Latest activity
Kahles vz ZCO
- By Gil P.
- Observation & Sighting Devices
- 175 Replies
Really? What day? I live in Vegas and I wouldn't mind checking out a ZCO.I'm sorry you feel that way, I'll be at some matches in Vegas with the Sin City Precision guys and some matches in the Reno area.
Come introduce yourself and we can chat in person
Richard
Maggie’s Funny & awesome pics, vids and memes thread (work safe, no nudity)
- By EddieNFL
- The Bear Pit
- 109811 Replies
Rides a bike when he’s not on the water.
XM7 worries from the field.
- By LRRPF52
- Semi-Automatic Rifles
- 126 Replies
I think the real takeaway of all of this can be summed up by looking how we would handle it in the private sector.
If a company failed to make a successful product that answered end-user needs dating back to the 1950s, they would go out of business. Only artificial influence could keep them afloat.
This is the story of US Army small arms. They got the .276 Pedersen Garand right already by 1930, but were later overridden by CoS McAurthur in sticking with the heavier .30 caliber cartridge, maybe due to budget constraints on the Army caused by the Great Depression. This was a missed opportunity with cascading effects we are still suffering from today. Look at this beauty, with its 10rd en block clip, relatively lightweight, low-recoiling, hard-hitting performance.
The conventional US Army failed to oversee the development of a successful service rifle or machine-gun ever since. The only successful service rifles and machine-guns were driven by the USAF and foreign nations. The M-1 Carbine was an exception that was developed for combat support and support troops due to the excessive weight of the .30 cal M1 Garand.
The M14 and M60 were failures for different reasons. The M14 production of receivers wasn’t held to a common TDP and there were all sorts of problems with initial production. It was conceptually a failure from the start for using a heavy cartridge, resulting in a heavy rifle with limited basic load. The idea that it could replace the M1 & M2 Carbines was fundamentally unsound, which really screwed over many combat arms, combat support, and support personnel basic weapon issue to either an M14 or M1911, with a few M3A1 Grease Guns remaining for Tankers.
The M60 was a hybrid between the German FG42 paratroop rifle with its half-bullpup layout, but fed from a sheet metal MG42 feed tray and feed tray cover assemblies instead of the side-feeding magazine of the FG42. Great for compactness and ergonomics (one of my favorite machine-guns in that regard), but a malf-o-matic that was hard to keep running. It took us decades to finally replace it with a MAG58 rebranded as M240.
The AR-15 was pushed by General Curtis LeMay within weeks of Army Ordnance Board declaring it totally unsuited for Infantry use. Initial orders were for USAF, then expanded to SOF in US Army, US Navy, and British SAS. Big Army begrudgingly went along with it as a stop-gap for their SPIW, seeing only a short-term future for the AR-15 until they could manifest their super engineer albatross weapon system that was doomed from the start.
The FN Minimi that won the 2nd SAW competition of the 1970s was of course a Belgian combination of the AK and MAG58. US Army found a way to make it heavier initially with the gay mag-feed option, then more ways to make it even heavier than the E1 when they did the M249E2 with its heavier stock and heat shield. The earlier SAW trials are another example of a missed opportunity to continue the development of an intermediate cartridge, namely the 6x45 SAW.
XM177E2, Colt 653, 723, 727, XM4, and M4 development was really carried along by organizations other than big Army.
So to me, we’re shooting ourselves in the foot when looking to the conventional Army when it comes to small arms development. They haven’t shown much care or investment in small arms programs from an end-user perspective that makes any sense. They have constantly placed people over these programs who are simply out-of-touch with soldiers and their needs. PEO Soldier engineers literally told us that they purposely engineer 85% solutions because they have to think about job security. Therefore, equipment is built to fail or not meet what soldiers are actually asking for, so they can come back with V2.0, 3.0, etc.
But we do have organizations that know exactly how to solicit, down-select, work with contractors, help develop, and see through production of small arms that are so successful, that not only do they out-perform big Army designs and get adopted in larger scale within the US than anticipated, they also get adopted by coalition partner forces who reject their own service rifles (SAS using AR-15s instead of SA-80s for example, Aussie SAS using AR-15s instead of F88 AUGs, Canada ditching the commonwealth SLRs for C7s and C8s, etc.). This was already true by the early 1980s once Canada came on board with C7. Other Commonwealth nations’ SOF were using AR-15s since the 1960s.
When you look at JSOC input into the AR-15 design and its accessories since the late 1970s (early own-the-night configurations), they have really been the pace-setter for small arms development in not only the US and NATO, but the world.
So if we are to be successful, we should cut off the retards and reward the golden children. We can do it for a fraction of the budget as well. There are plenty of other major defense systems that have actual money behind them. Trying to make a small arms program cost what aerospace does is retarded, especially with the insane price of 6.8x51 ammunition.
We gave the Army a Century to cover down on what should be its domain in small arms development, and it has failed as a rule, so it’s time to cut our losses and assign small arms development elsewhere. Most of the work is already done.
If a company failed to make a successful product that answered end-user needs dating back to the 1950s, they would go out of business. Only artificial influence could keep them afloat.
This is the story of US Army small arms. They got the .276 Pedersen Garand right already by 1930, but were later overridden by CoS McAurthur in sticking with the heavier .30 caliber cartridge, maybe due to budget constraints on the Army caused by the Great Depression. This was a missed opportunity with cascading effects we are still suffering from today. Look at this beauty, with its 10rd en block clip, relatively lightweight, low-recoiling, hard-hitting performance.
The conventional US Army failed to oversee the development of a successful service rifle or machine-gun ever since. The only successful service rifles and machine-guns were driven by the USAF and foreign nations. The M-1 Carbine was an exception that was developed for combat support and support troops due to the excessive weight of the .30 cal M1 Garand.
The M14 and M60 were failures for different reasons. The M14 production of receivers wasn’t held to a common TDP and there were all sorts of problems with initial production. It was conceptually a failure from the start for using a heavy cartridge, resulting in a heavy rifle with limited basic load. The idea that it could replace the M1 & M2 Carbines was fundamentally unsound, which really screwed over many combat arms, combat support, and support personnel basic weapon issue to either an M14 or M1911, with a few M3A1 Grease Guns remaining for Tankers.
The M60 was a hybrid between the German FG42 paratroop rifle with its half-bullpup layout, but fed from a sheet metal MG42 feed tray and feed tray cover assemblies instead of the side-feeding magazine of the FG42. Great for compactness and ergonomics (one of my favorite machine-guns in that regard), but a malf-o-matic that was hard to keep running. It took us decades to finally replace it with a MAG58 rebranded as M240.
The AR-15 was pushed by General Curtis LeMay within weeks of Army Ordnance Board declaring it totally unsuited for Infantry use. Initial orders were for USAF, then expanded to SOF in US Army, US Navy, and British SAS. Big Army begrudgingly went along with it as a stop-gap for their SPIW, seeing only a short-term future for the AR-15 until they could manifest their super engineer albatross weapon system that was doomed from the start.
The FN Minimi that won the 2nd SAW competition of the 1970s was of course a Belgian combination of the AK and MAG58. US Army found a way to make it heavier initially with the gay mag-feed option, then more ways to make it even heavier than the E1 when they did the M249E2 with its heavier stock and heat shield. The earlier SAW trials are another example of a missed opportunity to continue the development of an intermediate cartridge, namely the 6x45 SAW.
XM177E2, Colt 653, 723, 727, XM4, and M4 development was really carried along by organizations other than big Army.
So to me, we’re shooting ourselves in the foot when looking to the conventional Army when it comes to small arms development. They haven’t shown much care or investment in small arms programs from an end-user perspective that makes any sense. They have constantly placed people over these programs who are simply out-of-touch with soldiers and their needs. PEO Soldier engineers literally told us that they purposely engineer 85% solutions because they have to think about job security. Therefore, equipment is built to fail or not meet what soldiers are actually asking for, so they can come back with V2.0, 3.0, etc.
But we do have organizations that know exactly how to solicit, down-select, work with contractors, help develop, and see through production of small arms that are so successful, that not only do they out-perform big Army designs and get adopted in larger scale within the US than anticipated, they also get adopted by coalition partner forces who reject their own service rifles (SAS using AR-15s instead of SA-80s for example, Aussie SAS using AR-15s instead of F88 AUGs, Canada ditching the commonwealth SLRs for C7s and C8s, etc.). This was already true by the early 1980s once Canada came on board with C7. Other Commonwealth nations’ SOF were using AR-15s since the 1960s.
When you look at JSOC input into the AR-15 design and its accessories since the late 1970s (early own-the-night configurations), they have really been the pace-setter for small arms development in not only the US and NATO, but the world.
So if we are to be successful, we should cut off the retards and reward the golden children. We can do it for a fraction of the budget as well. There are plenty of other major defense systems that have actual money behind them. Trying to make a small arms program cost what aerospace does is retarded, especially with the insane price of 6.8x51 ammunition.
We gave the Army a Century to cover down on what should be its domain in small arms development, and it has failed as a rule, so it’s time to cut our losses and assign small arms development elsewhere. Most of the work is already done.
Finding a wife
- By BCP
- The Bear Pit
- 969 Replies
And a few years ago i found an old encyclopedia from around the same era, in it on the section about a wife, it said something along the lines of “if a wife is want to complain about her situation in life, she has no better recourse than to improve her manners.”
I tore the page out and gave it to my wife. We both got a good laugh from that.
I mean it's not wrong, if a guy sat around complaining people would tell him to get off his ass and fix his shit.
Maggie’s Motivational Pic Thread v2.0 - - New Rules - See Post #1
- By lash
- The Bear Pit
- 302462 Replies
45K views · 951 reactions | I have several questions but first. IM OLE GREGGGGGGGGGG | By Tacofficial | Facebook
I have several questions but first. IM OLE GREGGGGGGGGGGwww.facebook.com
