfare at Petersburg. And the introduction of mechanization at a level that had never been seen before. Telegraphy, railroads (that allowed almost instant movement of troops), steam ships, balloons, repeating rifles, Rifled muskets and cartridge rifles, Gatling Guns (definitely used at Petersburg in the hands of, I think, Burnside.)

-- The Boer War. Which was absolutely devastating for the British as the Mauser and smokeless powder made its debut. Along with repeating breech-loaders and Maxim guns. This was one of those splendid little small wars that everyone loved so much. And the Brits got their asses handed to them.

-- The Spanish American War with modern weaponry and amphibious operations (the British didn't even believe Amphibious landings were possible... and thus totally booted Gallipoli because they didn't think it could be done, so why plan properly for it... not to mention they were mostly sending 'surplus Colonial' troops and ships. The Spanish American War in Cuba and the Philippines should have been a wake-up. But the British didn't pay any attention to what 'colonials' were all about. They weren't British.

-- The advent of aviation... which the Army was completely against. And it took the RNAS to really pioneer any kind of aviation.

-- Motorization... in 1914, they weren't even CONTEMPLATING mechanization, to the point that the first armoured car squadrons were created by Churchill and the Navy... and the Duke of Westminster had to buy his own fleet of armoured cars, out of his pocket, to create the first Army Armoured Car squadron. Horses lad, horses. Never replace horses with newfangled automobiles!

-- Automatic weapons and machine guns... The British were way behind the curve and didn't even create the Machine Gun Corps until well into 1915. They had no clue about proper deployment and battlefield use until, well, they had been slaughtered at The Marne.

Then you have the evolution of the war and the lessons that they 'should' have taken in the first months. But often didn't. Preferring to blame the failure of junior officers or troops for plans that were simply suicidal... But they kept simply throwing cannon fodder at the cannons. And some of the really pathetic officers, such as the blithering idiot Fenton Aylmer who totally FUBAR'd the Mesopotamian Campaign or Douglas Haig who lost 600,000 at the Somme while still claiming after the war that the frontal assault and the cavalry charge were valid military tactics in the face of mechanized defenders.... For 5 years, many of the British senior staff simply failed to 'learn' or adapt, so sure were they of the methods that, really, were shown to be outdated at First Manassas.

Again... you are right that we have more experience and information and 20/20 hindsight to help us out. But I will argue back that when you are a general, it is your job to look ahead and be ready for the next war. Not keep fighting the last one while almost 900,000 of your subordinates are killed needlessly.

So I kind of think that they deserve much of the criticism they get. They SHOULD have seen it coming. And failed. They SHOULD have been able to adapt. And failed. They SHOULD have seen that Brigadier His Excellency First Lord Blivetsphincter of Plumpton was incompetent and replaced him before he killed his entire unit. And failed. Again and again.

That's they pay generals the big bucks, isn't it????

Donkeys indeed.

Sirhr
 
Sure, military planners, force designers, doctrine developers etc had the American Civil War, Boer War, and Spanish American War to observe but these (other than the Anglo-Boer wars to the British) were insignificant compared to other conflicts that did more to shape European military thinking.

he Wars of German Unification, Franco-Prussian War, and and Russo Japanese War did more to shape thought than anything else.... as they should have. Planners should have seen the warning signs, but circa 1910 you could look at these wars and take the opposite lessons away. They seemed to validate the most perverse planning assumptions, leading to some of the most tragic strategic/operational/tactical concepts actions of the war.

Schlieffen, Plan 17 and offensive l'outrance, the decisive 'Mahanian' fleet action, and so many others.....all came from this era. Winning by beating your opponents off the starting blocks in the mobilization race, spirited bayonet assaults carrying fixed defensive positions, rapid exploitation by hard-marching infantry, cavalry, and light artillery brought to the front on rail cars and carefully coordinated by telegraph.... all 'worked' even as World War I technology was making its way to the battlefield.

Yet the Moltke of 1914 was not his father uncle, Petain was right, and the the Marne looked nothing like Mafeking. Those planning for the 'next war' saw what won the last wars, but not quite what it took to get there. Sure, Japanese infantry beat machine guns at Port Arthur, Mukden, and the Yalu with lightning bayonet assaults, but their losses were staggering.

I am not sure Britian could have gone into it very differently. It floated a cripplingly expensive navy and a massive, similarly costly land Army of the type fielded by the land powers was just not an option. It was going into the war the way it always did- reinforcing allies and buying time while harassing along the periphery and building its 'surge force' if needed.

Horsed cavalry, while dying, had not made its last gasp as an effective maneuver element. It did pretty well in the East during the war, and was still highly effective during the Russian Civil War and Russo-Polish war.

Also consider that even in 1940 most armies were not truly mechanized.... some by 1945, for that matter.

Significant technological innovations notwithstanding, World War I leaders often showed a lot of skill and creativity in planning and execution with what they had. There was just so much you could do with the blunt, 'fire and forget' instruments available.

More often than not, those foolish offensives achieved their immediate operational objectives, but the exploitation force was too cumbersome and slow, the ground too churned up to get your artillery and heavy weapons forward, communication so bad your heavy artillery kept pounding the assault force after it achieved a local breakthrough, etc.

I think World War I was more a confluence of one-way, no-offramp strategic planning with a lopsided ascendency of lethality over the ability of maneuver, command, and protect your forces. All in all a pretty bad set-up.


I am not a scholar by any means, it just seems like most everyone gets most of it wrong- strategically, operationally, tactically, or all the above- when going into a conflict. I guess the key is to not get it so wrong that you can't recover.
 
One thing that sticks out to me as a indication that the powers at the time were slow to adapt is the stories from early in the war where "Observation" pilots from opposing sides would wave to each other. I suppose among airmen it was the gentlemanly thing to do.

Cant disagree at all with your one way, no off ramp comment.
 
Wasn’t evaluating them at all nor trying to, nor making a statement about something which I wasn’t there to witness. Simply making a statement about what a show that I thought was decent, showed. Nevertheless, you’re correct. It wasn’t my intention at all to demean their abilities, tho I reckon I could see how it could come across that way. Only wanted to point out that there seems to be a consensus the riflemen of the Brit Expeditionary were elite. (I don’t think the pals battalions was such a great idea tho)
Anyhow, does anyone know the standards to which the BEF riflemen had to perform?
Bloke on the Range did a video sometime in the last six months I think, in which he covered standard musketry training and ammunition allowances for that training. When you watch that, it is easy to understand why the Miniature Rifle Clubs, set up under Roberts’ aegis were so important to British and Imperial marksmanship training.
 
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Sure, military planners, force designers, doctrine developers etc had the American Civil War, Boer War, and Spanish American War to observe but these (other than the Anglo-Boer wars to the British) were insignificant compared to other conflicts that did more to shape European military thinking.

he Wars of German Unification, Franco-Prussian War, and and Russo Japanese War did more to shape thought than anything else.... as they should have. Planners should have seen the warning signs, but circa 1910 you could look at these wars and take the opposite lessons away. They seemed to validate the most perverse planning assumptions, leading to some of the most tragic strategic/operational/tactical concepts actions of the war.

Schlieffen, Plan 17 and offensive l'outrance, the decisive 'Mahanian' fleet action, and so many others.....all came from this era. Winning by beating your opponents off the starting blocks in the mobilization race, spirited bayonet assaults carrying fixed defensive positions, rapid exploitation by hard-marching infantry, cavalry, and light artillery brought to the front on rail cars and carefully coordinated by telegraph.... all 'worked' even as World War I technology was making its way to the battlefield.

Yet the Moltke of 1914 was not his father uncle, Petain was right, and the the Marne looked nothing like Mafeking. Those planning for the 'next war' saw what won the last wars, but not quite what it took to get there. Sure, Japanese infantry beat machine guns at Port Arthur, Mukden, and the Yalu with lightning bayonet assaults, but their losses were staggering.

I am not sure Britian could have gone into it very differently. It floated a cripplingly expensive navy and a massive, similarly costly land Army of the type fielded by the land powers was just not an option. It was going into the war the way it always did- reinforcing allies and buying time while harassing along the periphery and building its 'surge force' if needed.

Horsed cavalry, while dying, had not made its last gasp as an effective maneuver element. It did pretty well in the East during the war, and was still highly effective during the Russian Civil War and Russo-Polish war.

Also consider that even in 1940 most armies were not truly mechanized.... some by 1945, for that matter.

Significant technological innovations notwithstanding, World War I leaders often showed a lot of skill and creativity in planning and execution with what they had. There was just so much you could do with the blunt, 'fire and forget' instruments available.

More often than not, those foolish offensives achieved their immediate operational objectives, but the exploitation force was too cumbersome and slow, the ground too churned up to get your artillery and heavy weapons forward, communication so bad your heavy artillery kept pounding the assault force after it achieved a local breakthrough, etc.

I think World War I was more a confluence of one-way, no-offramp strategic planning with a lopsided ascendency of lethality over the ability of maneuver, command, and protect your forces. All in all a pretty bad set-up.


I am not a scholar by any means, it just seems like most everyone gets most of it wrong- strategically, operationally, tactically, or all the above- when going into a conflict. I guess the key is to not get it so wrong that you can't recover.
I would have to disagree with the synopsis that military planning, at least on the British side, was a kind of "one-way thinking with no offramp". Those idiots could barely see the road as their heads were stuffed too far up their pompous asses. As sirhr had pointed out there were plenty of chances to learn. And when learning stop taking away what YOU think and take away both sides of the battle. Good as well as bad. What could they have potentially done.

The simple fact that in Gallipoli, the British kicked off an offensive with the Australians taking the brunt of it. Even after they had been told by London that the offensive wasn't necessary because they were pulling out. And then drank tea while the Australians got slaughtered. That's a clear mindset they were still just a bunch of boys rolling balls at toy soldiers. That men, companies, battalions, brigades and divisions were just numerical assets. While losses no matter how bad, were not to be bothered with. They had 'real' objectives in mind and losses were accounted for. it was still a 'numbers' game to them and no concern for their men.
 
I would have to disagree with the synopsis that military planning, at least on the British side, was a kind of "one-way thinking with no offramp". Those idiots could barely see the road as their heads were stuffed too far up their pompous asses. As sirhr had pointed out there were plenty of chances to learn. And when learning stop taking away what YOU think and take away both sides of the battle. Good as well as bad. What could they have potentially done.

The simple fact that in Gallipoli, the British kicked off an offensive with the Australians taking the brunt of it. Even after they had been told by London that the offensive wasn't necessary because they were pulling out. And then drank tea while the Australians got slaughtered. That's a clear mindset they were still just a bunch of boys rolling balls at toy soldiers. That men, companies, battalions, brigades and divisions were just numerical assets. While losses no matter how bad, were not to be bothered with. They had 'real' objectives in mind and losses were accounted for. it was still a 'numbers' game to them and no concern for their men.
In terms of the detached, game-like mentality, Churchill himself was pretty eager for the war, and according to many historian's evaluations of the lead-up of events, deliberately pushed things to their conclusion because he wanted an exciting, great adventure that would teach the Hun a lesson. In fact, the "great adventure" broke Western civilization, ruined the British empire, destroyed a generation, and directly precipitated round 2, which happened 20 years later.
 
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I would have to disagree with the synopsis that military planning, at least on the British side, was a kind of "one-way thinking with no offramp". Those idiots could barely see the road as their heads were stuffed too far up their pompous asses. As sirhr had pointed out there were plenty of chances to learn. And when learning stop taking away what YOU think and take away both sides of the battle. Good as well as bad. What could they have potentially done.

The simple fact that in Gallipoli, the British kicked off an offensive with the Australians taking the brunt of it. Even after they had been told by London that the offensive wasn't necessary because they were pulling out. And then drank tea while the Australians got slaughtered. That's a clear mindset they were still just a bunch of boys rolling balls at toy soldiers. That men, companies, battalions, brigades and divisions were just numerical assets. While losses no matter how bad, were not to be bothered with. They had 'real' objectives in mind and losses were accounted for. it was still a 'numbers' game to them and no concern for their men.

Couple of thoughts here...

First, can't disagree with @mgrs points at any level. He has his facts straight. But I would also posit that they support the concept that the ossification of the senior officers was complete. That said... they were products of their times. Their 'system' worked. And to second guess them as historians is fraught with peril. Why on earth would they think any differently? Their thinking got them where they were and to change their train of thought would have been a very big leap. And very big leaps were not commensurate with being part of the British upper military 'crust' so to speak. So in many ways, we are in violent agreement.

As for Gallipoli... the fault goes back further. To the planning stages. Churchill pressed Gallipoli, but it was even beyond his role as First Lord of the Admiralty. The reality was that the entire thinking of the British War Cabinet was (I'll be pejorative here) retarded. Their idea was that they could get the Ottoman Turks to side with the Entente powers if they "sailed powerful ships up the Bosphorus and showed up at Constantinople and at gunpoint ordered them to join... vs. aligning themselves with the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austro-Hungary and (variously) Italy, Serbia, Ottoman Turkey... it was a changing threesome.

The arguments that took place turned the Gallipoli Landings into the "least objectionable" of a whole lot of really bad options. In the end, the zeitgeist of the British War Cabinet was best described by "oh what the hell, sure, do it." I paraphrase.

At a tactical level, the whole operation was blown not by early shelling, but by British ships that hit mines. And totally messed up the timetable.

For an utterly outstanding book on Gallipoli, check out Robin Prior. He delves deeply into the flawed planning. The Tactical folks did the best they could. But the entire operation was FUBAR. Except for the withdrawal which should be regarded as one of the most brilliant retreats in military history. Utterly brilliantly executed.

I have to find it, but I did a paper on Gallipoli a few years ago. I'll see if I can find and post.

Anyway, there were moments of brilliance in WW1. And some good commanders, mainly at the field-grade level. And there would likely have been many brilliant officers and leaders at the junior-grade level. But they were consumed as cannon-fodder.

Sadly,

Sirhr

P.S. I have done several conflict archaeology trips to EU and the WW1 Battlefields. And some WW2 battlefields. And there is a 'modern' lesson that I think tells us a lot about the British higher-command thinking both then and now. It is this... when a body is found (whether during archaeology or simply a farmer plowing), the police are called (best way to dispose of a body is to dump it in a battlefield after all). They will make a determination of the era/age of the remains. At that point, the U.S. Battlefield Monuments Commission folks, the German Graves folks and the British equivalents will also be notified. And an effort will be made to identify the remains and, if at all possible, find a family connection.

The United States will literally deploy a forensics team. Archaeologists. DNA analysis. Tracking family members. Anything to confirm whether the remains MIGHT be American. And IF they are American, no expense is spared to find the ID of the person and reunite the remains with the family. The Germans are about 90 percent of what the Americans do. Trying to repatriate their soldiers and give families closure.

The British treat it as an annoyance. But will make an effort to figure out if the remains belonged to an officer. If it was an officer, they will make an effort to track the family and to identify the individual, etc. If the remains are determined to be enlisted, they are all 'saved up' over the course of a year. And once a year, are buried in mass graves in the corner of one of their cemeteries. This tells you a lot about their thinking then and now.
 
This is a piece I wrote while doing my Masters in Military History. It's nothing too deep. But looks at some thoughts on the Dardanelles campaign. And how it can somewhat be considered a microcosm of the Great War itself.

Don't take it as holy writ. It was a single paper by a single Masters Candidate... among many other weekly papers. This was part of my Amphibious Warfare course. A very unique offering at the time. And I think, still, the only masters-level course on Amphib outside the War Colleges or NDU.

While it may be 'un-deep', it is one that I thought captured things rather well.

Cheers,

Sirhr



“An armed man is a citizen. An unarmed man is a subject. A disarmed man is a prisoner.” – Unknown



In analyzing the amphibious operation against the Dardanelles Peninsula – an assault that will go down in popular memory as “Gallipoli,” any analysis of the errors, follies, mistakes and blunders is bound to outweigh the successful aspects of the brief but costly campaign. The operation has been the subject of blame, debate, conjecture and myth virtually since it was ended with an evacuation of the surviving troops in 1915. And as with any operation that has been the subject of so much controversy, there are likely years more research to accomplish for the military historian.

As there are, realistically, too many items to list in terms of what went wrong for British and Australia New Zealand Auxiliary Corps (ANZAC) and French troops, we will gloss over them only briefly. One can cite the lack of proper and modern equipment; an unwillingness by command to commit sufficient troops early in the effort to take the peninsula; the inability of the Navy to provide adequate cover fire; diseases such as dysentery; weather; unit combat inexperience; challenging geography; challenges of communication, and a lack of joint/specialized training and preparation.[1] Any of these factors, alone, can make an already difficult and treacherous amphibious operation into a death-trap for the assaulting force. Unfortunately, as outlined by Robin Prior, in his book Gallipoli: The End of the Myth, the invading forces were saddled with all of these millstones, to one degree or another.

Yet, arguably, these factors can be mitigated, overcome or avoided with proper planning and proper leadership and it is in this area that the Gallipoli operations were doomed to failure from their inception.

Conceived as a way to “shorten the war” the British War council’s peripatetic Dardanelles plan evolved with little rhyme or reason, wending its way through argument and counter-argument until emerging as the ‘plan of least resistance.’ Some might argue that the Dardanelles offensive was merely the ‘also ran’ option that was among many plans which were being offered as panaceas for a looming ground war on the Continent. Presented by individuals such as First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, First Sea Lord Fisher; Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchner, among others, plans ranged from the impractical to the fanciful.[2] Some of these included assaults on the Dutch coast at, among other locations, the Isle of Borkum; an invasion of Pomerania and an assault on the Dalmation coast in modern-day Croatia. As note by Prior, the mood in the planning offices ranged from “Do something!!!!! We are waiting to be kicked!!!” to “LAND EVERYWHERE AT ONCE.”[3]

Ultimately, it seemed, that the only thing everyone could agree on was the somewhat harebrained scheme to “bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective..”[4] As Prior states: “This was the War Council at its worst – unable to stick to a thorough discussion of any subject, discursive, rambling, incoherent… Not surprisingly the War Council’s conclusions reflected the discussion. In the end, Gallipoli was accepted because “there was little to be lost in an option that diverted no troops or ships (of any consequence) from the main theater of war.” [5]

The result of this incoherence of purpose and lack of commitment at a strategic level led to appalling bad planning and, by the time orders were passed down to naval, landing and invasion forces, they had become a comedy of bad assumptions (ie. the ridiculously small number of naval shells that would be needed to take forts); vague landing instructions as evidenced by the order to “land somewhere between Bibrunesi Point and Gaba Tepe… a stretch of coast 6 miles long,” and ill-considered logistical support.[6] As Prior pointed out, General Sir Ian Hamilton, a British field commander, “regarded the achievement of landing as an end in itself and had given little thought as to what should happen next.”[7] Given that an amphibious operation only begins at waters’ edge, it seems absurd that no thought had taken place to the post-landing plan.

Ultimately, a play-by-play of the ground combat following the landings is superfluous to the discussion of Gallipoli, for at its core, the landings themselves were successful. However the lack of an objective for troops once they had landed, combined with an utter lack of support, led to almost immediate stalemate and to a flurry of minor battles which did little but move Entente and Turkish troops short distances up and down the peninsula. Thus it is safe to say that while the British, French and ANZAC troops fought well at a tactical level, it was events prior to and following the landings themselves pre-ordained the Gallipoli operation to disaster.

Before completely condemning the British planners, perhaps it is fair to ask whether amphibious landings were possible at all circa. 1915? After all, there had been vast changes in military technology and new defensive capabilities such as rifled armor-piercing artillery, Maxim machine guns, Mills bombs (grenades), barbed wire and other new weapons designed to induce stalemate and frustrate offense. Is there an argument to be made that even with proper planning the Gallipoli operation was doomed from the start? Here I would argue that is not the case… for had the operation been properly planned – at least as well planned as a simple ground operation – using the timeless elements of intelligence, surprise, overwhelming force, proper logistics, etc. the operation should have been straightforward.

For example, a properly planned operation would have organized the Navy and ground components into a true combined operation. This was nothing new and had been undertaken at places like Vera Cruz and Ft. Fisher decades earlier. Proper planning would have had both the Navy and the ground troops arriving in the Dardanelles simultaneously, using the timeless element of surprise to rout the Turks off the peninsula before they could react. Ground forces could have landed, unopposed, at any of a number of beaches and, using raiding techniques, silenced the Turkish batteries (the guns were pointed at sea… unable to defend against a land attack) from the landward side. (Of note, this was the basic premise of T.E. Lawrence assault on Aqaba in July 1917 during the Arab Revolt)[8] By silencing the guns from land, the troops would have allowed minesweepers to clear the mine fields and allow the capital ships to move into the Dardanelles Straights, support the ground troops with covering fire to prevent Turkish reinforcements from moving down the peninsula, a fact not lost on Hamilton’s staff which concluded “the Navy cant [sic] do it alone.[9] Though, ultimately, the objective itself – a display of force aimed at the Ottoman Turks was ultimately suspect, at a tactical level proper planning using existing doctrine, technology and tactics could have made the Dardanelles portion of the operation successful. Unfortunately, the piecemeal way in which the operation was planned at a political level (with little regard for proper military planning) ensured that the mission’s chances of success at a tactical level were virtually zero. Thus we are back to condemning the planners…

With the decks already stacked against the Entente Powers attack, it almost seems unfair that the Turks had a number of factors that went in their favor, possibly the most important of which was the telegraphing of intentions to the Turkish high command by the early naval bombardments of the guns/forts on the peninsula beginning weeks before the actual land attack. Even without exact knowledge of what the Entente powers had in mind, it would have been clear to even the densest of military minds that ‘something is up’ once shells begin landing on your forts and obsolete battleships begin blowing up on your mines. The Turks also had geography and even climate in their favor, with the peninsula offering the defenders superb terrain while making life as difficult as possible for the ill-conditioned attackers.[10] Proper intelligence by the Entente powers would have revealed difficult currents and tides; challenging foliage (the bracken and scrub of the peninsula); stifling summer temperatures and stormy winter conditions which made Naval support difficult.[11] The Turks were also able to reinforce faster than the British, since they could march troops, by land, long before the Entente powers could organize forces and reinforce by sea.[12] Finally, the Turks were competently led and had a more limited mission of defense, vs. the Entente’s scattershot plans which as stated by Prior, often seemed only to be “designed only to improve the local tactical situation on various parts of the line.”[13] Ultimately, it can be argued that the Turks needed to do little to foil the British Strategy and that defeating the disorganized rabble put ashore by British planners was little more challenging.

With this in mind, I would like to offer a final thought on the affair, its planning origins which none of our authors did not bring up this week and, perhaps, is more a question for social historians or for sociologists than for a budding military historian… And that is the question of whether the leaders in the Entente governments at the outbreak of World War One had any regard for the fact that they were consigning their subjects to slaughter?

Note that in bringing this up, I do not say citizens… for, especially in the case of England, the soldiers and sailors were Crown or Commonwealth subjects, not citizens. One could argue that they were seen as property, not as sentient beings. I wonder whether this viewpoint could have been reflected in decision-making not only as divisions were being pumped not only into the meatgrinders of Sari Bair, Suvla Bay and Krithia, but into the trenches and killing grounds of Flanders and the Somme? Even in the pre-planning stages, Prior points out that the pre-Dreadnought ships that were being sent into the Dardelnnells Straight were expendable and “too old to face the modern enemy units and were therefore useless for action in the North Sea. So whatever the merits or demerits of the plan, it would hardly risk British naval superiority.[ 14] In a possibly even greater disregard for human life, the crews of these obsolete ships were regarded as “not first line” thus the loss of them appeared utterly incidental to the high command and the War Council.

Though I cannot say whether Prior lists all of the “disposable” pre-Dreadnought-class battleships that were resigned to the Dardanelles Campaign, he does mention the Implacable, the Inflexible, the Ocean, the Albion, the Agamemnon, Bacchante, Canopus, Swiftsure, Cornwallis, Triumph, Vengeance, Goliath, Irresistible, Prince George, the Prince of Wales. In addition, he mentions the Cruisers Sapphire and Euryalus (spelled Euryalis in Prior) and the French pre-Dreadnought’s Bouvet and Suffren. According to Conways’ All the World’s Fighting Ships 1860-1905, British pre-Dreadnought ships, in the various classes represented by the above ships, had wartime crews that averaged 750 -800 per ship during wartime.[15] Thus when the ships and their crews were written off by the war council as, basically, expendable, the political and military planners were willing to simply toss away 11,250 men on the British battleships alone!

In addition, the War Council, in beginning to discuss landings and troops, discussed the ‘surplus’ troops currently in England and not then needed for operations in Europe. Thus commitment of these ‘extra’ troops to the Dardanelles campaign was, again, regarded as being of little or no risk.[16] That is unless you were a “surplus” soldier being thrown into the fray.

So at the outset, one has a campaign which is, essentially, directionless and at best has an ephemeral effect on the war; being fought with ships and troops which are ‘obsolete and surplus,’ to accomplish a goal which, at best, may have a minor diplomatic impact on the war effort in influencing then-neutral Turkey and some Balkan nations’ in terms of their allegiance either to the Central Powers or the Entente Powers… a mission certainly best accomplished with diplomacy and statecraft, not with gunboat diplomacy and a show of force by obsolete battleships outside a neutral capital.

The result of this leads me to offer a thought that one needs somewhat look at Gallipoli through, perhaps, the lens of the highly-stratified society of Edwardian England, or more properly, pre-WW1 Europe. For it could be argued that at no time in modern English history had the gap between the ruling or privileged class and the working or poorer classes as great both in financial terms, but also in purely sociological terms. By the reign of Edward VII, the Dickensian dystopia of British society had reached epic proportions. And perhaps Gallipoli is evidence that, in the waning days of that gilded age, the under-classes were simply regarded as chattel, property or, with the outbreak of war, as little more than cannon-fodder by an insulated, privileged and out-of-touch national government led by a largely hereditary peerage.

Perhaps, as further evidence of this disconnect, we might look at the latter days of the Gallipoli campaign as the failures of the plebian soldiers to accomplish a haphazardly planned and ill-thought-out mission resulted in courts-martial and accusations that troops were derelict in their duties. Because, in the world-view of those who commanded armies, only a failure of the common soldier could have foiled their plans when, instead, an introspective or upward-looking analysis of the root cause of the failures of Gallipoli were more appropriate.[17]

Finally, this cycles back to a discussion we had a couple of weeks ago as to whether the advantage in amphibious warfare (or, perhaps more accurately warfare in general) goes to the totalitarian state or to a free state. While there are arguments to be made on both sides of that question the corollary may be to ask whether a nation-state with an army of sovereign citizens has the advantage, or whether a nation which regards its troops as property of the crown or the state has the advantage.

Again, this can probably go both ways, but at least for the common soldier, the choice may be fairly clear. It’s no fun to be thought of as cannon fodder.



1. T.A. Gibson, “Gallipoli, 1915,” in Assault from the Sea, ed. Lt. Col. Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 151.

2. Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 3 – 19.

3. Ibid., 5-6.

4. Ibid., 19.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 111

7. Ibid., 131

8. James J. Schneider, Guerilla Leader (New York, Bantam, 2011), 84-127.

9. Prior, Gallipoli, 68.

10. Gibson, Gallipoli 1915, 150.

11. Prior, Gallipoli, 41, 78, 193, 225-6.

12. Ibid., 130.

13. Ibid., 247, 206.

14. Ibid., 23.

15. Roger Chesneau, ed. Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1860-1905 (New York: Mayflower Books, 1979).

16. Prior, Gallipoli, 29.

17. Ibid., 223.
 
I would have to disagree with the synopsis that military planning, at least on the British side, was a kind of "one-way thinking with no offramp". Those idiots could barely see the road as their heads were stuffed too far up their pompous asses. As sirhr had pointed out there were plenty of chances to learn. And when learning stop taking away what YOU think and take away both sides of the battle. Good as well as bad. What could they have potentially done.

The simple fact that in Gallipoli, the British kicked off an offensive with the Australians taking the brunt of it. Even after they had been told by London that the offensive wasn't necessary because they were pulling out. And then drank tea while the Australians got slaughtered. That's a clear mindset they were still just a bunch of boys rolling balls at toy soldiers. That men, companies, battalions, brigades and divisions were just numerical assets. While losses no matter how bad, were not to be bothered with. They had 'real' objectives in mind and losses were accounted for. it was still a 'numbers' game to them and no concern for their men.

They did learn, but in hindsight they learned many of the wrong lessons. Look at any war.... this is typically what happens. Occasionally, someone gets it 'right' from the start, but unless facing a fragile opponent or one with no strategic depth, that advantage is fleeting and gives way to the inexorable grind of attrition as others adapt.

Even with the flexibility afforded by being an island power, Britain fell into the same one-way vertical escalation trap as the others, as it was bound by alliances all the same and could not abide a world where Wilhelmine Imperial Germany upset the careful balance of power Britain had tended since before the Concert of Europe. In that world, everything that made Britain what it was would be held at risk. Remember Victoria's Diamond Jubilee was in living memory and Britain was at the height of her power, but that relative advantage was waning rapidly with a unified Germany's rise. Do you back your allies' play and fight now, or wait and watch as your Naval overmatch fades?

As an Island power, Britain did leverage strategic flexibility and was not bound by the careful mobilization timetables of her peer allies and adversaries. She also had the luxury of horizontal escalation, as evidenced by Gallipoli. A questionable idea and disaster as a campaign, but it was the sort of capability Britain, and no one else, had.

We like to keep saying "they should have known" or "should have learned" but the fact remains that the most proximate, major, modern state on modern state wars on the collective European conscious were all short, sharp, decisive, and not very costly at the national level compared to what was to come. Losses were heavy in the units participating in those short fights, but decision was achieved through speed and maneuver, and that is what was taken away.

When short, almost 'cabinet wars' are the last 50 years, it becomes increasingly tempting to "throw the iron dice."

The Germans, at least at the operational and tactical levels, got it better than most, but still based their planning and force structure on the formula that won the last three wars, synchronized even tighter, and with few options to avoid expanding conflict, or really even de-escalating. Moltke the Elder saw as early as the 1870s that what won the last war may not work in the next, but the proverbial troop train had already left the station.

Many, if not most, of the First World War leaders did have concern for their men, but this was the 'stiff upper lip' era and they had to make high-risk operational decisions that would incur tens of thousands of casualties

I might be apocryphally or incorrectly attributing this to Joffre, one of the 'worst' for this attitude, but when asked why he never visited the wounded, he answered that he could not bear to send his armies into the attack if he saw firsthand the damage it wrought. Might not be the right answer, but helps to show why many of the generals of that age acted like they did. Others were right in the thick of it, 'leading from the front,' but it didn't seem to make a difference when it came to how many they lost. History is replete with that sort of leader, who sends formations into the meat grinder with callous insouciance , but more often they are exalted for it.

I am not trying to be argumentative, just trying to look at why the decisions were made beyond "well, they were idiots."
 
Couple of thoughts here...

First, can't disagree with @mgrs points at any level. He has his facts straight. But I would also posit that they support the concept that the ossification of the senior officers was complete. That said... they were products of their times. Their 'system' worked. And to second guess them as historians is fraught with peril. Why on earth would they think any differently? Their thinking got them where they were and to change their train of thought would have been a very big leap. And very big leaps were not commensurate with being part of the British upper military 'crust' so to speak. So in many ways, we are in violent agreement.

As for Gallipoli... the fault goes back further. To the planning stages. Churchill pressed Gallipoli, but it was even beyond his role as First Lord of the Admiralty. The reality was that the entire thinking of the British War Cabinet was (I'll be pejorative here) retarded. Their idea was that they could get the Ottoman Turks to side with the Entente powers if they "sailed powerful ships up the Bosphorus and showed up at Constantinople and at gunpoint ordered them to join... vs. aligning themselves with the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austro-Hungary and (variously) Italy, Serbia, Ottoman Turkey... it was a changing threesome.

The arguments that took place turned the Gallipoli Landings into the "least objectionable" of a whole lot of really bad options. In the end, the zeitgeist of the British War Cabinet was best described by "oh what the hell, sure, do it." I paraphrase.

At a tactical level, the whole operation was blown not by early shelling, but by British ships that hit mines. And totally messed up the timetable.

For an utterly outstanding book on Gallipoli, check out Robin Prior. He delves deeply into the flawed planning. The Tactical folks did the best they could. But the entire operation was FUBAR. Except for the withdrawal which should be regarded as one of the most brilliant retreats in military history. Utterly brilliantly executed.

I have to find it, but I did a paper on Gallipoli a few years ago. I'll see if I can find and post.

Anyway, there were moments of brilliance in WW1. And some good commanders, mainly at the field-grade level. And there would likely have been many brilliant officers and leaders at the junior-grade level. But they were consumed as cannon-fodder.

Sadly,

Sirhr

P.S. I have done several conflict archaeology trips to EU and the WW1 Battlefields. And some WW2 battlefields. And there is a 'modern' lesson that I think tells us a lot about the British higher-command thinking both then and now. It is this... when a body is found (whether during archaeology or simply a farmer plowing), the police are called (best way to dispose of a body is to dump it in a battlefield after all). They will make a determination of the era/age of the remains. At that point, the U.S. Battlefield Monuments Commission folks, the German Graves folks and the British equivalents will also be notified. And an effort will be made to identify the remains and, if at all possible, find a family connection.

The United States will literally deploy a forensics team. Archaeologists. DNA analysis. Tracking family members. Anything to confirm whether the remains MIGHT be American. And IF they are American, no expense is spared to find the ID of the person and reunite the remains with the family. The Germans are about 90 percent of what the Americans do. Trying to repatriate their soldiers and give families closure.

The British treat it as an annoyance. But will make an effort to figure out if the remains belonged to an officer. If it was an officer, they will make an effort to track the family and to identify the individual, etc. If the remains are determined to be enlisted, they are all 'saved up' over the course of a year. And once a year, are buried in mass graves in the corner of one of their cemeteries. This tells you a lot about their thinking then and now.

Great points, agreed on the ossification. It is surely even harder to change if you are 'winning,' and your current system has gotten you to where you are.

Also good point on how different states handle remains recovery. It's often a very sharp contrast as well to see US military cemeteries abroad compared to others. It may be relative wealth, but is striking all the same.
 
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Interesting video but its greatest impact was to convince me all British testosterone was eliminated in the world wars and that cast is what is left of British manhood.

The Indian chick has more balls than any of them.
I taught school in England a number of years ago. It was a rural area in the West Country, and just like the US, the rural areas in the UK are more conservative. There was a surprising number of kids in their version of the ROTC program, and many students were very patriotic and disgusted with the freefall into cultural suicide that the UK was going through at the time. So there was no shortage of British patriotism on display there. Unfortunately the densely populated urban centers have been invaded, conquered, and assimilated into anti-western "stans"
 
I am not trying to be argumentative, just trying to look at why the decisions were made beyond "well, they were idiots."

By all means, you are not being argumentative. Au contraire, this is one of the most erudite discussions we have had on SH in a long time! Thanks for the outstanding dialog!

Cheers,

SIrhr
 
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@mgrs would you say Britain was better prepared for WW2 than they were WW1?
How would WW1 turned out if we never had joined the fray? Same outcome?
 
FC. Read Churchill’s history of WW2 in 5 volumes, then ask the question.

Also suggest Boyces origins of WW2 and everything Richard Overy ever wrote. Perhaps also Albert Speers Inside the Third Reich and Tolands Adolf Hitler. Then come back and ask for some additional reading.

Once you are done, you can ask this question.

Sirhr
 
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Even if Chamberlain didn’t wanna see reality, it appears Churchill took some lessons away from WW1 and was probably the best man for the job that Britain had. Thx for the recommendations
Btw, Was America’s help asked for, from the beginning of WW1? Or did Britain and France think they could handle the Western Front by themselves at first?

Also, the USMC marksmanship at Bellau Wood is the stuff of legend. Who y’all think had the more demanding training BEF circa 1913 vs USMC circa 1917? I’d have to think US Marines would’ve gotten more individual long range practice, no?
 
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I strongly recommend Riding the Retreat by Richard Holmes (ISBN 0-224-03762-5) where he both details the different sides, looks at the psychology of the time and why it had arrived at that point and breaks down the individual skillset required.

"The British infantryman of 1914 ... fired 250 rounds on his annual musty course, which consisted of slow, rapid and snap practices at ranges up to 600 yards. In the 'mad minute' he was expected to fire 15 rounds at a target 300 yards away and ... tater were very few infantryman (sic) who could not put all their shots into a two foot circle in that time."

Why? Because proficiency brings extra pay. And officers fired the same course as the men and were expected to do well.

There is an unexpected consequence of this extra pay as the town prostitutes charged 6d a go - the same rate as a marksman's daily proficiency pay.

As to Gallipoli, much has been written and mythologised about this failed campaign and Churchill has a long string of brilliant failures before WWII. I have a book published in 1956 by Alan Moorehead, simply titled Gallipoli, that presents the campaign in more time contextual terms. The key takeaway for us now distant observers is the reality the battles fought were essentially managed around Napoleonic C&C. "You go take that hill" is a trickle down to a platoon doing a bayonet charge against a machine gun nest. The General is merely a distant observer separated by time (how long it takes for a hand written message to reach the HQ) and space (on a destroyer).

You also have to understand the different culture of Empire to what you experienced in the US during the same period. For the sons of Empire, regardless of where they were located, you were English, merely located in a different land. England was always "home", to be cherished and protected despite the length of time your family had been away. And war for everyone was a great adventure, a relief from the boredom and monotony of daily life.

Take the time to watch They shall not grow Old on Netflix. Peter Jackson has colorised the WWI footage (really well if you have ever been to Flanders) and the commentary is provided by the participants themselves from oral recording taken in the late 60s. With two close relatives resting forever in Flanders fields (one on the first day of The Somme), there are some familiar stories.
 
And because the past always informs the present whether we like it or not, F M Crum's account of the 2nd Boer War is a must read. He worked hard in WWI to develop a modern and effective sniper doctrine and helped Baden-Powell establish the Boy Scouts, but in the Boer War he was wounded, taken prisoner, released then fought on in a mounted infantry role. With the Mounted Infantry in South Africa (https://archive.org/details/withmountedinfa01crumgoog) is the chronicle of this period and contains a report on using volley fire to break up a Boer mounted charge.
 
sirhr and mgrs, you have made this another OUTSTANDING thread. The dichotmy here of leadership views explains a lot. Yet hopefully leads us to better understanding the needs of the future.

Exactly!

RE: FC's points- that is another thread entirely. Since we have been focused on the land domain in this thread, B.H. Liddell-Hart and J.F.C Fuller (both Britain) were working on some neat stuff and really struggling to come to grips with mechanized maneuver warfare. Maybe not as cool as what the Germans and USSR were up to, but still moving somewhere.

Makers of Modern Strategy edited by Peter Paret is a good once-over of major theory developments from the renaissance era to the cold war, and sort of cuts things down into 30-60 page 'bite size' chunks. Of course, it is totally western in perspective, but our military heritage is western, so...

https://www.amazon.com/Makers-Moder...ocphy=9008188&hvtargid=pla-452668097179&psc=1

I think the price reflects that it is often used as a textbook, but still worth a read if you're into this stuff.

RE: USMC and AEF marksmanship- there was certainly more opportunity for aimed mass rifle rifle during the restoration of maneuver brought on by the Kaiserschlact. Comparing relative performance is hard, because the AEF was able to field the type of first-quality manpower and energy that the other belligerents brought into 1914 and had long ago spent. Everyone else was starting to scrape the bottom of the barrel. AEF nevertheless made a lot of the same mistakes others made early in the war and learned a lot of it the hard way.

USMC marksmanship was no doubt excellent as was much of the AEF, and the Marine contingent fought extremely well there, but it is interesting how popular legend has evolved to the point where Belleau wood was the most important AEF engagement of the war, and a Marine Brigade fighting there as part of 2ID blunted the Ludendorff offensive pretty much by themselves.
 
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And because the past always informs the present whether we like it or not, F M Crum's account of the 2nd Boer War is a must read. He worked hard in WWI to develop a modern and effective sniper doctrine and helped Baden-Powell establish the Boy Scouts, but in the Boer War he was wounded, taken prisoner, released then fought on in a mounted infantry role. With the Mounted Infantry in South Africa (https://archive.org/details/withmountedinfa01crumgoog) is the chronicle of this period and contains a report on using volley fire to break up a Boer mounted charge.

Neat. As most of the literature is from the British Perspective, this is probably one of the most inclusive accounts of life on the other side that I have run across:

https://www.amazon.com/Life-Commando-During-Anglo-Boer-1899-1902/dp/0798138084

It may be out of print, unfortunately. It was considerably cheaper (like $10) a few years ago.
 
Even if Chamberlain didn’t wanna see reality, it appears Churchill took some lessons away from WW1 and was probably the best man for the job that Britain had. Thx for the recommendations
Btw, Was America’s help asked for, from the beginning of WW1? Or did Britain and France think they could handle the Western Front by themselves at first?

Also, the USMC marksmanship at Bellau Wood is the stuff of legend. Who y’all think had the more demanding training BEF circa 1913 vs USMC circa 1917? I’d have to think US Marines would’ve gotten more individual long range practice, no?
Required reading first...then ask questions ;)
 
I get the sense that individual marksmanship was indeed stressed by the British Army at the outbreak of WWI, just as it was in the German Army. However - the concept of 'sniping' was considered by British military leadership morally aberrant and brutish, and thus it was not something the civilized British Army would engage in. The German Army had no such morale reservations about sniping in 1914 and the effect was pretty devastating to the British officer's in the first year of the war. So, the British had to change their perspective given the tactical trench warfare reality that were in by 1915. I will add to this statement:

Don’t forget to add “Sniping in France” by Major Hesketh-Prichard to the reading list. If you’re interested in WW1 marksmanship standards and sniping techniques then this book is essential reading. There’s a fair bit of technical info too.

Yes, it appears that by the summer of 1915 Major Hesketh-Prichard was able to overcome British reluctance and in Aug 1915 began a formal and effective snipping program for the British Army. Here's the opening to Steve Houghton's excellent reference book, The British Sniper (2019). My 2cts on this topic.
 

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Exactly!

RE: FC's points- that is another thread entirely. Since we have been focused on the land domain in this thread, B.H. Liddell-Hart and J.F.C Fuller (both Britain) were working on some neat stuff and really struggling to come to grips with mechanized maneuver warfare. Maybe not as cool as what the Germans and USSR were up to, but still moving somewhere.

Makers of Modern Strategy edited by Peter Paret is a good once-over of major theory developments from the renaissance era to the cold war, and sort of cuts things down into 30-60 page 'bite size' chunks. Of course, it is totally western in perspective, but our military heritage is western, so...

https://www.amazon.com/Makers-Moder...ocphy=9008188&hvtargid=pla-452668097179&psc=1

I think the price reflects that it is often used as a textbook, but still worth a read if you're into this stuff.

RE: USMC and AEF marksmanship- there was certainly more opportunity for aimed mass rifle rifle during the restoration of maneuver brought on by the Kaiserschlact. Comparing relative performance is hard, because the AEF was able to field the type of first-quality manpower and energy that the other belligerents brought into 1914 and had long ago spent. Everyone else was starting to scrape the bottom of the barrel. AEF nevertheless made a lot of the same mistakes others made early in the war and learned a lot of it the hard way.

USMC marksmanship was no doubt excellent as was much of the AEF, and the Marine contingent fought extremely well there, but it is interesting how popular legend has evolved to the point where Belleau wood was the most important AEF engagement of the war, and a Marine Brigade fighting there as part of 2ID blunted the Ludendorff offensive pretty much by themselves.
A second for the book Makers of Modern Strategy. It is must read for anyone studying 20th century conflict. It is indeed a textbook. And is cheap on used book market.

Sirhr
 
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British take on WW1 tactics. It's a comedy but uncomfortably close to reality:



Blackadder series 4, a must see.
Spoiler alert: The last 5 minutes of this series is the best 5 minutes of TV ever, but the whole series 4 must be seen first.
 
I strongly recommend Riding the Retreat by Richard Holmes (ISBN 0-224-03762-5) where he both details the different sides, looks at the psychology of the time and why it had arrived at that point and breaks down the individual skillset required.

"The British infantryman of 1914 ... fired 250 rounds on his annual musty course, which consisted of slow, rapid and snap practices at ranges up to 600 yards. In the 'mad minute' he was expected to fire 15 rounds at a target 300 yards away and ... tater were very few infantryman (sic) who could not put all their shots into a two foot circle in that time."

Why? Because proficiency brings extra pay. And officers fired the same course as the men and were expected to do well.

There is an unexpected consequence of this extra pay as the town prostitutes charged 6d a go - the same rate as a marksman's daily proficiency pay.
Thanks for adding this. Im playing hell finding anything on American training/quals circa WW1. @cplnorton have you per chance read anything on what USMC rifle training consisted of around WW1?

I have seen a couple places mention that course of fire for High Power was derived from USMC Garand training in WW2 & Korea. Standing, kneeling/sitting, prone with slow fire & rapid fire at 200, 300, and slow fire prone at 600. I wonder if it was the same with 1903's/1917's..??

FWIW I have read both Mcbride's books. But he served with Canada, not Britain(but maybe training was same for both?). Either way I dont remember him mentioning what the rifle training consisted of. He was already a National Match level shooter when he joined the Canucks so the rifle training was just an extra nuisance to him most likely when he was wanting to see some action...

I do remember him saying the Canadians put on a helluva display at Camp Perry with their Ross rifles, at I believe the 1913 Nat'l Matches, right before Franz Ferdinand caught his bullet. IIRC, they kicked our butts to put it frankly. But I cant remember whether he specified the Ross's used were in .280 Ross or .303... If they were .303 Ross's, that is quite an impressive feat. Still impressive if they were .280's, but theres a huge obvious ballistic advantage with the .280 Ross vs .30-06

Re: the Ross. I wonder if the interrupted thread style lugs of the M10 Ross was a mistake, and going back to standard style lugs on the M10 couldve helped solve some of the jamming issues with all the mud and dirt in the trenches.
Either way, .303 ammo quality was pretty bad from what I understand. Which the Lee Enfield action was much better suited to handle
 
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Thanks for adding this. Im playing hell finding anything on American training/quals circa WW1. @cplnorton have you per chance read anything on what USMC rifle training consisted of around WW1?

I have seen a couple places mention that course of fire for High Power was derived from USMC Garand training in WW2 & Korea. Standing, kneeling/sitting, prone with slow fire & rapid fire at 200, 300, and slow fire prone at 600. I wonder if it was the same with 1903's/1917's..??

FWIW I have read both Mcbride's books. But he served with Canada, not Britain(but maybe training was same for both?). Either way I dont remember him mentioning what the rifle training consisted of. He was already a National Match level shooter when he joined the Canucks so the training was just an extra nuisance to him most likely when he was wanting to see some action...

I do remember him saying the Canadians put on a helluva display at Camp Perry with their Ross rifles, at I believe the 1913 Nat'l Matches, right before Franz Ferdinand caught his bullet. IIRC, they kicked our butts to put it frankly. But I cant remember whether he specified the Ross's used were in .280 Ross or .303... If they were .303 Ross's, that is quite an impressive feat. Still impressive if they were .280's, but theres a huge obvious ballistic advantage with the .280 Ross vs .30-06

Re: the Ross. I wonder if the interrupted thread style lugs of the M10 Ross was a mistake, and going back to standard style lugs on the M10 couldve helped solve some of the jamming issues with all the mud and dirt in the trenches.
Either way, .303 ammo quality was pretty bad from what I understand. Which the Lee Enfield action was much better suited to handle
Ross military rifles were all chambered in .303. Which in 1913 is not really amazing. The Mk VII and Mk VIII both had superior projectiles in comparison to the M1906 projectile.
 
Ross military rifles were all chambered in .303. Which in 1913 is not really amazing. The Mk VII and Mk VIII both had superior projectiles in comparison to the M1906 projectile.
Correct. Idk if the Canadians at that match were using .mil rifles or personally bought .280's tho, I dont think Mcbride specifies one way or the other. Its very hard to find much infdo beyond the basics about those old matches way back then.
I was thinking we had the 174gr by then but apparently that didnt come around until the 20's
 
On the Ross, having played with them a bit, they are a wonderful piece of engineering, but they are wholly and solely a Range rifle. To the point that I started unconsciously to repeat some of the things McBride quotes in his book when the internal magazine jammed during a Rapid practice.

Putting the complex action to one side, the rifle is too long for easy carry, and it weighting (when compared with a SMLE) is out of balance. The fine adjustments for the sights are great on a rifle range, but unnecessary for snap shooting at close range. And the 5 round internal magazine cannot be removed without taking the rifle to pieces and does not compare to the SMLE 10 rounder.

Too much has been written about putting the bolt back in wrong, yes you can but it does take effort. The fact you could is bad, the fact it can kill you is far worse, so the training overhead and the panic overhead is too high for anything off the Range.

I have some 280 Ross ammo too. It is a wonderful round and far ahead of its time. There was also a 303 magnum after WWI for Match Rifle shooting that is worth revisiting.

As to rifle practices, I will stress the point I made earlier. We were Empire and the military training was all based around British tactics and doctrine. Each colony, commonwealth or dominion brought their own characteristics that often did not sit well with the British Establishment, but the core principles remained constant. The greatest challenge (in the pre-interweb world) being currency as the time it took for new things to arrive in the far reaches of Empire could be measured in years.
 
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Ross military rifles were all chambered in .303. Which in 1913 is not really amazing. The Mk VII and Mk VIII both had superior projectiles in comparison to the M1906 projectile.
Only the sporting rifles were in .280 Ross.

Military rifles were .303.

Great Uncle Ross was batshit crazy. But he could design a rifle.

Yes, that is right. Crazy uncle Ross.

Sirhr
 
On the Ross, having played with them a bit, they are a wonderful piece of engineering, but they are wholly and solely a Range rifle. To the point that I started unconsciously to repeat some of the things McBride quotes in his book when the internal magazine jammed during a Rapid practice.

Putting the complex action to one side, the rifle is too long for easy carry, and it weighting (when compared with a SMLE) is out of balance. The fine adjustments for the sights are great on a rifle range, but unnecessary for snap shooting at close range. And the 5 round internal magazine cannot be removed without taking the rifle to pieces and does not compare to the SMLE 10 rounder.

Too much has been written about putting the bolt back in wrong, yes you can but it does take effort. The fact you could is bad, the fact it can kill you is far worse, so the training overhead and the panic overhead is too high for anything off the Range.

I have some 280 Ross ammo too. It is a wonderful round and far ahead of its time. There was also a 303 magnum after WWI for Match Rifle shooting that is worth revisiting.

As to rifle practices, I will stress the point I made earlier. We were Empire and the military training was all based around British tactics and doctrine. Each colony, commonwealth or dominion brought their own characteristics that often did not sit well with the British Establishment, but the core principles remained constant. The greatest challenge (in the pre-interweb world) being currency as the time it took for new things to arrive in the far reaches of Empire could be measured in years.
Is it possible to form .280 cases from any other more available cases?
On the Ross, having played with them a bit, they are a wonderful piece of engineering, but they are wholly and solely a Range rifle. To the point that I started unconsciously to repeat some of the things McBride quotes in his book when the internal magazine jammed during a Rapid practice.

Putting the complex action to one side, the rifle is too long for easy carry, and it weighting (when compared with a SMLE) is out of balance. The fine adjustments for the sights are great on a rifle range, but unnecessary for snap shooting at close range. And the 5 round internal magazine cannot be removed without taking the rifle to pieces and does not compare to the SMLE 10 rounder.

Too much has been written about putting the bolt back in wrong, yes you can but it does take effort. The fact you could is bad, the fact it can kill you is far worse, so the training overhead and the panic overhead is too high for anything off the Range.

I have some 280 Ross ammo too. It is a wonderful round and far ahead of its time. There was also a 303 magnum after WWI for Match Rifle shooting that is worth revisiting.

As to rifle practices, I will stress the point I made earlier. We were Empire and the military training was all based around British tactics and doctrine. Each colony, commonwealth or dominion brought their own characteristics that often did not sit well with the British Establishment, but the core principles remained constant. The greatest challenge (in the pre-interweb world) being currency as the time it took for new things to arrive in the far reaches of Empire could be measured in years.
What exactly do the Brits do for snap shooting? Pop up targets? Or just a standard target and start from low ready, hitting target within x seconds?

Also, did British troops(not snipers) ever get any training/practice beyond 600yd? Individual point target shooting, not massed volley fire.
 
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Only the sporting rifles were in .280 Ross.

Military rifles were .303.

Great Uncle Ross was batshit crazy. But he could design a rifle.

Yes, that is right. Crazy uncle Ross.

Sirhr
One of Charles Ross’ great uncles was trusted with a church relic during the reformation... he sold it to buy a cannon which he used to blow up his neighbors house. Sounds like crazy was in their veins..
Apparently Ross’ last words were “gtho of here” to his nurse.
 
It is possible to form 280 Ross from 8 x 68s. Brass can also be bought.

British infantry also were trained (pre-1914) in long range fire. Volley fire where the NCO directs the platoon at a distant object to create a beaten zone was practiced out to 2700 yards. It was used at Mons to break up the initial German advance.
 
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