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plane crash in China

Agreed. Mil. a/c have control tabs, that are designed into the trim tabs, that work thru the pilot/co-pilot yokes. Don't know if comm. a/c have any redundancy in their design. Not knowing the attitude of the a/c, or a particular control surface, when the a/c nosed over, would determine the amount of force needed to move that particular flight control surface(elevator/rudder/ail.). Horiz. stab.'s. are operated by hydra./elec. jackscrews, so, no control tabs are involved. But, not knowing the airframe, I'm just guessing/speculating. I still say it was a suicidal pilot(s). Mac🤷‍♂️
737s have full cable control of all flight controls, even with no hydraulics the flight controls can still be operated.

Commercial aircraft have a lot of redunacy built in (as you'd expect) a serious malfuction would be required to cause an aircraft to nose dive uncontrollably like the one in the video.
 
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If I remember from the Netflix documentary on this, that's exactly what the Ethiopian crew did but by the time they took that action the aerodynamic forces on the control surfaces were too much to overcome.

Basically what the APA reps on the show were saying: you have less than 10 sec to figure this out before it becomes an unrecoverable problem.

Is that how you see it or is there something else?
You’re gonna talk about my lack of understanding and then quote Netflix documentary... lol!!!
 
737s have full cable control of all flight controls, even with no hydraulics the flight controls can still be operated.

Commercial aircraft have a lot of redunacy built in (as you'd expect) a serious malfuction would be required to cause an aircraft to nose dive uncontrollably like the one in the video.
I haven't put a wrench to an a/c in 25+ years, so, I agree with you on the "redundancy" manufactured into comm. a/c. After all, they do haul people around for profit.
My take, suicidal pilots, or, something got missed in a tail inspection.
Back in the day, I do know, comm. a/c will fly with shit that Mil. a/c would be grounded for(unless, in a hot zone). Mac
 
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I grew up on airplanes, Dad was a captain with TWA, until I was 21 I had a pass and could fly for free. Loved to fly.

When I heard the reason the crash (below) happened somethin inside me changed and Ive not gotten on another commercial plane since. I try to make myself reason through it but something in my gut holds me back.

One of the theories is that apparently someone got in a hurry and they used a forklift to change the engine rather than a chain hoist. Cracked two to the three already stressed fatigued bolts holding the engine on the wing and it came off during take off. All those people died because someone was in a hurry.

www.washingtonpost.com › archive › politicsDC10 Bolt Broke After Other Failure - The Washington Post


Jun 01, 1979 · June 1, 1979 National Transportation Safety Board experts established yesterday that the broken bolt widely blamed for last Friday's DC10 jumbo jet crash that killed 274 persons in
I used to fly quite a lot for work and pleasure 1-2 times a month on average, but after this latest incident, I have all but stopped even though I know there was nothing the pilots could have done to prevent the incident.

Several years ago I was on a middle leg flight from DAY to BWI aboard a very full MD 80. We took off in very clear weather and somewhere just above 5000' there was this loud thud and screeching sound heard throughout the cabin, the fuselage started rattling, and the entire plane yawed severely to the right. My only thought at the time was that planes are not supposed to fly sideways.... Following this I could only hear the sound of the left engine, so I assume the #2 engine had been taken out by a large bird or some internal mechanical problem.

The pilots began gaining altitude to about 10000' and circling the airport then placing the plane into a "dive" while making attempts to restart the #2. This rising, diving and trying to restart the failed engine went on for 3 or 4 times without success and we finally returned to the airport, made a safe landing on one engine, and waited while another plane was brought in from somewhere to complete the leg to BWI.

Although there were no announcements made to the passengers except for the one stating we were returning to the airport due to technical difficulties after the 3-4 failed engine restart attempts, the pilots otherwise handled the situation very well and very professionally and everyone was returned safely to the ground.

Ever since however, I have had this nagging feeling that perhaps the technology needed to maintain safe flight has exceeded the human capacity to manage should something go wrong and I have flown very rarely since.
 
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I haven't put a wrench to an a/c in 25+ years, so, I agree with you on the "redundancy" manufactured into comm. a/c. After all, they do haul people around for profit.
My take, suicidal pilots, or, something got missed in a tail inspection.
Back in the day, I do know, comm. a/c will fly with shit that Mil. a/c would be grounded for(unless, in a hot zone). Mac
I have no idea what went wrong (as none of us do) but it's worth noting that even the 737 NG is a pretty dumb plane by todays standards, it's not like it can have a computer malfunction and just take control of the A/C or for a single sensor to crap out and start setting off all the pilot aids like had happend in a few Airbus crashes.

As far as flying around with things that would've grounded a Mil A/C, I can't comment as never worked on any Military A/C but I've never come across something I've felt was dodgy in an MEL.
I'd think it was more a case of the Military can choose to pick a bit pedantic, whereas no company is going to ground and A/C and loose tens of thousands of dollars if the aircraft cn be flown safetly with the inbuilt redundancy or a small fuel penalty.
 
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You’re gonna talk about my lack of understanding and then quote Netflix documentary... lol!!!

9 years working as a manufacturing and flight test engineer at a major GA airframe maker + 500 hrs as an instrument rated private pilot + access to people at several tier 1 avionics and systems suppliers.

Plus the Netflix documentary

Your turn
 
I have not seen Downfall.

The Ethiopian crew had a pretty experienced Captain and as I recall a relatively green First Officer. What they failed to do as a crew, however, was SLOW THE JET DOWN. That's Pilot Shit 101 for flight control issues right back to Cessna 150s...reduce airspeed to lighten aerodynamic loads. When you're at TOGA or climb thrust down low and your airspeed goes to the moon, you're gonna struggle to spin that trim wheel.

I'll concede they had their hands full...but that's what two people are up there for. It also is a memory item, as in this procedure is important enough to commit to memory lest doing it slowly could cause loss of the aircraft.

Pull power
Stab Trim Switches - Cut Off
Stabilize airspeed somewhere at or just above min speed for the configuration
Manually adjust stab trim to better regain aircraft pitch control

I won't solely blame the crew, as I think the engineering behind a single AoA input was beyond ridiculous...but their actions certainly *did not* do them any favors for regaining positive control of the aircraft.
The other issue is Boeing did not disclose the problem nor provide updated checklist (read: emergency procedures) or training. How can you expect a pilot to respond to an unknown situation they have not trained for?

Knowing the type of redundacy that airlines are expected to provide and failure rates, this was gross incompetence on the engineering/production side. Six Sigma was inspired by airline failure rates (1 in a million) and even those are redundant. THis is the industry that x-rays every turbine blade. Now Boeing comes along and puts a single point of failure and TELLS NO ONE. WHen you are in charge of stuff like that--the operators don't get blamed. The Engineer does.

Even in the 1979 crash at O'Hare, they tried to pin stuff on the pilots (maybe that is too strong). Simulations found that it was recoverable but only if you knew that the engine was missing ahead of time.
 
My understanding is that once the AOA sensor failed like it did, there is nothing the pilot could do to overcome the incorrect adjustment by MAX autopilot assist nor disengage it?

I have never heard of a plane with a pusher or electric trim where it couldn’t be interrupted and disabled

We were doing run away trim and pusher malfunctions in training since before the max hit the news
 
9 years working as a manufacturing and flight test engineer at a major GA airframe maker + 500 hrs as an instrument rated private pilot + access to people at several tier 1 avionics and systems suppliers.

Plus the Netflix documentary

Your turn
Then you should understand what a trim cut out switche is.
 
It's been already addressed. Try to keep up.
The other issue is Boeing did not disclose the problem nor provide updated checklist (read: emergency procedures) or training. How can you expect a pilot to respond to an unknown situation they have not trained for?

Knowing the type of redundacy that airlines are expected to provide and failure rates, this was gross incompetence on the engineering/production side. Six Sigma was inspired by airline failure rates (1 in a million) and even those are redundant. THis is the industry that x-rays every turbine blade. Now Boeing comes along and puts a single point of failure and TELLS NO ONE. WHen you are in charge of stuff like that--the operators don't get blamed. The Engineer does.

Even in the 1979 crash at O'Hare, they tried to pin stuff on the pilots (maybe that is too strong). Simulations found that it was recoverable but only if you knew that the engine was missing ahead of time.
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Boeing did release a procedure after the first crash .

Remember to on the prior flight of the line Aircrash the same thing happened a pilot recognized the issue and saved the aircraft then reported it in maintenance and didn’t fix it.
 
If I remember from the Netflix documentary on this, that's exactly what the Ethiopian crew did but by the time they took that action the aerodynamic forces on the control surfaces were too much to overcome.

Basically what the APA reps on the show were saying: you have less than 10 sec to figure this out before it becomes an unrecoverable problem.

Is that how you see it or is there something else?
Its my understanding the Ethiopian crew initially turned off the horizontal stab trim but then for some reason they turned it back on. The crew that flew that same plane before them had the same failure and simply turned the trim off and flew the flight safely to its destination. The next crew not so much.
 

It is as if we have special "black box" devices to record events in an airplane and don't have to speculate on what the crew did or did not do.

Page 131.

Read it and speculate no more

Also on Page 132 it appears the Investigators disagree with our forum warriors about pilot error causing the crash.

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Don't think anyone is claiming the training for the mcas system was adequate. The testing was also questionable. Boeing did not want increased cost of training to slow sales of the max so they tried to make it invisible. The thing is there were procedures in place for uncommanded trim incidents which is why some max augured and some did not. The crews that panicked vs. the ones that did not.
 
I believe one major failure was the cozy relationship between Boeing and the regulators where they simply trusted them. And didn't some objections from the engineers during design get squashed?

Just like the Challenger disaster (launch parameters).
 
A piece of the plane was found 6 miles from the crash site, so I’m guessing the broken tail and horizontal stab theory is leading at this point.
 
Even in the 1979 crash at O'Hare, they tried to pin stuff on the pilots (maybe that is too strong). Simulations found that it was recoverable but only if you knew that the engine was missing ahead of time.

Eerie and slightly off-topic fact, but my mom was supposed to be on that plane as part of a group of employees returning home to Los Angeles from a company training in Chicago. Her and another co-worker showed up late to the airport and were booked on the next flight out. She lost several friends and co-workers on that flight.
 
Y'all must not have read recently the Chinese government gave a free flight to its citizens with the lowest social credit so they could go to a relaxing retreat in the mountains to consider their path in life and make improvements to their behavior for the good of all China.

It probably wasn't this flight though.
 
Y'all must not have read recently the Chinese government gave a free flight to its citizens with the lowest social credit so they could go to a relaxing retreat Gulag in the mountains to consider their path in life and make improvements to their behavior for the good of all China.

It probably wasn't this flight though.
 
Don't think anyone is claiming the training for the mcas system was adequate. The testing was also questionable. Boeing did not want increased cost of training to slow sales of the max so they tried to make it invisible. The thing is there were procedures in place for uncommanded trim incidents which is why some max augured and some did not. The crews that panicked vs. the ones that did not.

Your pretty spot on here re the Ethiopian crash. On the 737, there's a trim wheel by both pilot's inboard knee that is connected to the stabilizer trim. It's the manual trim wheel. The problem is, you've got to crank your ass off (about 20-30 rotations for 1 unit) and you can't have an air load to turn it, meaning you have to release back pressure on the yoke to get it to turn. I don't remember whether they thought it wasn't working (not rotating long enough) or not unloading the airplane (wouldn't turn). But they abandoned the manual system and turned the electric trim back on, where the MCAS finished running full to the stop.

As far as the speculation on the cause, quite honestly it's hard to say at this point. I will say, manufacturers, airlines, government agencies..all love dead pilots. They can chalk it up to pilot error and move on. It gets real expensive if it was a failure of design or maintenance.

Oh, and before anyone asks, I have 4 years (about 3000 hours) on the 737-7,8,9 and over 20 years flying one version of Boeing or another professionally.
 
Don't think anyone is claiming the training for the mcas system was adequate. The testing was also questionable. Boeing did not want increased cost of training to slow sales of the max so they tried to make it invisible. The thing is there were procedures in place for uncommanded trim incidents which is why some max augured and some did not. The crews that panicked vs. the ones that did not.
You know how I know you didn't read the report?

I know we don't trust the government but I trust you guys accounts of actions taken on another continent even less.
 
You know how I know you didn't read the report?

I know we don't trust the government but I trust you guys accounts of actions taken on another continent even less.
Not sure what you are inferring. Please spell out where I am incorrect in what I said.
 
One of my favorite shows is Air Disasters on Smithsonian channel. The shit they reveal would make most people stop flying.
Remember Air France 447 that "disappeared in the Atlantic? Read this if you dare. And this was Air France a first world airline.

will read it now but a synopsis?

edit, won't let me read it
 
Synopsis is Captain went on break and let the 2 co-pilots for the flight take over. The pitot tube iced up and they were getting bad airspeed readings. The most junior guy was PIC. He put the plane in a stall and then held the stick full back while they dropped like a rock. Captain finally comes back to the cockpit and asks wtf? Copilot says we lost control and can't figure out why. Mean while the poor plane has been screaming stall stall stall which they ignored. Copilot says I don't know why we are losing altitude I've holding the stick back all this time. Captain is like FFUUUUCCCCKKKKKKKK but too late whammmo.
 
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Synopsis is Captain went on break and let the 2 co-pilots for the flight take over. The pitot tube iced up and they were getting bad airspeed readings. The most junior guy was PIC. He put the plane in a stall and then held the stick full back while they dropped like a rock. Captain finally comes back to the cockpit and asks wtf? Copilot says we lost control and can't figure out why. Mean while the poor plane has been screaming stall stall stall which they ignored. Copilot says I don't know why we are losing altitude I've holding the stick back all this time. Captain is like FFUUUUCCCCKKKKKKKK but too late whammmo.
wow
 
I'm not experienced in this stuff but I've NEVER seen a plane nose dive straight down like that unless it was in a movie which would be unbelievable as well.
Value jet did it in Ft Lauderdale. Straight down into the everglades.
 
The pilots did not "Panic"
Its pretty obvious they didn’t react properly to an uncommanded nose down.
Failure to put and leave the stab trim cutout, in the cut out position. Is one.

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The airline companies cut corners to. They cheaped out and did not purchase a system boeing offered to alert of an AOA sensor disagreement. If the option is installed. Which neither lion or Ethiopian air purchased.

In the case of lion, failure on the airline/maintenance to fix a problem reported on a previous flight, where again a pilot made the correct decision and arrived safely at their destination.

When all of this happened one of my neighbors who is a career pilot at a US based airline was in trouble with the company for repeatedly grounding aircraft because they had problems and was refusing to fly. Airlines would push pilots to fly because they didn’t want to lose money or go behind schedule, according to him.

There were multiple things in these cases that could have prevented these accidents. I personally feel trying to crucify Boeing is the wrong course of action. But they are the company with deep pockets and Congress is full of bloodsucking lawyers. 2.5 Billion dollar settlement, coming from the same people that sold you Covid, Trump being a Russian spy and Joe Biden not guilty of quid pro quo....

While obviously this is a tragedy. I think boeing was unjustly crucified by media and congress critters to sway opinions and burn boeing. When there are many factors that caused these crashes
 
Did you even read the same report?

Both AOA indicators were installed but they never displayed the "Disagree" message as they were supposed to. (Finding #13).

Read page 14--phase 4 where they had the stab cutout as you describe. After 3 minutes, flight had stablized, they put them back in and MCAS activated again and crashed the plane 30s later.

If the pilots screwed up--where is it in the report? This is straight Boeing corporate line blaming the pilots before they got caught with their pants down.

Its like some of you have Boeing stock...

Having been through some nasty RCA's myself Boeing earned its crucifixion. Any program manager/engineer worth his/her salt can see that 1000 miles away. An untested major safety system as a single point of failure and no prior notice to operators.
 
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I thought AA was the only airline that actually purchased the optional AoA Disagree comparator….at least that’s my memory from being told exactly that by a cog within APA.

If turning a system off stabilizes things… dafuq do you turn it back on for? Without SLOWING DOWN when you have a known flight control issue impacting pitch?

Boeing absolutely deserves blame for shitty engineering and insufficient FCOM/Systems information for training…but (non-extraordinary) flight crew action could have saved the aircraft.
 
Did you even read the same report?

Both AOA indicators were installed but they never displayed the "Disagree" message as they were supposed to. (Finding #13).

Read page 14--phase 4 where they had the stab cutout as you describe. After 3 minutes, flight had stablized, they put them back in and MCAS activated again and crashed the plane 30s later.

If the pilots screwed up--where is it in the report? This is straight Boeing corporate line blaming the pilots before they got caught with their pants down.

Its like some of you have Boeing stock...

Having been through some nasty RCA's myself Boeing earned its crucifixion. Any program manager/engineer worth his/her salt can see that 1000 miles away. An untested major safety system as a single point of failure and no prior notice to operators.
I don’t believe these aircraft(edit- The ones that crashed ) were equipped with an aoa disagree /“idiot” light. It was an optional purchase. Yes I read what you posted. But from the research that I’ve done that’s what I find.

Yes and they should’ve never turned the trim cut out to the on position that was pilot error!!!!

The purpose of that report was to point the finger at Boeing. I look at it from an unbiased position which I have no investment in Boeing or profiting off of a massive lawsuit which ended up being a $2.5 billion settlement. It is in my personal opinion I’ve drawn from talking to four different airline pilots that I know personally and all the research that I’ve done online.
 
So they claim to have recovered the other recorder.

I can't help but wonder why we never heard anything about the first. It's been several days. If it's beyond recovery, then say so.
 
Dan Gryder has the same opinion as me. Suicide. They've had the recorders long enough now.
 
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